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I. INTRODUCTION
Few laws have failed so completely as the federal and state
statutes designed to create new facilities for the disposal of hazard-
ous and radioactive waste. Despite scores of siting attempts1 and
the expenditure of several billion dollars since the mid-1970s,
2
1. See generally NEw YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE COMM'N ON Toxmc SUBSTANCES &
HAZARDOUS WASTES, HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING: A NATIONAL SURVEY 1-2 (1987)
[hereinafter HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING] (reporting on a national survey of states'
processes for hazardous waste facility siting); William Lyons et al., Public Opinion and Haz-
ardous Waste, F. FOR APPLIED REs. & PUB. PoL'Y, Fall 1987, at 89, 90 (reporting that 32
siting attempts were made nationwide between 1979 and September 1984).
2. The federal government has spent $1.26 billion on the effort to site a repository for
high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Projected HLW Program Budget
Down by $200 Million, RADIOACTrIVE EXCHANGE, Nov. 16, 1992, at 14, $1.3 billion on the
Waste Isolation Pilot Project for transuranic waste in New Mexico, Keith Schneider, Wasting
Away, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 42, 43, and more than $100 million on
its effort (abandoned in 1971) to site a high-level radioactive waste repository in Lyons, Kan-
sas, id. at 56. Illinois spent $85 million in an abortive effort to site a low-level radioactive
waste (LLRW) facility in Martinsville, Illinois. Conference Notes, RADIOACTIVE EXCHANGE,
Dec. 14, 1992, at 14, 15. New York State has spent $37 million trying to site an LLRW
facility. Herbert Inhaber, Of NIMBYs, LULUs, and NIMTOOs, 107 PUB. INTEREST 52, 62
(1992). California, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania have each spent about $30 million trying to
site LLRW facilities, and North Carolina has spent $45 million. Jorge Contreras, In the Vil-
lage Square: Risk Misperception and Decisionmaking in the Regulation of Low-Level Radio-
active Waste, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 481, 528 (1992). As reported by an official of a large
chemical manufacturing company, the typical cost of obtaining federal and state permits for
hazardous waste facilities is $3 million. U.S. GENERAL ACCrG. OFFICE (GAO), PUB. No.
GAO/RCED-88-95, HAZARDOUS WASTE: FUTURE AVAILABILITY OF AND NEED FOR TREAT-
MENT CAPACITY ARE UNCERTAIN 22 (1988). However, some attempts have been much more
expensive. For example, CECOS International spent at least $7 million in a failed attempt to
expand a hazardous waste facility in Niagara Falls, New York. Paul MacClennan, The Stakes
Are High in the CECOS Hearings, BUFFALO NEws, Sept. 18, 1988, at H16. Clean Harbors of
Braintree, Inc. spent $16 million on its unsuccessful effort to site a hazardous waste incinerator
in Massachusetts. DENIS J. BRION, ESSENTIAL INDUSTRY AND THE NIMBY PHENOMENON 13-
14 (1991). In Canada, one ongoing permitting proceeding has already cost approximately
$100 million. Mary Lou Garr, Ontario Waste Management Corporation (OWMC) Proposal
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only one radioactive waste disposal facility,3 only one hazardous
waste landfill (in the aptly named Last Chance, Colorado),4 and
merely a handful of hazardous waste treatment and incineration
units5 are operating on new sites in the United States today.
In 1981, a leading member of Congress, relying on data from
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), predicted that
by 1985 the country would need between 50 and 125 new off-site
hazardous waste disposal facilities.6 Numerous legal commenta-
tors also stressed that many more facilities were desperately
needed if the nation was to avert an environmental crisis. 7 These
for an Industrial Hazardous Waste Treatment and Disposal Facility, in INNOVATIVE
APPROACHES TO THE SITING OF WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES: A GUIDE TO NONCON-
FRONTATIONAL SITING PROCEDURES 95, 105 (Resources Futures Int'l ed., 1992) [hereinafter
INNOVATIVE APPROACHES].
3. See infra text accompanying note 296.
4. Hunt v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1372-73 (Ala. 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
5. HAz RDOUs WASTE FACILITY SITING, supra note 1, at 33; Commercial Hazardous
Waste Management: Recent Financial Performance and Outlook for the Future, HAZARDOUS
WASTE CONSULTANT, Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 4-1; see also John A.S. McGlennon, A Model Siting
Process and the Role of Lawyers, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,239 (1985) (reporting
that no new facilities were sited in the United States between 1976 and 1981); Mario Ris-
toratore, Siting Toxic Waste Disposal Facilities in Canada and the United States: Problems
and Prospects, 14 POL'Y STUD. J. 140 (1985) (reporting that no new facilities were sited in the
United States between 1979 and 1985).
6. Lawrence S. Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous
Waste Facilities: The Massachussetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENVTh. L. REv. 265, 266 n.9 (1992)
(citing Hazardous Waste: Public Must Accept Risk in Siting New Waste Facilities, Conference
Told, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 314 (July 3, 1981) (remarks of Rep. James J. Florio));
see also 132 CONG. REC. S14,924 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Chafee) ("A
critical step in the implementation of a rational, safe hazardous waste program is the creation
of new [hazardous waste disposal] facilities."); DANIEL MAZMANIAN & DAVID MoREL,
BEYOND SUPERFAILURE: AMERICA'S TOXIC POLICY FOR THE 1990s at 95-96 (1992) (reporting
the conclusion of the National Conference of State Legislatures survey in early 1980s that at
least 125 new hazardous waste management facilities were needed).
7. See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 6, at 266 n.9 (noting that the EPA projects major
shortfall in disposal capacity); Susan Caskey, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Siting of
Hazardous Waste Facilities: The Pennsylvania Proposal in Light of the Wisconsin and Mas-
sachusetts Statutes, 5 TEMP. ENvrL. L. & TECH. J. 58, 58 (1986) ("Few people who are well
informed on the subject of hazardous waste generation and disposal will deny that there is an
urgent need, throughout the United States, for the establishment of safe and efficient waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities."); Kenneth A. DiMuzio, The Siting and Operation of
Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities, in CURRENT MUNICIPAL PROBLEMS 506, 506-07 (Byron
S. Matthews ed., 1982) ("The most serious political and moral problem facing New Jersey
today is the safe disposal of hazardous wastes."); Daniel Mazmanian & David Morell, The
"NIMBY" Syndrome: Facility Siting and the Failure of Democratic Discourse, in ENVIRON-
MENrAL POLICY IN THE 1990s at 125, 126 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990)
("One of the most important questions of the 1990s is how to move beyond the current
gridlock created by NIMBYism.... A workable answer is central to realizing the nation's
environmental goals."); Stephen Sussna, Remedying Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Mala-
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facilities have not been built, yet no such crisis exists. The
shortage of disposal facilities is actually far less severe and more
localized than is usually portrayed. Its principal adverse environ-
mental impact is that old, substandard, leaking disposal units stay
open because there are no replacements.8 But there is a genuine
political crisis-hundreds of battles have raged around the country,
some dethroning elected officials, 9 and some verging on vio-
lencea0 -over the efforts of the federal and state governments to
force hated facilities on terrified communities.
In this Article, I propose an approach to resolve the impasse
in siting disposal facilities for hazardous wastes (HWs) and radio-
active wastes (RWs). In doing so, I argue that the siting laws are
based on a fundamental conceptual error, as well as several factual
mistakes and policy blunders.
The conceptual error stems from the way the siting question is
posed, which is usually framed as how to find the best locations for
new facilities to dispose of HW/RW." But the fulfillment of this
dies by Considering Zoning and Other Devices, 16 URB. L. 29, 32 (1984) (observing that
"there is a desperate need for soundly designed treatment and disposal facilities").
8. See infra part HI.C.
9. E.g., Robert D. Benford et al., In Whose Backyard? Concern About Siting a Nuclear
Waste Facility, 63 Soc. INQuIRY 30, 31 (1993) (noting that in the Nebraska gubernatorial race,
the incumbent was replaced by a candidate who opposed locating a low-level radioactive
waste facility in the state); Howard Kunreuther et al., Public Attitudes Toward Siting a High-
Level Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 469, 469 (1990) (noting that
Richard Bryan defeated incumbent Senator Chic Hecht of Nevada for Hecht's seat in the U.S.
Senate in 1988 largely as a result of Hecht's allegedly equivocal stand on the siting of a high-
level radioactive waste repository in that state).
10. See MARY R. ENGLISH, SrriNG Low-LEVL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL FACILI-
TIEs: THE PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMA 90 (1992) (reporting threats of violence by opponents of
radioactive waste facility in New York State in 1990); DAVID MORELL & CHRISTOPHER
MAGORIAN, SrrINo HAzARDous WASTE FACILTES: LOCAL OPPOSTON AND THE MYM OF
PREEMPTION 96-97 (1982) (citing other examples such as vandalism and other destructions of
property); William L. Andreen, Defusing the "Not in My Back Yard" Syndrome: An Approach
to Federal Preemption of State and Local Impediments to the Siting of PCB Disposal Facili-
ties, 63 N.C. L. Ray. 811, 813 n.8 (1985) (noting that 523 persons were arrested for attempting
to block trucks loaded with PCB-contaminated soil from entering a disposal facility in Warren
County, North Carolina); E. William Colglazier & Mary R. English, Low-Level Radioactive
Waste: Can New Disposal Sites Be Found?, 53 TENN. L. REV. 621, 631 (1986) (recalling
several cases of suspected arson and sabotage to vehicles of a company that was attempting to
build a radioactive waste facility in Texas in 1978); Hazardous Waste: More than 100
Arrested in Protests Against Start-Up of Ohio Incinerator, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at
1910 (Nov. 27, 1992); Robert W. Lake, Rethinking NIMBY, 59 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 87, 87
(1993) (observing that protestors in Minnesota reportedly dropped explosives into test wells to
disrupt the search for a hazardous waste disposal site).
11. E.g., MICHAEL O'HARE ET AL., FACILITY SrrNG AND PUBLIC OPPOSrON 4 (1983);
George F. List et al., Modeling and Analysis for Hazardous Materials Transportation: Risk
Analysis, Routing/Scheduling and Facility Location, 25 TRANSp. ScL 100, 107 (1991); A. Dan
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task through government power over land use in effect subsidizes
the disposal, and hence encourages the creation, of HIW/RW by
aggressively ignoring negative externalities and distorting the eco-
nomics of production. Instead, the task should be posed as how to
find the system of HW/RW management that maximizes social
welfare, takes full account of social and environmental costs, and
still achieves fairness. Viewing the problem this way leads to mar-
ket solutions that reduce the generation of HW/RW rather than
encouraging waste production which results in disposal
nightmares.
The most important factual mistakes are the following wide-
spread (and erroneous) assumptions:
1. A shortage of disposal facilities increases illegal dumping
(when in fact illegal dumping has little to do with disposal capac-
ity, and can be addressed through targeted enforcement);12
2. States will cooperate with siting efforts, while willing local
communities cannot be found (although the opposite is more often
true); 13 and
3. Monetary compensation can gain acceptance of HW/RW
facilities in places that do not want them (although the evidence is
that this seldom works). 4
Three policy blunders also have helped doom siting efforts.
The first is separate regulation of all the different kinds of hazard-
ous and radioactive waste streams, thereby dividing the states into
victims (those with disposal facilities) and free riders (those with-
out) for each waste stream and inhibiting regional cooperation.
The second policy blunder is insistence on technically perfect sites.
Because such sites do not exist, old facilities remain open in some
of the worst possible locations. The third blunder is the allowing
of higher levels of government to preempt the authority of lower
levels in imposing sites on unwilling communities-a method that
not only always fails but is wildly counterproductive.'
5
Tarlock, Anywhere But Here: An Introduction to State Control of Hazardous-Waste Facility
Location, 2 J. ENvmL. L. 1, 21 (1981).
12. See infra part IV.C.2.
13. See infra part V.A.4.
14. See infra part V.A.1.
15. Addressing these problems requires delving into the literatures of law, economics,
sociology, political science, psychology, and several of the physical sciences. I also have
drawn heavily on my 16 years of experience litigating siting controversies on behalf of both
facility opponents and applicants. I should disclose here that, primarily on behalf of several
municipalities in New York and Connecticut, I have litigated against several companies named
in this Article: Browning Ferris Industries, Inc. and its subsidiary CECOS International, Inc;
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This Article is divided into five substantive parts. Part II lays
out the foundation by arraying the different kinds of hazardous and
radioactive wastes and describing the generation and disposal of
each kind. Part III explains how past and present siting decisions
have been made under federal and state laws and how old substan-
dard facilities remain open under grandfather clauses. Part IV con-
siders the effects of the current mechanisms for making siting
decisions. It analyzes whether new HW/RW facilities are really
"needed"; shows the irrelevance of illegal dumping to the question
of need; assesses the fairness of the current system for various
regions, economic classes, races, and generations; and erects a
framework that strives to explain why certain facilities are so vehe-
mently opposed, but others are accepted. Some of the hidden eco-
nomics and psychology of the siting process are explored here.
Although facility opposition is often trivialized with acronyms like
NIMBY ("Not In My Backyard"), 16 LULU ("Locally Undesirable
Land Use"), 17 or BANANA ("Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere
Near Anything"), 18 this section will show how even new, "state-of-
the-art" facilities pose real environmental hazards.
Part V discusses the prior proposals for addressing the siting
dilemma. These proposals are divided into those based on efforts
to achieve the consent of local communities to new sites; those that
rely on governmental coercion; and those that seek to avoid the
problem by minimizing waste production, exporting the waste to
other jurisdictions, or avoiding the problem by reducing it to legal
or linguistic nonexistence. This section also examines the frequent
failures and rare successes of experiments with each of these
proposals.
Finally, Part VI proposes a new alternative drawn from the
many lessons of past siting attempts. The proposal is based on
concepts of local control, state responsibility and national alloca-
tion. Under this scheme, all of the different types of hazardous and
radioactive waste streams would be considered together, thereby
eliminating much unnecessary regional conflict. The federal gov-
Occidental Chemical Corp.; and Waste Management, Inc. and its subsidiaries Chemical Waste
Management, Inc., CWM Chemical Services, Inc., Chem-Nuclear Services, and Wheelabrator
Technologies, Inc.
16. E.g., Greenberg v. Veteran, 889 F.2d 418, 419 (2d Cir. 1989); DENIs J. BRION,
ESSENTIAL INDUSTRY AND THE NIMBY PHENOMENON (1991).
17. See, e.g., Frank J. Popper, The Environmentalist and the LULU, in REsOLVING
LOCATIONAL CoNFLIcT 1, 1-13 (Robert W. Lake ed., 1987).
18. Public Opposition to Incinerating Waste Could Seriously Impede Cleanups, Officials
Say, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 2028 (Dec. 11, 1992).
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ernment would determine overall national disposal needs and allo-
cate the burdens among the fifty states. The states would then ask
communities to volunteer to host facilities-a method that, experi-
ence surprisingly shows, can attract numerous offers. The federal
government would also make available the multitude of highly,
and possibly permanently, contaminated sites that were used for
military purposes and nuclear weapons production but have now
been rendered obsolete by the end of the Cold War. Part VI also
measures this proposed alternative against the criteria used in Part
IV to assess existing siting mechanisms.
II. THE ORIGINS AND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS AND
RADIOACTIVE WASTES
This section reviews the different types of waste streams that
are regulated under the HW/RW laws. For each type, the origins,
quantities, regulation, and applicable disposal techniques are dis-
cussed. In an effort to devise a comprehensive approach, I have
included here several types of wastes that are not conventionally
discussed in this context but nevertheless form an important part of
the overall disposal picture.
As will become clear, domestic and international politics and
economics are as important as chemistry and physics in defining
what substances are closely regulated.
A. Nonradioactive Wastes
1. RCRA-Regulated Hazardous Wastes
The transportation, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste
are regulated primarily by the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA),'9 although other federal statutes govern particular
disposal methods. 20 RCRA defines "hazardous waste" with gen-
eral references to threats to health or the environment.21 The stat-
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
20. The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3 (1988), controls aspects of under-
ground injection wells. The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992), controls the disposal of hazardous waste through publicly owned treatment works.
Disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) is regulated under the Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1988). Ocean disposal of hazardous waste was governed by the
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1414b (1988 & Supp. IV 1992),
and was banned as of December 31, 1991, id. § 1414b(a)(1)(B). The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), regulates the release of toxics into the air.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988).
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ute also establishes an intricate system for the EPA to list the
chemicals or types of chemicals that fit within this definition.22
The chemical industry generates 88% of all the HW in the
United States. 3 Industries involved in producing primary and
fabricated metals and the petroleum refining industry rank just
behind the chemical industry in HW generation.24 A small number
of sites account for most of the HW. Just 1% of all generators
create 97% of the HW,25 and three plants-operated by DuPont,
Dow Chemical, and Eastman Kodak-generate 57% of all HW
nationwide.26
Despite considerable uncertainty,27 most estimates of RCRA
hazardous waste generated by the civilian sector during the 1980s
are around 250 million tons per year, which is the equivalent of
just under one ton for every person in the United States.2 8 This
figure greatly overstates the burden on disposal facilities, because
about 96% of this waste is disposed of at the point of generation;29
the great bulk of it is water mixed with wastes that are treated and
then released into rivers, lakes, and oceans.30 Some of this 96% is
injected underground, and some is burned in 154 on-site "captive"
22. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1988). A large body of judicial and regulatory authority has
arisen around this system of definitions. For information on judicial and regulatory definitions
of hazardous waste, see generally JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG, HAZARDOUS WASTE LAW AND
PRACnCE (1989); David R. Case, Identifying Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Wastes, in
3 ENViR mENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE 26-1, 26-5 to 26-21 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1992);
see also infra text accompanying notes 100-24.
23. OFFIcE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, PuB. No. 05-312,
NATIONAL BIENNIAL RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT 2 (1993) (using 1989 data).
24. OFFcE OF Toxic SUBSTANCES, U.S. EPA, THE Toxics RELEASE INVENTORY: A
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, 1987, at 226 (1989).
25. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, supra note 23, at 1.
26. Il at 2-14.
27. Review of EPA's Capacity Assurance Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Env't, Energy, and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 102d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 9 (1991) [hereinafter Capacity Assurance Program] (statement of Eleanor Chelim-
sky, Assistant Comptroller General); U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/PEMD-90-3, HAZARDOUS
WASTE: EPA's GENERATION AND MANAGEMENT DATA NEED FURTHER IMPROVEMENT (1990).
28. JAMEs E. McCARTHY & MARK E.A. REIsCH, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: HAZARD-
OUS WASTE FACT BOOK at CRS-6 to CRS-7 (1987); see also Capacity Assurance Program,
supra note 27, at 187 (statement of Sylvia K. Lowrance, Director, Office of Solid Waste &
Emergency Response, EPA). The reasons for varying estimates are discussed in OFFICE OF
TECH. ASsESSMENT, U.S. CONG., PUB. No. OTA-0-313, OCEAN INCINERATION: ITS ROLE IN
MANAGING HAZARDOUS WASTE 63-66 (1986); John L. Warren, Potential for Waste Reduction,
in HAZARDOUS WASTE MINIMIZATION 15, 17-18 (Harry Freeman ed., 1990).
29. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, supra note 23, at 4.
30. Il at 4; Doug MacMillan, Interstate Movement of Hazardous Waste, WASTE AGE,
May 1993, at 29, 32.
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hazardous waste incinerators. 31 The remaining RCRA hazardous
waste, approximately 4%, is mostly solid and is sent to a variety of
privately owned, off-site hazardous waste landfills, incinerators,
and treatment facilities.32 Landfills get 26.4% of the HW disposed
off-site and incinerators get 4.5%.33
The commercial, off-site hazardous waste facilities now oper-
ating in the United States consist of 103 chemical treatment plants,
95 solvent recovery plants, 60 physical treatment plants, 30 kilns
that burn hazardous waste as fuel, 24 landfills, 20 incinerators, and
8 deep injection wells.34 These 24 landfills and 20 incinerators,
and the efforts to increase their number, are at the vortex of the
current controversy over hazardous waste facility siting; there is
ample excess capacity at the other types of facilities, although
some regional shortfalls and deficits in some specialized forms of
treatment may exist.
35
New laws that discourage the landfifing of untreated hazard-
ous wastes36 increase the demand for incineration capacity.
37
Other factors, such as waste reduction and on-site treatment,
31. William Gruber, Hazardous Waste Incineration: 1990, El DIGEST, Apr. 1990, at 7,
11-15. This number includes 15 incinerators owned and operated by the Army or the Navy,
which are used mostly to destroy expired small caliber ammunition. Id. at 11.
32. Joan Z. Bernstein, The Siting of Commercial Waste Facilities: An Evolution of
Community Land Use Decisions, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 85-86 (1991).
33. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, supra note 23, at 2-46.
34. McCoy & Assocs., Inc., Special Feature: 1993 Outlook for Commercial Hazardous
Waste Management Facilities: A Nationwide Perspective, HAZARDOUS WASTE CONSULTANT,
Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 4.1; Number of Hazardous Waste Facilities Drops, Many Companies
Expanding Services Article Says, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 2634 (Feb. 5, 1993); see
also Report Says 11 States Are Lacking Hazardous Waste Facilities, WORLD WASTES, May
1992, at 60, 60.
35. McCARTHY & REISCH, supra note 28, at CRS-30 to CRS-31. During the 1980s at
least four hazardous waste facilities received final RCRA permits but failed to open because of
insufficient markets. HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING, supra note 1, at 26. Two states,
Kentucky and Georgia, have abandoned efforts to site hazardous waste disposal facilities when
they concluded that there was too little demand for such facilities. See Mary English & Gary
A. Davis, American Siting Initiatives: Recent State Developments, in AMERiCA'S FrruRE N
Toxic WASTE MANAGEMENT 279, 280-81 (Bruce W. Piasecki & Gary A. Davis eds., 1987)
[hereinafter AMERICA'S FUTURE] (concerning Kentucky); Hazardous Waste Authority Finds
No Need for State-Sponsored Management Facility, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1923
(Nov. 27, 1992) (concerning Georgia). But see Hazardous Waste: Treatment Capacity
Shortage Leads EPA to Extend Variance for Hazardous Debris, 24-Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 3,
at 134 (May 21, 1993) (reporting that the EPA on May 14, 1993 extended variance for hazard-
ous debris as a result of treatment capacity shortage).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d) (1988) (prohibiting certain land disposals of specified
waste; known as the "Land Ban").
37. OFIaCE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 28, at 74; SHARON N. GREEN, PLANNING
FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CAPACITY: LESSONS FROM THE NORTHEAST STATES 31 (1990). The
pertinent laws are discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 761-86.
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reduce the demand; the net effect is uncertain.3 8 Several new com-
mercial incinerators are now winding their way through the permit
process.39 Incineration capacity is growing faster than demand,4"
and aggregate projections show no significant capacity shortfalls.41
In 1993, a trade press report stated, "Today, there is an over-
capacity of offsite hazardous waste treatment facilities and serv-
ices, especially incineration."'42 In fact, the nation's commercial
HW incinerators were running at only about half their capacity. 43
Acknowledging this excess capacity in May 1993, the EPA
announced an eighteen-month "capacity freeze" on HW incinera-
tors while it launched a "national dialogue" on HW management.44
In the subsequent months several plans for HW incinerators were
cancelled due to lack of demand.45
38. Karin Schreifels & Lisa Nelowet, Opportunities and Dilemmas of Transportable
Hazardous Waste Management Facilities, in PROCEEDINGS, AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM,
HAzARDous MATERIALS/WAsTES: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF FACILITY PLANNING AND MANAGE-
MENT 62 (1992) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS].
39. William Gruber, Siting Efforts for Hazardous Waste Incinerators, El DIGEST, May
1990, at 18; Paul Kemezis, Among the States: Free Trade-High Court Opens the Doors for
Waste Imports, CHEMICAL WK., Aug. 19, 1992, at 50.
40. Paul Harris, Spotlight on TSD: Where Did the Business Go?, ENV'T TIMES, Oct.
1992, at 33.
41. OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, U.S. EPA, 1986-1987 SURVEY OF SELECTED FIRMS IN
THE COMMERCIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY: FINAL REPORT at iv (1988)
(concluding that commercial incineration capacity is adequate); FREDERIC M. IANNAZ23 &
CHRISTINE A. O'SHAUGHNESSY, HAZARDOUS WASTE INCINERATION, PART 2: LEADING PAR-
TICIPANTS (1991) (projecting incineration market to become increasingly competitive); Kristi
Highum, The Incineration Picture Based on the Capacity Assurance Plans, El DIGEsT, Apr.
1990, at 16, 26-28 (showing total annual capacity at commercial hazardous waste incinerators
to be over 1,000,000 tons/year, while demand is 670,000 tons/year).
42. Mary Melody, Hazwaste Treatment Services Weather Challenges, HAZMAT WORLD,
June 1993, at 30, 32; see also Ray Pospisil, Radical Change for Hazardous Waste Services,
CHEMICAL WK., Aug. 18, 1993, at 26 (noting that "incinerator overcapacity could be exacer-
bated by the debut of several new units").
43. Richard Ringer, Toxic-Waste Concern Sets Big Cutbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1993,
at D3.
44. EPA Draft Strategy for Combustion of Hazardous Waste in Incinerators and Boil-
ers; Interim Guidance on Waste Minimization for Hazardous Waste Generators, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 3, at 157 (May 21, 1993).
45. See Hazardous Waste: Colorado Firm Abandons Application to Build Waste Incin-
erator in Florida, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1174 (Oct. 22, 1992); Hazardous Waste:
Waste Company Blames North Carolina After Abandoning Bid to Build Incinerator, 24 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 909, 909-10 (Sept. 24, 1993); Hazardous Waste: Company Withdraws
Application to Build Incinerator, Cites EPA Review of Permits, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 20,
at 881 (Sept 17, 1993); Jeff Bailey, WMX Technologies Ends Plan to Build California Inciner-
ator; Demand Shrinks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1993, at C15; Elisabeth Kirschner, DuPont Drops
Incineration, But Ecoservices Still Growing, CHEMICAL WK., Sept 8, 1993, at 9.
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In 1990, a leading trade journal concluded that no national
shortage in hazardous waste landfill capacity existed.46 Since then,
landfill demand has declined sharply.47 Considering all types of
commercial hazardous waste disposal capacity, a vice president of
the largest company in the field, Waste Management, Inc., wrote in
1991, "Though some sites will shut down while others add tech-
nologies, we are close to a capacity equilibrium unless local polit-
ical restrictions limit that capacity. ' 48  In 1993, the largest HW
landfill in the country, located in Emelle, Alabama,4 9 was operat-
ing at less than half the rate it did before 1990.50 A leading finan-
cial analyst, Hugh F. Holman, wrote: "We are currently awash in
commercial land disposal capacity,"'" and he added, "[T]he busi-
ness of commercial hazardous waste management is, in many
ways, inherently self-limiting: it is a rare customer indeed that
wants to do more business with you."'5 2 Holman said that trends
for more on-site remediation, for treatment rather than disposal,
and for waste minimization will continue to erode the market for
off-site commercial disposal. 3 A few months later, Standard &
Poor's Corp. put Chemical Waste Management, Inc. on its "Credit
Watch" list because of declining waste volumes, due largely to
waste minimization and recycling. 4
In sum, most legal commentators 55 and some politicians
56
have decried a critical national shortage of hazardous waste dispo-
46. Jeffrey D. Smith, Growth Potential of the Hazardous Waste Landfill Business, EI
DIsr, Apr. 1990, at 45, 45-46.
47. Landfills: Recession Cuts Into Volumes, ENV'T TIMES, Oct. 1992, at 36; Emily S.
Plishner, Cyclicity Rears Its Ugly Head, CHEMICAL WK., Aug. 21, 1991, at 44, 44-45; Reces-
sion Shocks Hazwaste, CHEMICAL WK., Jan. 8, 1992, at 23.
48. Bernstein, supra note 32, at 86. Similar sentiments were expressed in Ross &
Assocs., FINAL REPORT-OBSERVATIONS ON CAPACITY ASSURANCE: THE WESTERN STATES'
EXPERIENCE IN IMPLEMENTING CERCLA 104(c)(9) at 3 (1990) (submitted by Western Gover-
nor's Ass'n to U.S. EPA on June 18, 1990).
49. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, supra note 23, at 2-35.
50. Paul Kemezis, Interstate Waste Transport is Still a Fair Game: New EPA Guide-
lines Bow to Mature Market, CHEMICAL WK., Aug. 18, 1993, at 30, 30.
51. ALEX. BROWN & SONS, CHEMICAL WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. AND ROLLINS ENVI-
RONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.: WHY WE RECENTLY DOWNGRADED THESE STOCKS TO "SOURCE
OF FUNDS" 17 (1993).
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id. at 15, 20; see also Haz Waste Market Growth Fueled by Remediation; Disposal
& Services Flat, ENVTL. Bus. ., June 1993, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Haz Waste Market]. A differ-
ing view is taken in FREEDONIA GROUP, COMMERCIALLY MANAGED WASTES GROW AT TWICE
THE RATE OF TOTAL GENERATION, NEW FREDONIA STUDY 1 (1993).
54. S & P Places Debt of Waste Management Firms Under Review, WALL ST. J., Sept.
7, 1993, at A5.
55. See sources cited supra note 7.
56. See sources cited supra note 6.
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sal capacity to attempt to impose facilities on unwilling communi-
ties. The waste management industry, the trade press that covers
the industry, and the financial analysts that study it, however, paint
a very different picture.
2. Civilian Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites
The explosion of public consciousness concerning hazardous
waste essentially dates to August 2, 1978, when New York State
declared the Love Canal neighborhood of the City of Niagara Falls
a public health emergency. In the 1930s and early 1940s, the
Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. had dumped 21,800 tons of
liquid hazardous waste into a large ditch. The ditch was covered
over, and a residential neighborhood and a school were later built
on top of the ditch. When residents began complaining of illness,
officials performed studies that ultimately led to the evacuation of
the entire neighborhood."
The EPA, which for some time had been advocating a new
statute to control inactive hazardous waste disposal sites, used the
massive publicity generated by the Love Canal incident to push
through Congress5 8 the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, also known as the
Superfund law).5 9 CERCLA requires the use of a hazard-ranking
system to establish the National Priorities List (NPL), which lists
the hazardous waste sites60 that pose the greatest dangers. 61 These
sites must undergo an elaborate process of investigation and
remediation. 62
The NPL now contains about 1200 sites nationwide.63 The
congressional Office of Technology Assessment has estimated that
57. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546,549 (W.D.N.Y.
1988); MICHAEL H. BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE PoIsoNING OF AMERICA BY Toxic CHEMI-
CALs 5-6, 40 (1981); ADELINE G. LEVINE, LOVE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE 7-
26, 29 (1982).
58. MARC K. LANDY LET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE
WRONG QUESTIONS 133-71 (1990).
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
60. Technically, these are hazardous substance sites, because CERCLA regulates haz-
ardous substances, a broad category which incorporates by reference all RCRA hazardous
wastes as well as several other lists of materials. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988).
62. This process is set forth in the National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1992);
see also THOMAS W. CHURCH & ROBERT T. NAKAMURA, CLEANING Up THE MESS: IMPLEMEN-
TATION STRATEGIES IN SuPERFuND 4-8 (1993).
63. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., PUB. No. OTA-ITE-433, COMING
CLEAN: SUPBRFUND'S PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED ... 6 (1989).
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the list could readily exceed 10,000. 64 Additionally, many states
have their own "mini-Superfund" lists, on which more than 19,000
sites have been placed.65 The average cost of investigating and
cleaning up these sites is roughly $30 million each.66 Cleanup
involves a broad range of possible actions, ranging from excavat-
ing the contaminated material and hauling it to a RCRA hazardous
waste landfill or incinerator, to cleaning it up in place using such
esoteric techniques as soil gas extraction or bioremediation. 67
Although the practice has now been banned, for several years
waste was simply dug up, hauled to another leaky landfill, and
dumped without further treatment; several of these receiving land-
fills later became CERCLA sites themselves. 68 NPL sites will
require the removal of about twenty-six million cubic yards of soil,
sludge, and sediment.69
3. RCRA Corrective Action Sites
All hazardous waste facilities with permits under RCRA must
undertake "corrective action" to clean up contamination on their
sites, including any that has spread beyond the facility boundary.70
This program, which is still in its infancy, is very similar to CER-
CLA's NPL program but addresses contamination at operating
facilities rather than at inactive sites. It may ultimately involve
between 1500 and 3500 sites.71 Under some estimates, the cost of
the RCRA corrective action program will grow to dwarf that of the
NPL program.
72
Comprehensive figures are hard to come by, but it appears
that, in the early 1990s, approximately eighty percent of the waste
received by off-site commercial HW landfills and incinerators was
"livestream," which means from ongoing industrial production,
with the rest coming from CERCLA, RCRA, and other remedial
projects.73
64. Id. at 11.
65. U.S. EPA, PuB. No. EPA/542/R-92/012, CLEANING UP THE NATION'S WASTE SrTs:
MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY TRENDS 7 (1993).
66. Id. at 179.
67. See infra part V.C.5.
68. Mazmanian & Morell, supra note 7, at 13, 43, 47.
69. EPA, supra note 65, at 4.
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(u), (v) (1988).
71. EPA, supra note 65, at 5.
72. MILTON RussELL Er AL., HAzARDouS WASTE REMEDIATION: THE TASK AHEAD 16
(Waste Mgmt. Research & Educ. Inst., Univ. of Tenn., 1991).




The U.S. military generates approximately 750,000 tons of
hazardous wastes annually, including such substances as paint
thinner, spilled solvents, hydraulic fuel, aviation fuel, fuel tank and
sewage sludges, and herbicides.74 The Department of Defense tra-
ditionally was lax in the use and disposal of such wastes, and
defense contractors had little incentive to be careful, because they
could charge the cost of cleaning up their own messes back to the
military.75 President Carter ordered federal facilities to comply
with federal pollution control standards in 1978,76 but not until
1992 was a statute enacted that allowed the EPA and the states to
penalize federal agencies for violating federal or state hazardous
waste laws.77 With the end of the Cold War and the retrenchment
of the military, the cleanup of former defense facilities has become
a major growth sector.78
The Department of Defense has two major cleanup programs
for domestic facilities. The Installation Restoration Program cov-
ers facilities still in use, and it has targeted 1877 installations for
cleanup at an estimated cost of $24.5 billion.79 The Formerly Used
Defense Sites Program covers 6786 former facilities, such as arse-
nals, ammunition plants, equipment manufacturing plants, depots,
bases, proving grounds, shipyards, forts, and camps; more than
half of the former facilities will likely require significant remedia-
tion at unknown cost. 0
Although housekeeping was no better at the U.S. military's
nearly 400 overseas bases, there is no integrated program to clean
74. Michael Satchell, Uncle Sam's Toxic Folly, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 27,
1989, at 20, 21.
75. Bill Richards & Andy Pasztor, Why Pollution Costs of Defense Contractors Get
Paid by Taxpayers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1992, at Al.
76. Exec. Order No. 12,088, 3 C.F.R. 243 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 note
(Supp. IV 1992).
77. Federal Facility Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992) (to be
codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
78. Katie Hickox, Swords into Bankshares: How the Defense Industry Cleans Up on the
Nuclear Build-Down, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1992, at 31, 31-32; Cheryl L. McAdams,
Targeting Closing Military Bases: The Clean Up of Hazardous Wastes on Closing Military
Bases Could Represent a Waste Management Business Bonanza, WASTE AGE, Oct. 1992, at
53.
79. U.S. DOD, DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM: ANNuAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1991, at 4, 6 (1992).
80. Id. at 10; see also SUTH SHULMAN, THE THREAT AT HOME: CorNFoNTING THE
Toxic LEGACY OF THE U.S. MILrrARY 105-06 (1992).
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them up."' After the U.S. General Accounting Office surveyed
some of these bases in 1986, the Pentagon classified the findings . 2
Various civilian federal agencies have also identified about
350 sites requiring remediation, but that number seems destined to
climb considerably.83 These include research laboratories, prisons,
power plants, properties acquired through foreclosure, and many
other facilities.84
5. Chemical Weapons8 5
Although it claims never to have used them in war, the United
States has been manufacturing and stockpiling chemical weapons
for decades.86 President Nixon halted U.S. production in 1969 in
the wake of a nerve gas leak in Utah that killed 4300 sheep. Con-
gress has insisted that most of the older chemical weapons be
destroyed by 1994,87 a deadline that has been pushed back several
times-most recently to 2004.88
In 1992, in the face of domestic protests, Congress cut off
funding for much of the incineration of these old weapons. 89 Much
of the local opposition was based on the fear that, once the chemi-
cal weapons had been destroyed, the government would use the
incinerators to destroy other defense or commercial waste.90 Con-
gress also directed the Army to explore technological alternatives
81. SHULMAN, supra note 80, at 107-08; Luis H. Francia, Bases Loaded: Pentagon
Strikes Out at Subic and Clark, VILLAGE VOICE, June 15, 1993, at 17.
82. Satchell, supra note 74, at 21.
83. See EPA, supra note 65, at 7.
84. Il at 89-90.
85. Unless otherwise noted, this subsection is based on John W. Birks, Weapons For-
sworn: Chemical and Biological Weapons, in HIDDEN DANGERS: ENVIRONMENTAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF PRaEAING FOR WAR 161 (Anne E. Ehrlich & John W. Birks eds., 1990)
[hereinafter HIDDEN DANGERS]; Vicki Kemper, Deadly Debris: How the Army Plans to Rid
the World of Chemical Weapons, COMMON CAUSE MAG., July-Aug. 1990, at 20 (examining
the Army's plan to remove chemical weapons and the organized resistance of such disposal
plans); Eugene L. Meyer, Toxic Fallout: Citizens Are Up in Arms over Plans to Incinerate the
Nation's Chemical Weapons, AUDUBON, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 16 (examining the politics sur-
rounding the disposal of chemical weapons).
86. SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: AMERICA'S HIDDEN
ARSENAL 22-41 (1968).
87. Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-145, § 1412, 99
Stat. 583, 747-49 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1521 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
88. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. 102-484, § 171,
106 Stat. 2315, 2341 (1992).
89. Paul Kemezis, Congress Kills Funds for Alabama Chemical Weapons Incinerator,
CHEMICAL WK., Oct. 14, 1992, at 14; Ronald Smothers, Plan to Destroy Toxic Weapons
Polarizes a City, N.Y. TIaS, Sept. 24, 1992, at A16; 60 Minutes: Time Bomb (CBS televi-
sion broadcast, July 19, 1992).
90. Jacki Jones, Is the Nerve Gas Burning?, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 6, 1992, at 16.
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to incineration.9' The overall program to destroy chemical weap-
ons is estimated to cost nearly $8 billion.
92
Before 1970, the federal government buried old chemical
warfare materiel at an additional seventy-five locations around the
country. Most, but not all, of these locations are on military instal-
lations. The Army is now deciding what to do about these sites.93
6. Building/Structure Remedial Wastes
Some materials that were used for many years in construction
are now recognized as hazardous. The three most prominent
examples are asbestos, lead, and polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs). A federal statute requires the inspection of all school
buildings for asbestos and the performance of abatement where
needed.94 The EPA has estimated that more than 44,000 schools
may require asbestos abatement 95 and that 300,000 to 400,000 pub-
lic and commercial buildings have asbestos that may have to be
removed,96 although no law requires such removal. An unknown
number of residential buildings are also contaminated. National
91. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484,
§ 173, 106 Stat. 2315, 2342 (1992); see also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., PUB.
No. OTA-BP-0-95, DISPOSAL OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS: ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES 1-11
(1992); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE DESTRUCrION
OF CHEMICAL AGENrs AND MUNITIONS 1-21 (1993) (finding that numerous technologies other
than incineration are available; their economics and feasibility are now under study).
92. U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/NSIAD-93-50, CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEmSTnoCION:
IssuEs AFFECrING PROGRAM COST, SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE 2 (1993). An international
agreement, the Chemical Weapons Convention, has been negotiated that would ban the pro-
duction, use, and stockpiling of chemical weapons worldwide. Michael R. Gordon, Negotia-
tors Agree on Accord to Ban Chemical Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1992, at Al; Alan
Riding, Signing of Chemical-Arms Pact Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1993, at A16. The
republics of the former Soviet Union face formidable problems in destroying their own stock-
piles. John J. Fialka, Russia Seeks to Include a Recycling Plan In Its Chemical-Weapons
Dismantling, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1992, at A7; Karen E. House & Philip Revzin, Toxic
Dump: Arsenal of Poison Gas Languishes as Russia Is Unable to Destroy It, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 25, 1993, at Al; see also Tariq Rauf, Soviet Union: Cleaning Up With a Bang, BULL.
AToMcC ScIENrsTS, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 9 (describing a proposal by a Moscow company to
destroy or encapsulate chemical and nuclear waste with underground nuclear explosions).
93. U.S. ARMY ENvrL. CmR., ENVIRONMENTAL UPDATE: ARMY REPORTS ON SrrTs THAT
MAY CoNTAIN 'NoN-STOCKPIn' CHEMICAL MATERIEL FACILITIES 5 (1993); Federal Facili-
ties: Army Announces Program to Manage Old Chemical Sites, Non-Stockpile Materiel, 23
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 52, at 3191 (Apr. 23, 1993).
94. Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-2655 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992).
95. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 63, at 101.
96. Il
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expenditures for asbestos abatement have been running at three to
four billion dollars per year.97
Several federal statutes recognize the dangers of lead 98 (until
recently a common component of paint and plumbing fixtures), but
no comprehensive regulatory program is currently in place. In sev-
eral recent incidents, lead released by the sandblasting or scraping
of large structures, such as bridges and water towers has contami-
nated surrounding neighborhoods. 99 PCBs are often present in old
transformers and in the ballasts of fluorescent light bulbs.
Each of these substances require special disposal. Lead is a
RCRA hazardous waste,ee and certain debris from its remediation
must go to RCRA-licensed facilities. 10 Asbestos, although not a
RCRA hazardous waste, 0 2 is regulated under CERCLA.10 3 As a
result, many ordinary solid waste landfills, fearful of liability for
later clean-up costs, refuse to accept it. PCBs are regulated under
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)1°4 and must go to
TSCA-licensed landfills or incinerators. 10 5
Thus, the demolition or rehabilitation of buildings and struc-
tures, when performed properly, adds to the demand for hazardous
waste disposal facilities. 10 6 In all, some thirty-one million tons of
"construction and demolition debris"--both hazardous and non-
97. Abatement Industry Sees Decline in Removal, Trend Toward In-Place Management
Strategy, 7 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 758 (Nov. 25, 1992).
98. The Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4801-4846 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992), authorizes regulations prohibiting the use of lead-based paint in cooking,
eating, and drinking utensils and in toys, furniture, and housepaint. The Act further authorizes
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to establish procedures to eliminate
lead-based paint hazards. The Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988,42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-21
to -26, is aimed at reducing the hazard of lead in drinking water at schools and day care
centers.
99. See, e.g., Steven Lee Myers, Sandblasting Halted Again on Bridge, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
27, 1992, at BI (concerning the Williamsburg Bridge in New York City); Marcia Willhite,
Sandblasting of Lead Paint Contaminates Residential Area, NATICH NEwSL. (National Air
Toxics Information Clearinghouse), Sept. 1991, at 5, 5-6 (concerning a water tower in Cedar
Park, Texas).
100. 40 C.F.R. § 261.24 (1992).
101. See Suzette Brooks, Legal Considerations of Disposal of Lead-Contaminated Con-
struction Debris, N.Y. LJ., July 19, 1993, at 1, 1.
102. But see Metal Trades, Inc. v. United States, 810 F. Supp. 689, 695-97 (D.S.C.
1992).
103. See United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1988).
105. 40 C.F.R. pt. 761 (1993).
106. Cf. State, Los Angeles Officials Grapple with Cleanup of Ruins Caused by Rioting,
23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 284, 284-85 (May 8, 1992) (noting concern over presence of
asbestos and other hazardous materials in many of the buildings gutted by fire during the riots
that followed the acquittal of the police officers accused of beating Rodney King).
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hazardous-is generated every year.10 7 It is typically dumped in




Much industrial waste does not fit within the RCRA defini-
tion of hazardous waste or would but for particular exemptions.10 9
Under one estimate, 430 million tons of industrial waste-much of
it containing high levels of heavy metals and organic com-
pounds-is discharged each year into waste ponds, waste piles,
landfills, and other non-RCRA facilities.' 0 Most of these facilities
lack even the most rudimentary liners or other groundwater protec-
tions, and they are barely regulated by either the federal or state
governments."' A few states-notably California, Illinois, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin-require groundwater pro-
tection and other controls, but the federal government has no
coherent program for these industrial wastes, the volume of which
overwhelms that of RCRA hazardous waste and municipal solid
waste."12
8. Mining and Oil and Gas Wastes
Some 1.3 billion metric tons of mining wastes are produced
each year.113 This material comes from the extraction, beneficia-
tion,114 and processing of ores and minerals. This waste material is
107. Nonhazardous Industrial Waste: A Question of Orphans, SMITH BARNEY POLLU-
TION CONTrrOL MONTHLY, June 1990, at 1 [hereinafter Orphans]; see also Richard M.
Schlauder & Robert H. Brickner, Setting Up for Recovery of Construction and Demolition
Waste, SOLm WASTE & POWER, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 28.
108. See also Bridgeport's Plan to Burn Mountain of Trash Draws Threat of Lawsuit,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1992, at B7 (reporting on the controversy over a plan to incinerate
contents of an illegal construction and demolition debris landfill, including lead, creosote, and
asbestos).
109. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4 (1992).
110. Incineration of Hazardous Waste at Sea: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oce-
anography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
215 (1987) [hereinafter Incineration of Hazardous Waste at Sea].
111. Orphans, supra note 107, at 1-2.
112. John C. Dembach, The Other Ninety-Six Percent, ENVmL. F., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 10,
10-11.
113. Incineration of Hazardous Waste at Sea, supra note 110, at 214.
114. Beneficiation is the process during which the ore is crushed and ground and miner-
als are recovered by physical or chemical techniques. T.S. Ary, The Importance of Waste
Management Regulations to the Minerals Industry, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND WASTE MANAGEMENT IN ENERGY AND
MATERIALS PRODUCTION 5-6 (T.M. Yegulalp & Kunsoo Kim eds., 1992) [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS].
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typically placed in a slurry and dumped in tailings impoundments
that average 500 acres in size, with the largest exceeding 10,000
acres. 115 More than 24,000 mining waste ponds are in active
use, 11 6 and another 22,300 abandoned mines and processing facili-
ties are expected to require cleanup, at a total cost of $55 billion. 17
Much mining waste would be considered hazardous waste;
however, in 1980-shortly before the RCRA regulations were to
take effect-Congress enacted the Bevill Amendment," 8 which
temporarily excluded mining wastes from RCRA regulation pend-
ing an EPA study and a subsequent rulemaking. The resulting
EPA regulations have engendered a considerable amount of litiga-
tion;119 however, much mining waste remains exempt from
RCRA 120 despite clear evidence of serious health and environmen-
tal risks. 2'
In the oil and gas industry, an estimated 8.6 billion metric
tons of brines and drilling muds are discharged each year into
some 125,000 oil and gas waste ponds.122 These wastes have high
concentrations of chlorides, barium, and other contaminants12 3 but
are also exempt from RCRA under the Bevill Amendment. 24
9. Pollution Control Residue
Pollution control devices typically capture the offending
material before it can exit the smoke stack or drain pipe. Indeed,
certain elements of the two main pollution control laws, the Clean
115. Id.
116. Incineration of Hazardous Waste at Sea, supra note I10, at 214.
117. OFFICE oF TECH. AssEsMmENT, supra note 63, at 100, 194; see also MINERAL
POL'Y CTR., THE BURDEN OF GILT (1993) (estimating that there are 557,650 hardrock mines in
the United States, of which 14,950 contaminate ground or surface waters); Keith Schneider,
New Approach to Old Peril: Abandoned Mines in West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1993, at Al,
B17 (reporting that there are at least 500,000 abandoned mines in the western United States).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b) (1988) (enacted as part of the Solid Waste Disposal Amend-
ments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2336).
119. E.g., Solite Corp. v. EPA, 952 F.2d 473, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1316, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1011
(1989); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1309, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
120. See John R. Jacus & Thomas E. Root, RCRA Regulation of Mine Waste: An Over-
view, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1991, at 26, 26-27; Constantine Sidamon-Eristoff,
Mining in the Environmentally Conscious '90s, in PRocEEDINos, supra note 114, at 19; Glenn
C. Van Bever, Note, Mining Waste and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: An
Overview, 7 J. MN. L. & PoL'2 249, 255-56 (1991-92).
121. Steve Hwang, An Assessment of Health and Environmental Impact of Contaminant
Releases from a Mine Tailings Pile, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 114, at 174.
122. Incineration of Hazardous Waste at Sea, supra note 110, at 214.
123. Id.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2) (1988).
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Air Act and the Clean Water Act, have not so much eliminated
pollution as consolidated it in residues that require their own
disposal. 2 5
One prominent example is sewage sludge, which is a by-prod-
uct of sewage treatment plants. In 1990, the nation's approxi-
mately 15,000 sewage treatment plants produced some 8.5 million
dry tons of sewage sludge.' 26 Land application for fertilizer or soil
conditioner is the preferred disposal method, but because certain
contaminants can make sewage sludge unsuitable for this use, the
EPA regulates sludge disposal.
127
Sludge disposal is especially difficult for metropolitan areas
with little nearby agricultural land. New York City, for example,
historically dumped its sewage sludge into the Atlantic Ocean. In
1988, a year when needles and other medical waste washed onto
beaches in New York and New Jersey, Congress banned ocean
dumping of sewage sludge after December 31, 1991.128 The ban
increased New York City's annual sludge disposal costs from $20
million to $250 million'29 and led to plans to build five sludge-
burning incinerators in New York City and six in New Jersey,
130
despite local opposition. 13 1 Meanwhile, New York City is export-
ing much of its sewage sludge, and some regions have willingly
125. In enacting RCRA, Congress made a formal finding that "as a result of the Clean
Air Act... the Water Pollution Control Act.. . and other Federal and State laws respecting
public health and the environment, greater amounts of solid waste (in the form of sludge and
other pollution treatment residues) have been created." d. § 6901(b)(3).
126. Of this amount, 41.9% was land applied (used, after processing, as a soil condi-
tioner or fertilizer, or as a fill material in land reclamation projects); 22.2% was landfilled;
13.6% was incinerated; 5.8% was processed, distributed, and marketed for compost and other
uses; 9.2% was spread on vacant land; 4.8% was dumped in the ocean; and 2.5% was disposed
of by other means. George A. Ravenscroft, Managing a Special Waste: Sewage Sludge,
SOLID WASTE & POWER, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 50.
127. Sewage Treatment: Final EPA Sludge Management Standards Promote Beneficial
Uses, Official Says, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1932, 1932-33 (Dec. 4, 1992); see also 33
U.S.C. § 1345(d)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (utilizing sewage sludge).
128. 33 U.S.C. § 1414b (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see United States v. City of New
York, 972 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1992); City of New York v. EPA, 543 F. Supp. 1084, 1086
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
129. Michael Specter, Ocean Dumping Is Ending, But Not Problems, N.Y. TIMES, June
29, 1992, at B1.
130. BUREAU OF IMPACr ASSESSMENT AND METEOROLOGY, N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF
ENVTL. CONSERV., INcINERATION 2000: A JOINT STUDY OF IMPACrs OF A SLUDGE DISPOSAL
ALTERNATIVE TO OcEAN DUMPING IN THE NEW YoRK-NEw JERSEY METROPOLITAN REGION
35-36 (1992).
131. See Jonathan Rabinovitz, Nassau's New Sludge Plan Is to Dump It Elsewhere,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at B5; Jonathan Rabinovitz, Nassau Given Time to Explore Sites
for Sludge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1992, at 25 (reporting that Nassau County, New York decided,
one week before it was to award a $200 million contract to build two plants to process sewage
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accepted this material.132  However, other regions, which claim
that the sludge is contaminated, 133 have gone to court to try to stop
the exports.1
34
Ash is another residue of certain kinds of pollution control.
For every 100 tons of municipal solid waste (MSW) that is inciner-
ated, for example, there remain about 3 tons of fly ash (the material
captured by the air pollution control equipment) and 27 tons of
bottom ash.' 35  As much as 5.5 million tons of ash is created by
MSW incineration each year in the United States.136 Much is so
contaminated with organic chemicals and heavy metals that it fits
within the RCRA definition of hazardous waste.' 37  Because the
ash is derived primarily from household trash, however, it may be
exempt from regulation under RCRA's exemption for household
hazardous waste.' 38 The circuits have split on this issue,139 and the
U.S. Supreme Court recently agreed to address the question.
40
sludge, to ship the sludge elsewhere); Jonathan Rabinovitz, U.S. Judge Lets Nassau Sludge Be
Shipped Out, Not Shaped, N.Y. TimS, Mar. 20, 1993, at A26.
132. See Frank E. Allen, Western Farmers Love New York Sludge, WALL ST. J., Nov.
24, 1992, at B1; Illinois: Christian County May Receive N.Y. City Sludge, SOLID WASTE Dio.
(Midwest ed.), Aug. 1992, at 6; Michael Specter, Ultimate Alchemy: Sludge to Gold-Big
New York Export May Make Desert, and Budget, Bloom, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993, at B1.
133. See Stephen Lester, New York- Sewage Sludge ... A Dangerous Fertilizer, EvERY-
oNm's BACKYARD, Oct. 1992, at 8, 8-9; Nassau Sewerage Sludge Not Wanted in West Virginia,
SoLID WASTE Di. (Northeast ed.), May 1993, at 7.
134. Sewage Treatment: Texas Sues EPA for Failing to Study Risks of Spreading New
York Sewage Sludge on Ranch, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 770 (July 10, 1992); Texas:
Out-of-State Sludge Disposal May be Illegal, Texas Attorney General Tells Water Commis-
sion, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1434 (Sept. 18, 1992); see Texas: Immediate Stop to
Spreading New York Sludge, Permit Revocation Advised by Attorney General, 23 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 25, at 1601 (Oct. 16, 1992).
135. Louis BLUMBERG & ROBERT GoTTLIEB, WAR ON WASTE: CAN AMERICA WIN ITS
BATILE wrIH GARBAGE? 110 (1989).
136. OFFICE OF TECH. AssEssMENT, U.S. CONG., PUB. No. OTA-0-424, FACING
AMERCA'S TRASH: WHAT NExr FOR MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE? 247 (1989).
137. l at 250.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i) (1988).
139. Compare Environmental Defense Fund v. Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 725 F.
Supp. 758,770 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that exemption does apply), aftd, 931 F.2d 211 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991) with Environmental Defense Fund v. City of Chi-
cago, 948 F.2d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that exemption does not apply), vacated, 113
S. Ct. 486 (1992) (remanded for reconsideration in view of EPA policy statement that MSW
ash should not be treated as hazardous waste), reinstated on remand, 985 F.2d 303 (7th Cir.
1993), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2922 (1993) (No. 92-1639). See generally Benjamin
Hershkowitz, Analysis of the Household Waste Exclusion for Municipal Solid Waste Incinera-
torAsh-42 U.S.C. § 6921(i), 2 N.Y.U. ENv-rL. L.J. 84, 107-113 (1993); David C. Wartinbee,
Comment, Incinerator Ash May Not Be a Hazardous Waste, But the Story Doesn't End There!,
9 COOLEY L. REv. 115, 121-29 (1992).
140. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 113 S. Ct. 2992, 2992 (1993)
(No. 92-1639).
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10. Medical Waste
Approximately 500,000 tons of regulated medical waste 141 are
generated each year by about 380,000 generators, such as hospi-
tals, clinics, and physicians' offices. 142 The quantity of regulated
medical waste is expected to increase considerably, because many
states are requiring much hospital waste-whether or not it is
infectious-to be handled specially and because of the increase in
in-home health care.
1 43
The Medical Waste Tracking Act of 198814 was enacted in
the wake of the summer of beach washups noted above. The spe-
cial legal attention afforded medical waste seems based more on
the fear of AIDS than on any clear evidence that medical waste
poses greater dangers in the environmental setting-as opposed to
the occupational setting-than does MSW. 145 Nonetheless, the sit-
ing of facilities to incinerate or otherwise dispose of medical waste
is enormously controversial, 4 6 in part because of the psychology
surrounding medical waste' 47 and in part because medical incinera-
tors and municipal incinerators tend to have much higher dioxin
and furan emissions than hazardous waste incinerators. 48 Existing
medical waste incinerators have the capacity to bum about ten
times the amount of such waste actually generated, but most of the
141. For a listing of some items that fit within this term, see 42 U.S.C. § 6992a(a)
(1988). Wastes containing genetically engineered microorganisms have thus far escaped much
regulatory attention and are usually treated as municipal solid waste. Shawna Vogel, Biotech
Wastes, TECH. REV., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 13, 13-14.
142. AGENCY FOR Toxic SuBsTANcEs & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERvs., THE PUBLIC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF MEDICAL WASTE: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS 3.6 (1990).
143. Id. at E.9; Sue Darcy, State Laws Boost Medical Waste Handling, WORLD WASTES,
Nov. 1992, at 44, 44-45.
144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6992-6992k (1988).
145. Ortwin Renn & Vincent Covello, Medical Waste: Risk Perception and Communi-
cation, in PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICAL WASTE at VII.I to VII.2 (Nelson A. Rockefeller Inst. of
Gov't, State Univ. of N.Y. ed., 1989).
146. See, e.g., BFI Medical Waste Systems v. Whatcom County, 983 F.2d 911, 913-14
(9th Cir. 1993); Oklahoma Court Revokes Incinerator Permit, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at
571 (July 5, 1991); Ian Fisher, Builders and Foes Using Bronx Incinerator as Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1992, at B3; Frances F. Marcus, Medical Waste Divides Mississippi Cities,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1992, at A16.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 594-98.
148. E. Malone Steverson, Provoking a Firestorm: Waste Incineration, 25 ENVTL. SC.
TECH. 1808, 1810-11 (1991). The higher amount of these emissions is largely the result of the
far more stringent regulation of HW incinerators.
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excess capacity is in hospital incinerators that are used only
intermittently.1 49
11. Municipal Solid Waste (MSW)
Although this Article focuses on hazardous and radioactive
wastes, ordinary MSW is so tied in law, politics, and regulation to
HW/RW that it must be discussed as well. Approximately 180
million tons of MSW is generated annually, of which 40% is
paper; 18% is yard wastes; 8% is metals; 8% is plastics; and 7% is
food wastes. 150  Of all this MSW, 72.7% is landfilled, 14.2% is
incinerated, and 13.1% is recycled or otherwise recovered.
1 5 1
The number of MSW landfills declined from about 20,000 in
the early 1970s to about 7000 in 1991.152 The number may fall to
only about 1600 in 2003.' 5 Strict environmental regulations 54 are
leading to the closure of many small landfills and open dumps and
to the opening of large new landfills. 55  Old landfills present
severe environmental hazards; 21% of all hazardous waste sites on
the National Priorities List are municipal landfills, 5 6 and munici-
palities have been held liable under CERCLA for MSW containing
hazardous substances that they have sent to their own and to
others' landfills.157 The leachate from even modem MSW landfills
is just as toxic as that from HW landfills, although HW landfills
are more rigorously regulated.'
58
149. Id. at 1808. The overcapacity of medical waste incinerators in some markets is also
discussed in Jeff Bailey, How Two Garbage Giants Fought over Medical Waste, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 17, 1992, at B6.
150. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, PUB. No. EPA/530-
SW-90-042A, Executive Summary to CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1990 UPDATE at ES-3, ES-5 (1990).
151. Id. at ES-6.
152. NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MGMT. ASS'N, SPECIAL REPORT: LANDFILL CAPACITY IN
NORTH AMERiA-1991 UPDATE at 2-3 (1992) [hereinafter NAT'L S.W.M. ASS'N].
153. O'ICE OF TECH. AssESsMENT, supra note 136, at 273; see also Capacity Assur-
ance Program, supra note 27, at 195 (statement of Sylvia Lowrance, Director, Office of Solid
Waste & Emergency Response, EPA).
154. The most important of these is 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 258 (1992) (promulgated at 56
Fed. Reg. 50,978 (1991)). See Kathleen Farrelly, Comment, The New Federal Standards for
Municipal Solid Waste Landfills: Adding Fuel to the Regulatory Fire, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
383, 383-84 (1992).
155. Solid Waste: Cost of Compliance with RCRA Subtitle D Will Lead to 'lega-Land-
fills,' Consultant Says, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 1204 (Aug. 16, 1992).
156. U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-89-165BR, NONHAZARDOUS WASTE: STATE
MANAGEMENT OF MUNICIPAL LANDFILLS AND LANDFILL EXPANSIONS 2 (1989).
157. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1206 (2d Cir. 1992).
158. Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 50,982 (Oct. 9, 1991)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-258); Kirsten Engel, Environmental Standards as Regulatory
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Even though the number of landfills is sharply falling, the
new landfills-364 of which opened between 1986 and 1991159-
are so large that total capacity has actually increased, 160 and a bid-
ding war has erupted among landfills looking for more garbage.
161
The EPA has concluded that the nation has adequate MSW landfill
capacity, although there are some regional shortages. 162
The siting of MSW-buming incinerators (also called resource
recovery plants or waste-to-energy plants) has been very contro-
versial, 163 and many proposed plants have been cancelled in the
face of public opposition.'" An average of twelve new plants
opened each year in the late 1980s; however, only nine were
opened in 1991,165 and by 1992 there were 190 operating MSW
incinerators in the United States. The portion of MSW that is
incinerated has steadily increased. 166 Nonetheless, there is a good
deal of unused incinerator capacity nationwide, 167 and several
municipalities are losing so much money on new but under-utilized
incinerators that they have imposed special taxes on their resi-
dents 168 and passed "flow control" laws to prohibit export of their
Common Law: Toward Consistency in Solid Waste Regulation, 21 N.M. L. REv. 13, 15-16
(1991); G. Fred Lee & R. Anne Jones, Groundwater Pollution by Municipal Landfills:
Leachate Composition, Detection and Its Water Quality Significance 2 (paper presented to the
National Water Well Association's Fifth National Outdoor Action Conference, Las Vegas,
Nev., May 1991) (on file with the Tulane Law Review).
159. NAT'L S.W.M. Ass'N, supra note 152, at 4 (1992).
160. Id. at 5; Jeff Bailey, Space Available: Economics of Trash Shift as Cities Learn
Dumps Aren't So Full, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1992, at Al; Edward W. Repa & Susan K. Sheets,
Landfill Capacity in North America, WASTE AGE, May 1992, at 18, 24.
161. Barnaby J. Feder, The Saga of Lonetree Landfill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1992, at Dl.
162. Capacity Assurance Program, supra note 27, at 194-95 (statement of Sylvia
Lowrance, Director, Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response, EPA).
163. See Steven A. Broiles, A Suggested Approach to Overcome California's Inability to
Permit Urban Resource Recovery Facilities, 8 RISK ANALYSIS 357, 357-58 (1988); Richard
W. Tome, Regional Note-The Siting of a Trash-to-Energy Plant: A Tale of Three Connecti-
cut Towns, 9 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 181, 183-88 (1990); Michael Specter, Incinerators:
Unwanted and Politically Dangerous, N.Y. TIMas, Dec. 12, 1991, at BI.
164. OFFICE oF TECH. AssassMairT, supra note 136, at 343.
165. Randy Woods, Fighting NIMBY with Fire, WASTE AGE, Sept. 1992, at 39. Four
such plants opened in 1992. Tom Arrandale, Waste-to-Energy: Promises and Problems, Gov-
ERNING, Feb. 1993, at 51.
166. Jonathan V.L. Kiser, Municipal Waste Combustion in North America: 1992
Update, WASTE AGE, Nov. 1992, at 26, 28. For projections of future growth, see Curt
Holman, Gains Expected in Incineration and Gas Recovery, WORLD WASTES, Aug. 1993, at 8.
167. See Steverson, supra note 148, at 1808.
168. Jonathan Rabinovitz, Costs of Long Island Incinerators Rise with Trash Shortage,
N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 10, 1992, at 26; see also Frank E. Allen, Some Incinerators Have Capacity
to Burn, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1991, at B1; Jeff Bailey, Up in Smoke: Fading Garbage Crisis
Leaves Incinerators Competing for Trash, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1993, at Al.
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garbage.169 Two states, West Virginia and Rhode Island, have
banned the construction of new MSW incinerators, and several
others have imposed temporary moratoria.
170
12. Dredge Spoil
Many bodies of water used for shipping must be dredged peri-
odically to maintain their required depth. Especially near major
urban areas, this dredged material is often tainted with PCBs,
heavy metals, and other toxins. It is usually dumped at sea. From
the New York harbor alone, eight to ten million cubic yards of
dredged material are dumped at sea annually, despite concern by
some environmentalists that this practice degrades the ocean.1
7 1
Some sediments at the bottom of rivers and other bodies of
water are so contaminated that dredging and upland disposal in
special facilities are necessary. For example, General Electric
dumped about 1.1 million tons of PCBs from one of its factories
into the Hudson River between the 1940s and 1977. New York
State decided that much of the nearby river bottom should be
dredged out, but so far the state has been unable to find a place to
dispose of this material.
172
13. Storage Tank Remediation
In 1984, Congress recognized the threat to groundwater posed
by leaking underground storage tanks (USTs), especially those
containing gasoline and other petroleum products. As a result,
Congress enacted a statute that requires the upgrading or replace-
ment of many USTs.17 3 There are approximately 295,000 contami-
nated UST sites in the United States, containing at least fifty-six
169. Sue Darcy, Flow Control: A Tug of Waste, WORLD WAsTES, July 1992, at 58, 58;
Flow Control: When Keeping Waste in Is As Important as Keeping It Out, SOLID WAs=r DIG.
(Midwest ed.), Aug. 1992, at 10; Sarah Lyall, Suddenly, Towns Fight to Keep Their Garbage,
N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 5, 1992, at E14; Eric Peterson, Whose Waste Is It, Anyway?, WORLD
WASTES, Apr. 1993, at 48, 52. The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari to a case chal-
lenging a local flow control ordinance as a violation of the Commerce Clause. C & A Car-
bone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 113 S. Ct. 2411, 2412 (1993) (No. 92-1402).
170. Sue Darcy, Environmental Worries Spark State Burn Bans, WORLD WAsTF-_s, June
1993, at 12.
171. See Clean Ocean Action v. York, Civ. No. 93-2402 (D.N.J. June 7, 1993); Anne G.
Seel, Regulation of Contaminated Dredged Material from New York Harbor, 3 ENVTL. L.
N.Y. (Berle, Kass & Case, New York, N.Y.) 113 (1992).
172. See Washington County Cease, Inc. v. Persico, 473 N.Y.S.2d 610, 612 (App. Div.
1984), aff'd, 477 N.E.2d 1084 (N.Y. 1985); Elsa Brenner, New Campaign Against PCBs in the
Hudson, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, § 13, at 1.
173. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat.
3221 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991i (1988)).
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million cubic yards of soil and debris requiring cleanup. 74
Whether this soil must be treated as a hazardous waste depends
largely on the unresolved regulatory status of used oil. 75
B. Radioactive Wastes
As just shown, hazardous wastes-and materials with hazard-
ous characteristics, regardless of their regulatory status-are pro-
duced by virtually every sector of the economy and every type of
human activity. In contrast, almost all man-made radioactive
wastes come from just two enterprises: the generation of electricity
by nuclear power plants and the manufacture of nuclear weap-
ons. 176 Both of these activities are on the decline. No new nuclear
power plant has been ordered in the United States since 1973 with-
out subsequently being cancelled. 177 The general trend around the
world today, except in parts of Asia, is away from nuclear
power. 178 The production of nuclear weapons has also all but
stopped.17
9
Virtually all radioactive wastes start with one substance: ura-
nium ore. To fuel a typical nuclear power plant for one year, about
125,000 tons of uranium ore must be mined, yielding 175 tons of
uranium.18 0 In a year, the plant will fission about one ton of ura-
nium and convert 1.9 pounds of matter to energy, generating about
7 billion kilowatt hours of electricity. It will also leave about 45
tons of spent fuel and 500 tons of low-level radioactive waste.' 8'
Eventually, the plant will have to be dismantled and will itself
become radioactive waste.
174. EPA, supra note 65, at 5. The cost of this cleanup is estimated at $30 billion. Id.
at 6; see also Cost of Cleaning Up Leaking UST Sites Could Exceed $41 Billion, Report Says,
23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 2091 (Dec. 25, 1992). Another estimate is $67 billion. See
RUSSELL ET AL., supra note 72, at 16.
175. See GREEN, supra note 37, at 69-70; Christopher Harris & Gary Fremerman, Used
Oil Management, in 4 ENVIRONMENTAL LAw PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 22, at 37-1, 37-15
to 37-16; Dale E. Hermeling & Joseph B. Pereles, Storage Tanks, in 4 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 22, at 39-1, 39-4 to 39-5.
176. All other sources, such as medical and industrial uses, account for only a tiny frac-
tion of all radioactive wastes.
177. Nicholas Lenssen & Christopher Flavin, Closing Out Nuclear Power, WORLD
WATCH, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 35.
178. Howard W. French, Cuba Cancels Atom Plant, Blaming Costs and Russians, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 1992, at 5; Lenssen & Flavin, supra note 177, at 36.
179. Michael Renner, Finishing the Job, WORLD WATCH, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 10, 10-12.
180. Calculated using information from Robert L. Goble, Time Scales and the Problem
of Radioactive Waste, in EQUITY IssUEs IN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 139, 164
(Roger E. Kasperson ed., 1983) [hereinafter EQUIrrY IssuEs].
181. Sidamon-Eristoff, supra note 120, at 19, 67.
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1. High-Level Radioactive Waste (HLW)
There are two main kinds of HLW. 182 The first is the residue,
mostly liquid, from the manufacture of plutonium for warheads. In
the United States most of this residue is now stored in 177 under-
ground tanks at the Hanford Reservation of the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) in southern Washington State and in fifty-one tanks
at the DOE's Savannah River plant in South Carolina. The rest is
located at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratories and at the
West Valley site in New York State. In 1957, a tank holding simi-
lar wastes exploded in Kyshtym, the Soviet equivalent of Hanford,
spreading radioactive contamination over hundreds of square
miles. 183 In 1993, a similar but much smaller explosion occurred
in a radioactive waste tank in the Siberian city of Tomsk.'84 There
is considerable concern that the U.S. tanks may also explode from
the chemical and radioactive reactions that constantly occur within
them. Several of the tanks are leaking, and on sixteen occasions
between 1987 and 1991, they released toxic gases, often injuring
workers. 185
The second kind of HLW is spent fuel from nuclear power
plants. When the uranium fuel is first loaded into a reactor, it is
only mildly radioactive, but after one or more years it becomes too
radioactive to use, and it also creates plutonium. 8 6 When com-
mercial nuclear power began in the 1950s, it was assumed that this
spent fuel would be reprocessed through in a series of physical and
chemical operations that separate the uranium and plutonium for
reuse.'8 7 However, reprocessing became an economic and envi-
ronmental disaster. Only three commercial reprocessing plants
were ever built in the United States. One plant, located in Morris,
182. 10 C.F.R. § 60.2(19) (1993). Additionally, nuclear submarines and experimental
reactors both produce HLW and low-level radioactive waste, although in much smaller quanti-
ties than do weapons production and power generation reactors.
183. Keith Schneider, The Soviets Show Scars from Nuclear Arms Production, N.Y.
TMaEs, July 16, 1989, at D2.
184. Neela Banerjee, Explosion Causes Radiation Leak at Siberian Nuclear Fuel Facil-
ity, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1993, at A10; James Ridgeway, Russian Roulette: The Plutonium
Trade is Booming, VILLAGE VoicE, Apr. 20, 1993, at 18.
185. Y.S. TANG & JAMES H. SAUING, RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 91 (1990);
Matthew L. Wald, At an Old Atomic-Waste Site, the Only Sure Thing Is Peril, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1993, at Al; Matthew L. Wald, Deadly Nuclear Waste Seems to Have Leaked in
Washington State, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1993, at 31; Matthew L. Wald, Hazards at Nuclear
Plant Fester 8 Years After Warnings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1992, at All.
186. MARvIN RESNiKO:FI, LIviNG WITHouT LANDFILLS: CoNmRoNrnwo THE "Low-
LEvEL" RADmiACnVE WASTE CRISIS 10 (1987).




Illinois, did not work and therefore never opened. The second,
located in Barnwell, South Carolina (near the Savannah River
plant), experienced such cost overruns that it was never finished.
The third, located in West Valley, New York, operated for six
years but shut down in 1972, leaving behind hundreds of thousands
of gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste and a legacy of fires
and accidents. 188 Reprocessing suffered an enormous political set-
back in 1974 when India detonated an atomic bomb made with
plutonium that was reprocessed from the fuel rods of a nuclear
power plant. On October 28, 1976, five days before the presiden-
tial election, President Ford, trailing Jimmy Carter in the polls and
concerned about the dangers of nuclear proliferation, ordered a
temporary ban on commercial reprocessing. After the election,
President Carter extended the ban. 89 President Reagan tried to
revive reprocessing, but its economics were so unfavorable (partly
because of its high cost relative to fresh uranium) that it never
resumed.190
Virtually all the spent fuel rods ever generated by commercial
reactors in the United States-24,000 metric tons through 1991-
are stored on site at the reactors where they were used. 191 After
removal from the reactor, the fuel is initially so hot that it must be
kept underwater in spent fuel pools, with the water circulating con-
stantly to cool it.192 The cancelling of reprocessing greatly
increased the need for on-site storage capacity, but the utilities
have crammed more rods into their existing pools, 193 and it now
appears that virtually all the power plants can store their wastes on-
188. Id at 75-87. For a much more sanguine view of the hazards at West Valley, see
generally John M. Matuszek, Safer than Sleeping with Your Spouse-The West Valley Experi-
ence, in Low-LEvEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REGULATION: SCIENCE, PoLrIcs AND FEAR 261
(Michael E. Bums ed., 1988) [hereinafter Low-LEvEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REGULATION].
189. BARLETr & STEELE, supra note 187, at 90-94.
190. Id. at 94-99. Spent nuclear fuels for military purposes are still reprocessed at three
facilities: Hanford, Savannah River, and the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant in Idaho Falls.
TANG & SALING, supra note 185, at 103. Great Britain and France still do commercial
reprocessing. Glen Zorpette & Gary Stix, Nuclear Waste: The Challenge Is Global, IEEE
SPEcTRUM, July 1990, at 18, 20. The Soviet Union formerly took spent fuel from nuclear
power plants in Czechoslovakia for reprocessing. That practice stopped with the collapse of
the Soviet Union, and the new Czech and Slovak republics have been forced to store the spent
fuel from their nuclear plants until a solution is devised. Malcolm W. Browne, Post-Czecho-
slovak Problem: Spent Atom Fuel, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 22, 1992, at 11.
191. ARJUN MAKHUANI & SCOTT SALSKA, HIGH-LEvEL DOLLARS, Low-LEVEL SENSE:
A C~rIQUE OF PRESENT POLICY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF LONG-LIVED RADIOACTIVE
WASTES AND DISCUSSION OF AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 11 (1992).
192. Id. at 10.
193. BARLErr & STEELE, supra note 187, at 124.
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site through the remainder of their forty-year operating licenses194
and perhaps 100 years or longer.
1 95
With no commercial reprocessing, spent fuel rods are a waste,
not a resource. The nuclear utilities, no more eager than anyone
else to have nuclear waste stored in their backyard, began pressing
for a long-term disposal solution. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1982 (NWPA) required the DOE to establish a system of "long
term" or "permanent" deep geologic disposal facilities for both
kinds of HLW, waste from bomb production and spent fuel rods.'
96
The DOE was told to recommend to the President three sites to be
studied in depth. 9 7 Accordingly, the DOE recommended Yucca
Mountain, Nevada; Deaf Smith County, Texas; and Hanford,
Washington; 198 and in 1986 President Reagan approved these three
sites for study. 199 Just as the studies were about to begin, however,
Congress stepped in and ordered the DOE to halt any investiga-
tions of the Texas and Washington sites and to put the HLW facil-
ity at Yucca Mountain. 200 This location is near the Nevada
Nuclear Test Site, 110 miles west of Las Vegas, with its nearest
neighbor a legal brothel eighteen miles away.201 Nevada then
began a long campaign of litigation,20 2 raising many serious techni-
cal questions about the site20 3 and considerably delaying the pro-
ject,204 so that opening is not projected until 2010 at the earliest
20 5
194. U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-91-194, NucLEAR WASTE: OPERATION OF
MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE FACILITY Is UNLIKELY BY 1998, at 4 (1991).
195. BOARD ON RADIOACrVE WASTE MOmT., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIN.CE,
RETMINKING HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL 8-9 (1990).
196. James H. Davenport, The Law of High-Level Nuclear Waste, 53 TENN. L. REv. 481,
485 (1986) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,131-10,145 (1982)).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 10,132(b)(1)(B) (1988).
198. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258, 1262 (1st Cir. 1987).
199. Nevada v. Herrington, 827 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1987); Robert D. Hershey, Jr.,
U.S. Suspends Plan for Nuclear Dump in East or Midwest, N.Y. TIMEs, May 29, 1986, at Al.
200. Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 5011-
5012, 101 Stat. 1330-225, 1330-227 to 1330-330 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,172-10,172a
(1988)).
201. Fred C. Shapiro, Yucca Mountain, NEW YORKER, May 23, 1988, at 61, 62.
202. See Nevada v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 710,711 (9th Cir. 1991); Nevada v. Burford, 918
F.2d 854, 855 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2052 (1991); Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d
1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1105 (1991); Nevada v. Herrington, 827
F.2d 1394, 1395 (9th Cir. 1987).
203. GERALD JACOB, SrrE UNSEEN: THE POLITICS OF SITINO A NUCLEAR WASTE REPOsI-
TORY 172-74 (1990); William J. Broad, A Mountain of Trouble, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 18, 1990,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 36, 37-38. A technical justification for the selection of Yucca Mountain is
provided in Katrin Borcherding et al., Comparison of Weighting Judgments in Multiattribute
Utility Measurement, 37 MGMT. SCi. 1603 (1991).
204. U.S. GAO, PuB. No. GAO/RCED-92-73, NucLEAR WASTE: DOE's REPOSITORY
SITE INVESTIGATIONS, A LONG AND DIFFICULT TASK 4 (1992); see also Energy Policy Act of
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and may well not occur until after 2020.206 The sense of proce-
dural fairness that the DOE sought to cultivate has utterly evapo-
rated and residents call the statute designating Yucca Mountain as
the facility site the "Screw Nevada Bill. '20 7 Sensitivities are fur-
ther heightened by the diseases some residents of this area have
suffered as a result of open-air testing of nuclear weapons in the
1950s and early 1960s.2 °8
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act also calls for establishment of
a Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility,20 9 which would
prepare spent fuel for emplacement in the geologic repository and
act as a central receiving station.210 This proposal has also sparked
considerable controversy, especially in Tennessee, which was ini-
tially targeted for the facility.21' In late 1992, it appeared that the
DOE had become discouraged in the search for a volunteer site for
an MRS facility and was focusing on interim storage at nuclear
weapons facilities or other federal sites.212 By mid-1993, however,
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 801, 106 Stat. 2776, 2921 (requiring EPA to repromulgate 40
C.F.R. pt. 191 (1992), concerning licensing standards for Yucca Mountain facility); Congress
Approves Energy Bill with Yucca Mountain HLW Standard, RADIOACTIVE EXCHANGE, Oct. 21,
1992, at 15 (describing origins of this legislation in challenges brought by Nevada); Matthew
L. Wald, Rules Rewritten on Nuclear Waste, N.Y. Trams, Oct. 11, 1992, at 31.
205. Matthew L. Wald, U.S. Will Start Over on Planning for Nevada Nuclear Waste
Dump, N.Y. Tsmms, Nov. 29, 1989, at Al.
206. U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-93-124, NUCLEAR WAsTE: YUCCA MOUNTAIN
PROJECT BEHinD SCHEDULE AND FACING MAJOR ScIENTIFIc UNCERTAINTIES 45 (1993).
207. JACOB, supra note 203, at 169. Siting difficulties are not unique to the United
States; no country has a permanent repository for HLW. Nicholas Lenssen, Confronting
Nuclear Waste, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1992, at 46, 53-63 (Linda Starke ed., 1992).
208. See Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 257-58 (D. Utah 1984).
209. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,161-10,169 (1988 & Supp. I 1991).
210. Tennessee v. Herrington, 806 F.2d 642, 644-45 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 946 (1987); MAKHuANI & SAL sKA, supra note 191, at 48; TANG & SALrNG, supra note
185, at 67, 76; Nicholas K. Brown, Monitored Retrievable Storage Within the Context of the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 52 TENN. L. Rav. 739, 740-43 (1985).
211. Richard P. Mauro, Note, Tennessee v. Herrington: An End Run Around State Par-
ticipation in Nuclear Waste Siting Decisions, 9 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 113, 127-28 (1988).
One of the concerns was that the MRS facility would become a permanent resting place for
HLW because of the difficulties in siting the geologic repository. In 1987, however, Congress
provided that construction of the MRS may not begin until after a license for the construction
of the geologic repository has been issued. 42 U.S.C. § 10,168(d)(1) (1988).
212. See Mescalero Tribe Says It Wants to Host MRS, Expresses Doubts About Govern-
ment's Sincerity, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 2493, 2493-94 (Jan. 22, 1993); Radioactive
Waste: U.S. Negotiator's Office Criticizes DOE for Implying DOE Has Failed in Siting MRS,
23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 2257 (Jan. 8, 1993); DOE Looks to Spent Fuel Storage at
Federal Facilities, RADIOACrIVE EXCHANGE, Dec. 22, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter DOE Looks to
Federal Facilities]; DOE 'Supplementing,' Not Abandoning Search for MRS Host, RADIOAC-
TrvE EXCHANGE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 1; see also James P. Miller, Northern States Utility Nears
Pact with Apache Tribe, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 4, 1994, at B2 (reporting tentative agreement
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the nuclear industry was pressing for the construction of an MRS
facility, and two tribes-the Mescalero Apaches in New Mexico
and the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians in Utah-stood
ready to negotiate a compensation package.
213
2. Transuranic Waste (TRU)
Another variety of radioactive waste is TRU: material, such
as plutonium, that has an atomic number greater than that of ura-
nium. 214 Although most TRU has a relatively low level of radioac-
tivity, it is long-lived and highly toxic. 215 Almost all TRU comes
from military activities.216
To dispose of TRU, the federal government has built, but so
far has been unable to open, a facility it calls the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant (WIPP), located twenty-six miles east of Carlsbad, New
Mexico. When the project was first proposed in the early 1970s, it
was enthusiastically endorsed by local officials, who saw it as a
way to replace jobs lost in the declining mining industry.217 Con-
gress authorized WIPP in 1979.218 Disposal would be in excavated
salt formations 2150 feet underground.219 The first rooms were
mined in the early 1980s, but in 1990 alarmed workers found
lumps of rubble lying on the floor and discovered that some of the
older rooms were collapsing.220 With this development and with
attitudes toward nuclear power changing in New Mexico, the state
switched to active opposition to the opening of WIPP. The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed with New Mexico that
explicit congressional authorization was required before the prop-
erty could be transferred to the DOE and shipments begun. 21
However, Idaho, where much of the TRU is being stored until
between Minnesota utility and Mescalero Apache tribe for storage of utility's spent fuel at
Mescalero reservation).
213. Radioactive Waste: Mescalero Apache Tribe Renews Efforts to Site MRS on New
Mexico Reservation, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 274 (June 11, 1993); Matthew L. Wald,
Nuclear Industry Seeks Interim Site to Receive Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1993, at 1, 1.
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ee) (1988).
215. MAKHuANI & SALESKA, supra note 191, at 94; TANG & SALiNG, supra note 185, at
6.
216. TANG & SALING, supra note 185, at 14, 176.
217. JoHN E. SEI.EY, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIc-FAcILrTY PLANNING 94 (1983).
218. U.S. Department of Energy National Security and Military Application of Nuclear
Energy Authorization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-164, § 213, 93 Stat. 1259, 1265 (1979).
219. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESMmENT, U.S. CONG., PUB. No. OTA-0-484, ComPLEX
CLEANUP: THE ENVIRoNMENTAL LEGACY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCrION 50 (1991).
220. Schneider, supra note 2, at 58.
221. New Mexico v. Watldns, 969 F.2d 1122, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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WIPP opens,222 brought counterpressures, and Congress promptly
supplied the needed authorization.2 3 WIPP remains very contro-
versial and it is not expected to start receiving waste before
1998.224
For all its size and controversy, WIPP will receive only about
twenty percent of DOE's TRU. Much of the rest lies in shallow
burial grounds at nuclear weapons facilities around the country,
and there are no clear plans for its final disposal.22 5
3. Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW)
LLRW is all radioactive waste that is not defined as HLW,
TRU, or uranium mill tailings.226 In the civilian sector, ninety-nine
percent of the radioactivity and half the volume in LLRW is pro-
duced by nuclear power plants, principally the ion-exchange resins
that filter radioactivity from reactor cooling water.227 Other
sources include industrial, medical, and research applications.228
The volume of civilian LLRW generated has been declining rap-
idly. It dropped by about half between 1980 and 1989, largely due
to disposal surcharges that have given generators a strong incentive
to produce less LLRW.22 9 This reduction occurred despite an
222. Charles C. Reith & N. Timothy Fischer, Transuranic Waste Disposal: The WIPP
Project, in DESmTs AS DUMPs? THE DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS IN ARID ECOSYS-
TEMS 303, 316 (Charles C. Reith & Bruce M. Thomson eds., 1992) [hereinafter DESERTS AS
DUMPS]; see also Keith Schneider, Idaho Says No, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1990, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 50.
223. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-579,
106 Stat. 4777; see also Congress Approves WIPP Bill with EPA Standard Requirements,
RADIOACTrvE EXCHANGE, Oct. 21, 1992, at 17.
224. John H. Cushman Jr., U.S. Drops Test Plan at Bomb Waste Site, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 1993, at A16. For other discussions of WIPP, see generally LUmER J. CARTER, NUCLEAR
IMPERATIVES AND PUBLIC TRUST: DEALING WITH RADIOACTIVE WASTE 176-93 (1987); Allen
V. Kneese et al., Economic Issues in the Legacy Problem, in EQUrrY IsSUES, supra note 180,
at 203 ( giving cost-benefit analysis of WIPP); Nicholas Lenssen, WIPP-Lash: Nuclear Burial
Plan Assailed, WORLD WATCH, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 5.
225. Safety, Modernization, and Environmental Cleanup of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Complex: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence of the
Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (1989) [hereinafter Safety]
(statement of Keith 0. Fultz, Director, Energy Issues Resources, Community, and Economic
Division of the GAO).
226. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., PUB. No. OTA-0-427, PARTNERSHIPS
UNDER PRESSURE: MANAGING COMMERCIAL Low-LavEL RADIOACrIVE WASTE 5 (1989).
227. RESNiKOFF, supra note 186, at 4, 11; TANG & SALING, supra note 185, at 197.
228. See Radioactive Waste: Medical Waste Needs Should Not Be Scare Tactic to Open
Low-Level Disposal Facilities, Group Says, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 2584 (Jan. 29,
1993).
229. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 226, at 1, 8.
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increase in the amount of nuclear power generated during the same
period.230
The amount of LLRW generated in nuclear weapons produc-
tion is unclear, but much of it (about 1.5 million cubic yards) is
simply buried in shallow trenches at the production plants. z3' Prior
to 1970, the U.S. military dumped its LLRW into the sea.232 Most
civilian LLRW has gone to the six commercial LLRW disposal
facilities that were built in the United States after the government
banned burial of civilian LLRW at federal facilities in 1962.233
Three of the six facilities-those located in West Valley, New
York; Maxey Flats, Kentucky; and Sheffield, Illinois-have been
permanently closed because of water infiltration into the waste
trenches and other environmental problems.234 The three facilities
still operating in 1992 were located in Barnwell, South Carolina
(opened in 1971, near the Savannah River facility); Beatty, Nevada
(opened in 1962); and Richland, Washington (opened in 1965, near
the Hanford facility).23 5
In 1979, both the Washington and Nevada sites were forced to
shut down temporarily. 236 In that year of the Three Mile Island
accident, South Carolina was unhappy at being forced to take the
entire nation's LLRW and ordered a fifty percent reduction in the
volume of waste accepted by Barnwell, leading Washington and
Nevada to announce that they would shut their facilities perma-
nently. This precipitated a national crisis in LLRW disposal. To
resolve it, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act of 1980, which declared that the states, acting alone or
in compacts with other states, were responsible for disposing of
their own LLRW.237 The Act gave South Carolina, Nevada, and
Washington the power to exclude other states' waste after 1986.
By 1985, however, little progress had been made in siting new
LLRW facilities, and Congress extended the deadlines, imposed
230. In 1980, 251,116 million kilowatt hours of electricity were generated by nuclear
power. This figure rose to 529,355 in 1989 and to 612,565 in 1991. Nuclear Power Plant
Operations, MONTHLY ENERGY REv., Jan. 1993, at 101.
231. OFIcE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 219, at 24, 45.
232. See infra text accompanying notes 864-66.
233. BARLMEr & STEELE, supra note 187, at 255.
234. REsNuoi, supra note 186, at 33.
235. Colglazier & English, supra note 10, at 627.
236. The account in this paragraph is drawn from New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
2408, 2415-16 (1992); Colglazier & English, supra note 10, at 622-24; Timothy J. Peckin-
paugh, The Politics of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal, in Low-LEVEL RADIOACnVE
WAsTE REGULATnON, supra note 188, at 45.
237. Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d (1988)).
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interim milestones, and allowed the three sited states to exclude
waste from states that missed the deadlines.238 Congress also pro-
vided that, in 1993, states that had not made provision for dispos-
ing of the LLRW generated within their borders would have to
"take title" to it, thereby assuming liability for damage it causes.239
In 1990 New York State, acting with (and under pressure by) the
two counties tentatively designated as the location for its LLRW
facility, challenged the constitutionality of the 1986 amend-
ments.240 In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the "take
title" provision as a violation of states' rights under the Tenth
Amendment but upheld the balance of the statute.241
The federal requirement that states site LLRW facilities has
sparked enormous debate all over the country.2 42 The three states
that were furthest along in developing sites when the Supreme
Court ruled were Illinois, California, and Nebraska.243 However,
in 1992 the Illinois siting commission rejected the selected site
because of geological problems and other deficiencies.244 In 1993,
a federal court enjoined certain work at the California site because
of potential impacts on an endangered species, the desert tor-
toise,245 and the Nebraska health and environment departments
announced they were denying permits for that state's facility.246
An elected judge in Texas also rejected that state's chosen site in
238. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
240, § 102, 99 Stat. 1842, 1843 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (1988)).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1988).
240. The author was counsel of record for Cortland County in this litigation.
241. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2428-29 (1992).
242. See generally Paul Furiga, Hot Stuff, GOVERNING, Nov. 1989, at 50 (observing that
citizens' emotions make it even harder for states to decide what to do with low-level radioac-
tive wastes).
243. U.S. GAO, PuB. No. GAO/RCED-92-61, NUCLEAR WASTE: SLOW PROGRESS
DEVELOPING Low-LEVEL RADIoAcrvEw WASTE DISPOSAL FAcmrrEs 4 (1992); ENGLISH, supra
note 10, at 13-15.
244. Martinsville Rejected for Central Midwest LLRW Facility, RADIOACrIVE
EXCHANGE, Oct. 21, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Martinsville].
245. Desert Tortoise v. Interior Dep't, No. C93-0114 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 1993); TRO
Against Ward Valley Land Transfer Extended, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 2594 (Jan. 29,
1993); Burying the Future, WALL ST. J., at A10 (Jan. 22, 1993); see also California Radioac-
tive Materials Mgmt. Forum v. Department of Health Servs., 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 367 (Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that no adjudicatory hearing is necessary on U.S. Ecology's permit appli-
cation for Ward Valley facility); Jon Cohen, California's Disposal Plan Goes Nowhere Fast,
263 SCIENCE 912, 912 (1994). But see Radioactive Waste: California Approves License
Application; Governor Agrees on Hearing for Disposal Site, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at
916-17 (Sept. 24, 1993).
246. Letter from Randolph Wood, Nebraska Dept. of Envtl. Quality and Mark B. Hor-
ton, Nebraska Dep't of Health, to Richard F. Paton, US Ecology, Inc., Jan. 22, 1993; see also
Concerned Citizens v. NRC, 970 F.2d 421,426-27 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of
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Hudspeth County.247 North Carolina plans to open a new facility
in 1996 to replace Barnwell; it selected a site in 1993 but was
immediately met with threats of lawsuits.248
In January 1993, the Nevada facility shut down completely
and the Washington site closed its doors to all but six western
states. This left only Barnwell, which is scheduled to be closed to
states outside its compact in July 1994 and to be shut down alto-
gether by 1996. Meanwhile, medical, research, and industrial
LLRW generators have been left scrambling for temporary
storage.249
4. Remedial Waste from Nuclear Weapons Production
The sites where the United States manufactured nuclear weap-
ons are, collectively, called the Nuclear Weapons Complex
(NWC). The NWC includes 14 major facilities in 13 states, on
military reservations covering 3350 square miles and employing
more than 100,000 people3 °0 The NWC originated with the Man-
hattan Project in World War II and was greatly expanded in the
early 1950s. Among the largest facilities are the Rocky Flats plant
in Colorado, which produced plutonium "triggers" for bombs; the
Hanford Reservation in Washington, which produced weapons-
grade plutonium; the Savannah River site in South Carolina, which
made tritium for hydrogen bombs and plutonium; the Feed Materi-
als Production Center in Fernald, Ohio, which produced uranium
metal for weapons; the Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee,
which fabricated weapons components; and the Idaho National
challenge to development of regional LLRW facility on ground that siting violated unenumer-
ated Ninth Amendment right to environment free from releases of nonnatural radiation).
247. County of El Paso v. Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Auth., No.
2588-34 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Hudspeth County Apr. 25, 1991). The efforts to site an LLRW facility
in Hudspeth County are described throughout Rita R. Hamm, Coalition Formation in Radioac-
tive Waste Disposal Facility Siting, in PROCEEDINGs, supra note 38, at 176. Texas subse-
quently selected an alternative site and agreed to accept LLRW from Maine and Vermont once
the site opens. The site is not expected to open before mid-1996 at the earliest. Texas Agrees
to Host Disposal Site in Low-Level Compact with Vermont, Maine, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
7, at 323, 324 (June 18, 1993).
248. Radioactive Waste: North Carolina Authority Selects Site for Southeast's Next
Low-Level Facility, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1497 (Dec. 10, 1993); Radioactive Waste:
State Pledges Thorough Investigation of Proposed Regional Low-Level Facility, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 33, at 1524 (Dec. 17, 1993).
249. Sarah Lyall, Failing to Build a Dump, New York Faces Shutout, N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 1993, at Al; Robert Reinhold, States, Failing to Cooperate, Face a Nuclear-Waste Crisis,
N.Y. TnMEs, Dec. 28, 1992, at 1.
250. OFFICE oF TEcH. AssEssm, rr, supra note 219, at 15; Thomas B. Cochran et al.,
The U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production Complex, in HIDDEN DAr CRs, supra note 85, at 3.
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Engineering Laboratory, where fuel from military reactors is
reprocessed?5 1 The NWC is rapidly phasing down its active opera-
tions, many of its units are inactive,252 and some plans for new
units have been cancelled.5 3 The United States stopped producing
highly enriched uranium in 1964 and plutonium in 1988 and has
manufactured no nuclear warheads since July 1990.5
The NWC has left behind an environmental horror. At every
facility, the groundwater is contaminated with radionuclides, and
pollution of surface waters, sediment, and soil is extensive. 5 5 The
immensity of the resultant cleanup task has necessitated the devel-
opment by the DOE of a National Priority System (NPS) to better
facilitate the allocation of resources"6 The NWC stores large
volumes of HLW, TRU, and LLRW. 57 The Secretary of Energy
has blamed this contamination on "a 40-year culture cloaked in
secrecy and imbued with a dedication to the production of nuclear
weapons without a real sensitivity for protecting the
environment." 8
Cleaning up the NWC will be one of the largest public works
projects in history. In 1992, the DOE estimated that the work will
cost $160 billion2 9 and take twenty to thirty years;260 another
recent estimate placed the'cost at $240 billion.26' Included in these
costs are some very large waste treatment facilities. For example,
251. Cochran et. al. Supra note 250, at 3, 5. All the facilities are listed, and their status
given, in Oversight of Cleanup and Modernization Proposals for DOE's Weapons Production
Complex: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Govtl. Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 390-
431 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings].
252. OFFICE OF TECH. ASsESsMENT, supra note 219, at 17.
253. See, e.g., Keith Schneider, U.S. Drops a Plan to Build a Reactor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 1992, at 5 (reporting government's decision decides not to build a new nuclear reactor to
produce tritium at the Savannah River Plant).
254. Renner, supra note 179, at 12.
255. COMMrIrTEE TO PROVIDE INTERIM OvERsIoHT OF THE DOE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
COMPLEX, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX: MANAGEMENT
FOR HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 37-38 (1989) [hereinafter NUCLEAR WEAPONS
COMPLEX]; OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 219, at 4.
256. NucLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX, supra note 255, at 41-42.
257. Leo P. Duffy, Environmental and Waste Management Issues, Causes, Characteris-
tics, and Cures, in PROCEEDINOS, supra note 114, at 15.
258. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 219, at 15.
259. U.S. GAO, PuB. No. GAO/T-RCED-92-82, FEDERAL FACILITIES IssuEs INVOLVED
IN CLEANING Up HAZARDOUS WASTE 5 (1992).
260. Hearings, supra note 251, at 10.
261. See RUSSELL ET AL., supra note 72, at 16; see also Energy Department Lacks Valid
Cost Figures for Cleanup of Weapons Complex GAO Reports, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 13,
at 553 (July 30, 1993) (noting that although the DOE will not estimate cleanup costs, its
informal predictions have quoted costs as high as $600 billion).
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the DOE plans to spend four billion dollars building a factory to
transform the thirty-four million gallons of HLW in tanks at
Savannah River into a glass form for eventual disposal, presuma-
bly at Yucca Mountain.262 Similar plants are planned for Hanford
Reservation and the Idaho laboratory.
263
5. Nuclear Weapons
At the peak of the arms race in the mid-1980s, the Soviet
Union had roughly 33,000 nuclear warheads and the United States
had about 24,000.264  The United States has produced nearly
70,000 nuclear warheads since 1945, more than 50,000 of which
have now been retired and disassembled. 65 Between them, the
United States and the republics comprising the former Soviet
Union possess more than 200 tons of weapons-grade plutonium
and more than 1000 tons of highly enriched uranium, either assem-
bled in warheads or held in storage. 66
The START II agreement and earlier treaties portend a drastic
reduction in the number of deployed weapons but do not specify
what is to be done with the decommissioned warheads. There is
no coherent policy on what is to become of the nuclear material
contained in these warheads.267 It can be recycled into new war-
heads; diluted and used as fuel for nuclear power plants; stored and
guarded; or converted into a relatively irretrievable form, such as
ceramic or glass blocks, and sent to a repository like Yucca Moun-
262. U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-92-183, NUCLEAR WASTE: DEFENSE WASTE
PROCESSING FACmrrY-COST, SCHEDULE, AND TECHNICAL ISSUES (1992).
263. Safety, supra note 225, at 331 (statement of Raymond P. Berube, DOE); id. at 417
(statement of Dan W. Reicher and James D. Werner, Natural Resources Defense Council).
The GAO has recommended reconsideration of the plan to build a vitrification plant at Han-
ford. U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAOIRCED-93-99, NUCLEAR WASTE: HANFORD TANK WASTE
PROGRAM NEEDS COST, SCHEDULE, AND MANAGEMENT CHANGES 5 (1993); see also Federal
Facilities: Washington State, U.S. Agencies Agree to Changes in Hanford Site Cleanup Plan,
23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 3121 (Apr. 9, 1993).
264. William J. Broad, Nuclear Accords Bring New Fears on Arms Disposal, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 1992, at 1, 6.
265. WILLIAM M. ARKIN & ROBERT S. NORRIS, TAKING STOCK: U.S. NUCLEAR DEPLOY-
M ENs AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR 1 (1992); Nuclear Notebook: Where the Bombs Are,
BULL. AToMIC SCIEmsrs, Sept. 1992, at 48, 49.
266. Frans Berkhout et al., Plutonium: True Separation Anxiety, BULL. ATOMIC SCI.,
Nov. 1992, at 28; Renner, supra note 179, at 13. A very detailed accounting of nuclear weap-
ons is presented in DAVID ALBRIGHT Er AL., WORLD INVENTORY OF PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY
ENRICHED URANIUM, 1992, at 31-41 (1993).
267. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., PUB. No. OTA-0-572, DISMANTLING
THE BOMB AND MANAGING THE NUCLEAR MATERIALS 2 (1993).
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tain or WIPP.268 The United States has committed to help the Rus-
sian republics destroy their nuclear weapons269 and has arranged to
buy some of the material from Russia for dilution into reactor
fuel.z70 Meanwhile, great concern exists that terrorists or rogue
nations might acquire some of the materials, especially those held
by the four republics with Soviet weapons-Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus and Kazakhstan. Already, radioactive materials and bomb
parts from these countries have been found trading in the black
market.27'
6. Decommissioned Nuclear Plants
There are approximately 112 nuclear power plants, 22 nuclear
fuel cycle plants (mostly in the NWC), and 54 research and indus-
trial reactors in the United States. 72 All will eventually have to be
decommissioned. Nuclear power plants were anticipated to have a
forty-year life span, but some are now being shut down much ear-
lier, largely because alternative power sources, especially natural
gas, are cheaper.273  The world's first commercial nuclear power
plant, a small unit in Shippingport, Pennsylvania, opened in 1957
and was dismantled in 1989. The reactor vessel was sent whole by
barge, via the Panama Canal, to the Hanford Reservation in Wash-
268. Renner, supra note 179, at 13. The warheads also contain other valuable materials.
See John J. Fialka, Alchemists Today Recycle A-Bombs; They Conjure Gold, and That's Not
All, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1993, at A5A.
269. Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 102-228, 105 Stat. 1691 (codi-
fied at various sections of 22 U.S.C (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)); Freedom for Russia and Emerg-
ing Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act, Pub. L. No. 102-511, 106 Stat.
3320 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5801 (1992)); see U.S. GAO, Pua. No. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-5,
SoviET NUCLEAR WEAPONS: U.S. EFFORTS TO HELP FoRMER Sovmr REPUBLICS SECURE AND
DESTROY WEAPONS 1-3 (1993).
270. William J. Broad, A Plutonium Pact Will Aid Disposal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1993,
at All; William J. Broad, From Soviet Warheads to U.S. Reactor Fuel, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 6,
1992, at E4; see also Thomas L. Neff, A Grand Uranium Bargain, N.Y. TmS, Oct. 24, 1991,
at A25.
271. Craig R. Whitney, Illicit Atom-Material Trade Worries Germans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
20, 1992, at A8. Another disposal problem-although one that does not (yet) affect U.S.
disposal capacity-was the use of artillery shells made of depleted uranium by the United
States and its allies in the Persian Gulf War. Roughly 10,000 such shells were used in Iraq and
Kuwait in the 1991 war, and there are fears that the shells are causing health problems in the
Persian Gulf region. Eric Hoskins, Making the Desert Glow, N.Y. Tmams, Jan. 21, 1993, at
A25. But see Russell Seitz, No Uranium Peril in Iraqi Desert, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1993, at
A20.
272. U.S. GAO, PuB. No. GAO/RCED-89-119, NUCLEAR RaULATION: NRC's
DECOMMISSIONING PROCEDURES AND CRrrERIA NEED TO BB STRENGTHENED 8 (1989).
273. Matthew L. Wald, Cheap and Abundant Power May Shutter Some Reactors, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 1992, at Al, D25; Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear Power Plants Take Early Retire-
ment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1992, at E7.
1086 [Vol. 68
WASTE FACILITY SITING
ington State for disposal.274 No large commercial plant has yet
been dismantled, however. Several have been retired, but they
remain intact and their spent fuel pools must be continually moni-
tored, with ongoing security, testing, and training, at an annual cost
of several million dollars each.275 Completely dismantling a large
power plant may cost more than one billion dollars276 and will
leave wastes approximately one hundred times more radioactive
than the combined total of all the LLRW generated during the
reactor's operation.277 Another option is "entombment": the plant
is encased in a massive structure of concrete and steel having a
structural lifetime of perhaps two hundred years-leaving the task
of dismantling a somewhat cooler plant to a distant generation.278
The twenty-five year practice at the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (NRC),279 which allowed licensees to bury LLRW on-site
without prior NRC approval,28 ° complicates decommissioning. In
one case, at a Westinghouse plutonium processing plant in Ches-
wick, Pennsylvania, radioactive waste was found under an
employee softball field.281
7. Uranium Mill Tailings
Uranium ore is the basic raw material of both nuclear power
plant fuel and nuclear warheads. After the usable uranium is
extracted from the ore, finely ground radioactive tailings remain
whose radioactivity is reduced to about six percent of its initial
value after four half-lives, or 300,000 years.282 More than 230 mil-
lion tons of uranium mill tailings have accumulated in the United
States, representing over ninety-five percent of the volume of all
RW generated in this country.283 The largest number of adverse
274. ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 4.
275. Matthew L. Wald, As Nuclear Plants Close, Costs Don't Shut Down, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 20, 1992, at E18.
276. PACE UNIV. CTR. FOR ENVTL. LEGAL STUDIEs, ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ELEc-
TRicrry 389 (1990) [hereinafter PACE UNIV.]; Robert Johnson & Ann de Rouffignac, Closing
Costs: Nuclear Utilities Face Immense Expenses in Dismantling Plants, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25,
1993, at Al.
277. RnsNKol, supra note 186, at 14.
278. TANO & SALING, supra note 185, at 348.
279. The Decommissioning and Decontamination Requirements for Closing Nuclear
Facilities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Env't, Energy, and Natural Resources of the
House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 126-30 (1989) (written submission
of Kenneth M. Carr, Chairman, NRC); GAO, supra note 272, at 4.
280. See 10 C.F.R. § 20.302 (1993).
281. GAO, supra note 272, at 4.
282. Goble, supra note 180, at 139, 157.
283. MAKHuAM & SALESKA, supra note 191, at 21.
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health effects from all nuclear-related activities in the United
States arise from the mining and milling of uranium.284
Historically, these tailings were carelessly managed. Until
1966 they were often used as fill material in building construction,
leading to the contamination of thousands of buildings285 and,
years later, to litigation brought by property owners.286 The great
bulk of the tailings, however, were dumped in enormous piles or
ponds.287 Contamination from these piles is spread above the sur-
face by wind and below it by groundwater.288
In 1978, Congress enacted the Uranium Mill Tailings Radia-
tion Control Act289 (UMTRA), with a mandate to clean up twenty-
four inactive uranium processing sites, containing twenty-four mil-
lion tons of tailings.2 90 This leaves another twenty-six sites with a
total of more than 200 million tons of tailings.29' Although some
of this material will be moved to new disposal sites, the volumes
are so great that most will have to be managed in place.
292
284. See Jessica Pearson, Hazard Visibility and Occupational Health Problem Solving:
The Case of the Uranium Industry, 6 J. COMMUNrrY HEALTr 136, 137-38 (1980); W. Paul
Robinson, Uranium Production and Its Effects on Navajo Communities Along the Rio Puerco
in Western New Mexico, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 153
(Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai, eds., 1992); Keith Schneider, Valley of Death: Late Rewards
for Navajo Miners, N.Y. TimEs, May 3, 1993, at Al, B10.
285. Roger E. Kasperson, Social Issues in Radioactive Waste Management. The
National Experience, in EQurry IssuEs, supra note 180, at 24, 30.
286. E.g., Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984).
287. In 1979 a tailings dam collapsed at a uranium mill near Churchrock, New Mexico.
This collapse released 100 million gallons of tailings solution that contaminated at least 60
miles of the Rio Puerco along its course through lands in New Mexico and Arizona used by
Navajo for watering stock. TANG & SALING, supra note 185, at 277-78.
288. William E. Blundell, Nuclear Mess: Uranium Mill Wastes, Piled High in West,
Pose Cleanup Issues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1986, at 1.
289. Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-604,92 Stat.
3021 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7942 (1988)); see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 61(1), (W) (1992)
(air pollution standards for radon emissions from disposal of uranium mill tailings and from
operating mills); 40 C.F.R. pt. 190 (1992) (EPA radiation standards for uranium mill sites); 40
C.F.R. pt. 192 (1992) (EPA standards for remedial actions at inactive uranium processing
sites); 40 C.F.R. pt. 440(C) (1992) (EPA water pollution standards for uranium, radium, and
vanadium ores).
290. See Raoul S. Portillo, Mill Tailings Remediation: The UMTRA Project, in
DESERTS AS DUMPS, supra note 222, at 281, 281.
291. John L. Russell, Health Risks from Uranium Mill Tailings, in PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 114, at 236. Even greater problems seem to have been left behind in the uranium mining
and processing industry of former East Germany, which supplied the Soviet Union's nuclear
weapons program. Patricia Kahn, A Grisley Archive of Key Cancer Data, 259 SCIENCE 448,
448-49 (1993).
292. Portillo, supra note 290, at 284-85; see also Colorado NPL Site to Be Uranium
Waste Dump, SUPERFUND WK., Mar. 26, 1993, at 4 (reporting that a remediated uranium mill
site may be utilized for off-site disposal of waste from other UMTRA sites).
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8. Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material 293 (NORM)
Numerous activities in such industries as oil and gas extrac-
tion, water treatment, mining, and fossil-fired power generation
produce NORM: radiation present in nature but brought into con-
tact with humans by these processes. Tens of billions of tons of
NORM-containing wastes are generated each year, a volume
dwarfing all other hazardous and radioactive wastes combined.
Where NORM is produced, workers are often exposed to far
higher levels of radiation than would be permitted for workers at a
nuclear power plant. However, NORM is virtually unregulated.
The EPA has released draft regulations aimed at some NORM
wastes,294 but it has not promulgated them. One state, Louisiana,
has its own regulations on the subject.
295
The only disposal site for NORM in this country is located
near Clive, Utah and was established in the mid-1980s to take ura-
nium mill tailings.296 Recent attempts to site another facility in
Texas were defeated by local opposition.297 The vast majority of
all NORM is simply buried or stored onsite, without any regulatory
oversight at all. Its enormous volume, its multiple sources, and
confusion over what to do with it have led essentially to regulatory
paralysis.
9. Mixed Waste
Mixed waste is material that is both RCRA hazardous waste
and radioactive waste. An example is a solvent-containing rag that
was used to clean a radioactively contaminated pump at a nuclear
power plant. Over ninety percent of all mixed waste produced in
293. This discussion is drawn from Joseph R. Egan & John F. Seymour, Disposing of
Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material Wastes: A Legal Strategy, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,433 (1992); Anthony J. Thompson & Michael L. Goo, Naturally Occurring Radio-
active Material: Regulators Should Look Before They Leap, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,052 (1992) (discussing scientific aspects of NORM and the regulatory efforts of EPA,
NRC, Texas, and Louisiana to control NORM hazards); see also James R. Cox, Comment,
Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials in the Oilfield: Changing the NORM, 67 Tm.. L.
REv. 1197, 1197-1209 (1993) (exploring regulations controlling and monitoring exposure to
NORM).
294. 55 Fed. Reg. 16,850 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 193, 764).
295. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, § 15:1401-:1420.
296. Nukewaste, UPI, May 8, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file.
297. See Barry Siegel, A Perfect Place for a Waste Dump, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1991,
Magazine, at 25. A different attempt in Texas has also been defeated. See Texas Denies Low-
Level Waste Landfill Permit, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 440 (July 9, 1993).
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the United States is generated by the DOE.298 Mixed waste is
simultaneously regulated as radioactive waste by the NRC and as
hazardous waste by the EPA.299 However, these two schemes of
regulation are incompatible. For instance, under RCRA, the opera-
tor of a disposal facility must verify the contents of a waste pack-
age by opening it and sending a representative sample for testing.
However, this procedure could subject facility workers to doses of
radiation that would violate NRC standards.300 Partly because of
such contradictions, no disposal facility, offsite storage, or treat-
ment facility for commercial mixed waste exists in the United
States.01 The material is simply stored; in 1993 an estimated
589,481 cubic meters of mixed waste were in storage.3 0 2 As a
result the EPA has been forced to grant variances from the RCRA
rules for disposal of mixed waste.30 3 Even so, the D.C. Circuit has
ruled that, under RCRA, electric utilities cannot store mixed waste
on site indefinitely while waiting for the EPA to develop disposal
guidelines °.3 0 The court conceded that its decision puts the utilities
"in the unenviable position of having no choice but to violate the
law.,3 o5
III. How SITING DECISIONS ARE MADE
A. Siting in the Absence of Government Regulation
Unlike the practice in most of Europe and Canada, the U.S.
private sector has been primarily responsible for the disposal of
hazardous waste and commercial LLRW in the United States.3 6
Prior to the onset of modem environmental legislation in the early
1970s, the siting of private disposal facilities was relatively unfet-
298. See Capacity Assurance Program, supra note 27, at 184, 263-64 (statement of
Sylvia Lowrance, Director, Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response, EPA); see also
Radioactive Waste: Study Says Most Mixed Waste in 1990 Consisted of Liquid Scintillation
Fluids, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 2682, 2682-83 (Feb. 12, 1993).
299. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Hodel, 586 F. Supp. 1163, 1166 (E.D. Tenn.
1984); 10 C.F.R. pt. 962 (1993).
300. OFFICE OF TEcH. AssEssMENT, supra note 226, at 17.
301. Id. at 15. A minor exception is a facility in Utah that accepts mixed waste that is
only slightly radioactive. Richard Zuercher, NRC, States Prod DOE to Accept Commercial
Mixed Waste, INsmE NRC, Oct. 5, 1992, at 3.
302. Federal Facilities: DOE Mixed Waste Inventory Report First Step in Cleanup,
Official Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 146 (May 21, 1993).
303. 55 Fed. Reg. 22,520, 22,645 (1990) (to be codified in scattered sections of 40
C.F.R.); 57 Fed. Reg. 22,024 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 268).
304. Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
305. Id.
306. GREEN, supra note 37, at 2.
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tered by environmental constraints. Decisions on where to site dis-
posal facilities were made the same way as decisions on where to
put any heavy industry: by companies seeking the best combina-
tion of such key factors as proximity to markets and materials,
availability of labor, transportation, utilities and infrastructure, and
low land and development costs. 30 7 Because heavy industry gener-
ates most of the 1-W, 30 8 disposal facilities tended to be built near
industrial concentrations, which in turn tended to be in or near cit-
ies. 30 9 They were also often put on wetlands-then known as
swamps-and floodplains, where land was cheap.310
In contrast, the facilities in the nuclear weapons complex,
where cost was never a controlling factor, tended to be sited more
for expediency and sometimes even caprice. For example, in 1942
J. Robert Oppenheimer personally selected the site of what became
the Los Alamos National Laboratory largely on the basis of its
grand scenic view and his childhood memories of attending a boys'
school there.31 1 The same year, General Leslie Groves, military
head of the Manhattan Project, sent two men scouting for a site for
a plutonium production facility. He told them he wanted a place
that was remote from population and had ample water and electric-
ity. They found a large spot on the Columbia River in Washing-
ton, just 100 miles from the newly completed Grand Coulee Dam.
Groves swiftly bought it, and it became the Hanford Reserva-
307. JOHN V. WINrR & DAVID A. CONNER, POWER PLANT SITING 61-63 (1978); Wil-
liam G. Murray, Jr. & Carl J. Seneker II, Industrial Siting: Allocating the Burden of Pollution,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 304 (1978); Suren S. Singhvi, A Quantitative Approach to Site Selec-
tion, Morrr. REV., Apr. 1987, at 47. Even after most environmental regulations took effect,
they played only a secondary role in industrial location decisions, with the more traditional
factors retaining primacy. Howard A. Stafford, Environmental Protection and Industrial
Location, 75 ANNALS Ass'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 227, 231-32 (1985); see also Craig N. Oren,
Prevention of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 36 (1988) (arguing that prevention of significant deterioration requirements under the
Clean Air Act have had little impact on facility siting; underlying economics of projects are far
more important in siting decisions).
308. See supra part H.A.7.
309. MICHAEL R. GREENBERG & RICHARD F. ANDERsON, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITEs:
THE CREDmrY GAP 389 (1984); R. Nils Olsen, Jr., The Concentration of Commercial Haz-
ardous Waste Facilities in the Western New York Community, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 473, 482-83
(1991).
310. Bernstein, supra note 32, at 83, 84.
311. RIcHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE AToMIC BOMB 449-51 (1986); see also
TAD BARTIMUS & SCOTT McCARTNEY, TRuNrrY'S CHILDREN: LIVING ALONG AMERICA'S
NUCLEAR HIGHWAY 67-90 (1991).
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tion.31 2 Almost immediately, concerns were raised about the pro-
ject's impacts on the Columbia River-concerns that were soon
borne out-but wartime exigencies preempted any reconsideration
of the site selection.313 In 1942 as well, General Groves personally
selected a site in eastern Tennessee for uranium production, based
on its remoteness from metropolitan areas, its cheap land, and its
abundant water and power; this site is now known as Oak Ridge.314
In 1950, with scarcely more study, the bank of the Savannah River
in South Carolina was selected for the manufacture of tritium for
hydrogen bombs, even though the site sits atop a prolific aqui-
fer;31 5 and in 1951, Rocky Flats, Colorado was chosen for pluto-
nium fabrication with similar inattention to geologic conditions. 1 6
Individual entrepreneurs also have played a key role. The
most important by far was Frederick P. Beierle, who began his
career as a reactor operator at Hanford and who is personally
responsible for siting three of the nation's six LLRW facilities and
two hazardous waste landfills.317 In 1963, Beierle and two other
men leased a parcel near Hanford for a LLRW landfill; this
became the Richland facility, which is still operating. In 1966,
Beierle moved to Sheffield, Illinois and persuaded its citizens to let
him build a LLRW facility, which he sold to a company that
became US Ecology. (The LLRW facility is now closed, but US
Ecology still operates a hazardous waste landfill in Sheffield.) In
1968 he formed a new company, soon renamed Chem-Nuclear
Services, and he built what is now the Barnwell LLRW facility
near the Savannah River plant with the active support of the local
community and the State of South Carolina.318 In 1976, Beierle
opened a hazardous waste landfill in Livingston Parish, Louisiana,
which he later sold to Browning-Ferris Industries. Beierle also
312. MICHELE S. GERBER, ON THE HOME FRONT: THE COLD WAR LEGACY OF THE HAN-
FORD NUCLEAR SITE 11-12, 22-23 (1992); RHODES, supra note 311, at 496-97; SHuLMAN,
supra note 80, at 96.
313. See J. NEwELL STANNARD, RADIOACTIVITY AND HEALTH: A HISTORY 757, 763-64
(Raymond W. Baalman, Jr. ed., 1988).
314. CHARLES W. JOHNSON & CHARLES 0. JACKSON, CITY BEHIND A FENCE: OAK
RIDGE, TENNESSEE 1942-1946, at 3-8 (1981).
315. Hearings, supra note 251, at 420; CHARLES PiLLER, THE FAIL-SAFE SOCIETY:
COMMUNITY DEFIANCE AND THE END OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGICAL OPrIMISM 77 (1991).
316. ROGER RAPOPORT, THE GREAT AMERICAN BOMB MACHINE 33 (1971).
317. This account is based on BARLEIr & STEELE, supra note 187, at 250-96; Carol
Bradley, "Environmentalist" is Father of Low-Level, GANN=~r NEws SERVICE, Nov. 25,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File.
318. Kathryn Visocki & Sherol S. Breman, Regional Compacts and Waste Disposal, 8
F. FOR AFPLIED RES. & PUB. POL'Y 86, 87 (1993).
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was behind an unsuccessful attempt to build a HLW repository in
salt caverns located in Lyons, Kansas.
These siting decisions, swift and sure but often environmen-
tally disastrous, stand in marked contrast to the current siting pro-
cess, which is governed by federal and state environmental
agencies and regulations.
B. Siting Under Government Regulation
1. Federal Siting Processes
I have already mentioned four federal efforts to site federally
owned disposal facilities for HW/RW: Yucca Mountain, WIPP,
Lyons, and the incinerators for chemical weapons. Thus far, only
the last has led to the disposal of a single pound of waste. A fifth
effort occurred two decades ago and went nowhere.3 1 9 There have
also been two federal attempts to require the states to site facilities.
The first was the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, which
has not yet brought about any new facilities. 320 The second effort
has, so far, been similarly unproductive. It arose in the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986321 (SARA). Con-
gress was concerned that most states were making little progress in
siting new HW disposal facilities and that "Superfund money
should not be spent in States that are taking insufficient steps to
avoid the creation of future Superfund sites. ' 322 In an effort "to
solve the 'NIMBY' . . . problems that arose because of political
pressure and public opposition,' 323 Congress provided that, after
October 17, 1989, no state could receive Superfund assistance for
remedial actions unless it assured "the availability of hazardous
319. In 1970, the Army began transporting ammunition and nerve gas from depots in the
western United States to Florida for disposal at sea. Congress was concerned about where to
put such materials, LANDY ET A .. , supra note 58, at 91, and directed the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare to study the feasibility of creating a national system of sites for the
disposal of hazardous wastes. Resource Recovery Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-512, § 212, 84
Stat. 1427, 1434 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3251 (1988)). The resulting report, completed in
1973, recommended a National Disposal System with about 20 regional processing facilities.
However, this report was never implemented. CHARLES E. DAvis, THE PoLmcs OF HAZARD-
oUs WASTE 19 (1993); GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 309, at 169-70; Bernstein, supra
note 32, at 83, 86.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 237-48.
321. Superfund Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 102, 100 Stat. 1613, 1617.
322. Superfund Improvement Act of 1985, S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22
(1985); see also 132 CONG. P~c. S14,924 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Senator
Chafee) (stating that the states are not moving to avoid creation of future superfund sites and
that they must give assurances of effort to obtain funding).
323. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781,784 (4th Cir.
1991).
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waste treatment or disposal facilities which . . .have adequate
capacity for the destruction, treatment, or secure disposition of all
hazardous wastes that are reasonably expected to be generated
within the State" during the next twenty years. 2 4 These facilities
could be within the state, or outside the state if an interstate agree-
ment for the facilities' use is in place.3
Acting under this authority, the EPA required every state to
submit a "capacity assurance plan," detailing the sources, quanti-
ties, and characteristics of the hazardous wastes generated within
its borders and explaining how these wastes would be handled. 26
The National Governors Association had recommended that, after
preparation of the plans, the states negotiate between themselves to
allocate waste disposal responsibilities between them and accept an
EPA resolution if they could not agree; however, the EPA did not
adopt this suggestion.3 2 7 Every state submitted a plan,328 and the
EPA approved almost every one,32 9 even when states relied on new
facilities that were later rejected or on facilities in other states that
opposed importation. 33 0 There is no evidence that this process has
led to the initiation or approval of any new hazardous waste facili-
ties.3 31 New York State, which has a large HW landfill on which
other states are relying, sued the EPA in 1992 over its refusal to
sanction states that are not creating their own facilities. 32
324. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1988).
325. Id. § 9604(c)(9)(B).
326. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, OSWER DREC-IvE
No. 9010.00, ASSURANCE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE CAPACITY: GU1DANCE TO STATE OFFICIALs
1-14 (1988).
327. Jean H. Peretz, Equity Under and State Responses to the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 25 POL'Y SCL 191, 203 (1992).
328. GRa, supra note 37, at 96.
329. See Capacity Assurance Program, supra note 27, at 281 (statement of Sylvia K.
Lowrance, Director, Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response, EPA) (noting that the only
plans not approved were those pending from Georgia, Mississippi, Arizona, Missouri, and the
District of Columbia); see also Mississippi: Capacity Assurance Plan Nullified; Environmen-
tal Council Ruled Unconstitutional, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 331 (June 18, 1993)
(reporting the ruling of a state judge that the Mississippi submission violates the state constitu-
tion, because it requires state legislators to serve on an administrative board).
330. Capacity Assurance Program, supra note 27, at 153 (statement of Richard C. For-
tuna, Executive Director, Hazardous Waste Treatment Council).
331. GREEN, supra note 37, at xxiii.
332. New York v. EPA, 35 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1959, 1960 (N.D.N.Y. 1992). The
author's law firm represents the Town of Porter, the Town of Lewiston, and Niagara County,
New York, which are plaintifffintervenors in this action. No decision on the merits of the
action has been rendered. See also Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina,
945 F.2d 781, 782 (4th Cir. 1991).
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In 1993, the EPA changed its approach. Each state was
directed to submit data on its HW disposal capacity and demand.
Based on this information, the EPA will determine if there are any
national shortfalls. If there are, states whose demand exceeds sup-
ply in national shortfall categories will be required to submit waste
minimization plans and other data. If shortfalls are still projected
after that, further measures may be invoked.333
2. State Siting Processes
The federal government's unsuccessful attempts to site its
own HW/RW disposal facilities and to require the states to site
facilities have been mirrored by the states' efforts. Many states
have tried and failed to build state-owned facilities and to
encourage private companies to create privately owned facilities.
The two states that came closest to creating their own facili-
ties were Maryland and Arizona. In 1984, the State of Maryland
actually built an industrial waste landfill at Hawkins Point in Balti-
more Harbor, on the site of an existing chrome ore treatment facil-
ity. The state had to close the landfill after four months of
operation, however, because it could not compete financially with
commercial facilities in other states that charged lower fees.334 In
1981, the Arizona Legislature mandated the creation of an inte-
grated hazardous waste treatment facility, including an incinerator
and a landfill, in Maricopa County.335 The state contracted with
Ensco, Inc. to build the facility.336 In 1991, when the plant was
nearly complete, the state government, facing rising opposition,
cancelled the project and paid Ensco forty-four million dollars for
333. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, OSWER DmECTIVE
No. 9010.02, GUIDANCE FOR CAPACITY ASSURANCE PLANNING: CAPACITY PLANNING PURsu-
ANT TO CERCLA § 104(c)(9), at 1-2 to 1-3 (1993).
334. GREEN, supra note 37, at 75, 78; ANNE S. RYAN, A REPORT To MASSACHUSETrs
HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITE SAFETY COUNCIL, APPROACHES TO HAZARDOUS WASTE
FACILITY SITING IN Tm UNITED STATES at All (1984); Thomas D. McKewen & Anne C.
Sloan, A Successful Hazardous Waste Landfill Siting-Maryland's Experience, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HAZARDOUS WASTES AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
247, 250 (Hazardous Materials Control Research Inst. 1987).
335. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-902(A) (1993).
336. RYAN, supra note 334, at Al; Richard N.L. Andrews, Hazardous Waste Facility
Siting: State Approaches, in DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLITICS AND POLICY 117,
121 (Charles E. Davis & James P. Lester eds., 1988) [hereinafter DIMENSIONS]; Mary Powers,
Hazardous Waste: Arizona Is First State to Own Treatment Plant, ENG'G NEws-REc., Apr.
19, 1990, at 12.
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its trouble; the state raised the money by selling two state prisons
and leasing them back.
337
Efforts by states to encourage private firms to locate HW/RW
facilities within their borders have fared little better. In the late
1960s and early 1970s, many states adopted legislation that cen-
tralized the permitting of power plants and other heavy industrial
facilities. 338 With this as precedent, and under the prodding of the
EPA,339 at least thirty-six states enacted hazardous waste facility
siting laws, mostly between 1979 and 1984.340
No two of these state laws are alike. They have been ana-
lyzed and compared many times,34 1 and that analysis need not be
repeated here. Suffice it to say that most of these laws provide for
enhanced public participation and for technical siting criteria.
They often create special siting boards to act on facility proposals.
The laws vary considerably in the degree of state initiative in the
siting process, from aggressively proactive to passively reactive.
Some allow the states to preempt local authority, and some pre-
serve local approval power.
Technical siting criteria, especially when combined with sit-
ing boards, advance the notion that an objectively "best" site exists
337. Arizona Governor Approves $44 Million Buyout of Planned Hazardous Waste
Incinerator, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 567 (July 5, 1991); Hearing on Hazardous Waste
Facility Draws 2,500 to Hear Debate on Permits, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 429 (June
29, 1990).
338. CHRISTOPHER J. DutRKsF. , ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL PLANT
SITING: How To MAKE IT WORK BETTER 109-23 (1983); O'HARE ET AL., supra note 11, at 54,
60; Mickale Carter, The Montana Major Facility Siting Act, 45 MoNT. L. REV. 113, 113-14
(1984); A. Dan Tarlock, Siting New or Expanded Treatment, Storage, or Disposal Facilities:
The Pigs in the Parlors of the 1980s, 17 NAT. RFSOURcES LAW. 429, 459 (1984).
339. The EPA developed a Model State Hazardous Waste Management Act and urged
the states to assume primary responsibility for assuring the availability of hazardous waste
disposal capacity. Brain Canter, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the New State Siting Pro-
grams, 14 NAT. RESOURcES LAW. 421, 432-36 (1982).
340. HAZARDOUS WASTE FAcILrrY SITING, supra note 1, at 9.
341. For comparisons of various state siting laws, see generally HAZARDOUS WASTE
FAcmry SrrING, supra note 1, at 9-22; GREEN, supra note 37, at 76-77; GREENBERG &
ANDERSON, supra note 309, at 179-86; RYAN, supra note 334; Andrews, supra note 336, at 8-
25; Canter, supra note 339; Isabelle R. Davidson, An Analysis of Existing Requirements for
Siting and Permitting Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities and a Proposalfor a More Worka-
ble System, 34 ADMIN. L. REv. 533, 543-40 (1982); Celeste P. Duffy, State Hazardous Waste
Facility Siting: Easing the Process Through Local Cooperation and Preemption, 11 ENVTL.
Ai-. 755, 773-83 (1984); English & Davis, supra note 35, at 280-81; Susan G. Hadden et al.,
State Roles in Siting Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities: From State Preemption to Local
Veto, in THE PoLmcs OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT 196, 198-209 (James P. Lester &
Ann O'M. Bowman eds., 1983) [hereinafter PoLmcS]; Albert R. Matheny & Bruce A. Wil-
liams, Knowledge vs. NIMBY Assessing Florida's Strategy for Siting Hazardous Waste Dis-
posal Facilities, 14 POL'Y STUD. J. 70, 70-72 (1985); Tarlock, supra note 338.
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only people with enough data, expertise, and wisdom can find it.
This idea is implicit in many of the state statutes and has been
made explicit by some commentators, several of whom see this
search as the means to achieving public acceptance of unwanted
facilities.42 The siting criteria most commonly concern depth to
groundwater; proximity to wells, surface waters, residences, prop-
erty lines, and recreational areas; and avoidance of wetlands and
endangered species habitats.343 Elaborate multistage techniques
have been devised under which the number of possible sites is pro-
gressively reduced by the application of successive "filters" or
"constraints." 34
As shown by the dismal record of siting attempts, these multi-
stage techniques can be counterproductive. Michael O'Hare and
colleagues have correctly pointed out that
[t]he general rule seems to be that rationalistic site selection by
successive exclusionary judgments serves only to focus political
opposition in the relatively small part of the state remaining after
the exclusion process, while the broad consensus agreement on
the particular criteria being used seems impossible to maintain
after its implications become known.345
342. See, e.g., MORm.L & MAGORIAN, supra note 10, at 160; O'HARE ET AL., supra note
11, at 4; Douglas Easterling, Fair Rules for Siting a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository, 11
J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MomT. 442,442-43 (1992); Matheny & Williams, supra note 341, at 71;
Barry D. Solomon & Diane M. Cameron, Nuclear Waste Repository Siting: An Alternative
Approach, 13 ENERGY PoL'Y 564, 572-75 (1985).
343. TEMPLE, BARKER & SLOANE, EPA OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, STUDY OF STATE HAZ-
ARwous WASTE FAcIrY SrrNG CRrrERIA (1987); WILLIAM M. SLOAN, SITE SELECTION FOR
NEw HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES 73 (1993); Thomas P. Ballestero & Mark
D. Kelley, Where Can New Landfills Be Sited?, WASTE AGE, Oct. 1990, at 145, 145-52.
Certain federal statutes also require the development of siting criteria, e.g., NWPA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 10,132(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(4) (1988); see Guidelines
for Hazardous Waste Treatment Sites: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Commerce, Transp.,
and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1986)
[hereinafter Guidelines] (statement of Marcia E. Williams, Director, Office of Solid Waste &
Emergency Response, EPA).
344. NEw YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
FACILITY SITING (1990); GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 309, at 191-234; GEORGE
NOBLE, SITING LANDFILLS AND OTHER LULUs (1992); Richard F. Anderson & Michael R.
Greenberg, Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: A Role for Planners, 48 J. Am. PLAN. ASs'N,
204, 207-10 (1982); Charles D. Hollister & Harry W. Smedes, Selecting Sites for Radioactive
Waste Repositories, in HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT: IN WHOSE BACKYARD? 63-66
(Michalann Harthill ed., 1981) [hereinafter HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT]; Stephen K.
Swallow et al., Siting Noxious Facilities: An Approach that Integrates Technical, Economic,
and Political Considerations, 68 LAND ECON. 283, 288-89 (1992).
345. O'HA.E ET AL., supra note 11, at 56; see also Frank J. Dodd, Siting Hazardous
Waste Facilities in New Jersey: Keeping the Debate Open, 9 SETON HALL LEOIs. J. 423, 433
(1986); Tarlock, supra note 338, at 457-58.
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Moreover, the criteria themselves, far from being objective, are
necessarily laden with value judgments. How close may a waste
facility be to an elementary school: 500 feet or 5000 feet? Can a
scenic vista be destroyed, and what precisely is a scenic vista?
How much numerical weight should be given to impacts on drink-
ing water versus impacts on endangered species? Experts are of
little help in answering these questions. 346 Even when siting crite-
ria are agreed on in advance, their application in particular cases
can often be seriously questioned.347
The perfect site is a mirage, because the definition of perfec-
tion embodies so many contradictions. The perfect site would be
far from any population centers so as to reduce the risk of health
effects, but it would be near a highway and close to where the
waste is generated in order to reduce transportation accidents. The
perfect site would also be in an area with no development, but it
would not be within a wilderness area, a park, an agricultural
region, or the habitat of rare species; it would have a high and deep
clay layer, but no water trapped on the top. Finally, it would be in
a region that benefitted from the production of the waste to be
disposed of, even though the most isolated and dry places in the
United States, the western deserts, tend to be in states that generate
little nuclear and hazardous waste.
C. Continuation and Expansion of Existing Facilities
It is a great irony that, at least so far, the principal environ-
mental impact of stringent siting rules, ineffective siting strategies,
and the illusory search for the perfect site has been to continue the
life of old, substandard, poorly sited HW/RW facilities, so that
most of this waste still goes to places picked by Leslie Groves,
Frederick A. Beierle, and their counterparts. Of the twenty-one
commercial HW landfills operating today, for example, only one is
346. See generally Joseph B. Rose, Planning for "Fairness:" Wrestling with Criteria
for the Location of City Facilities, AssEsSOR, Feb. 1991, at 1, 2-3 (showing how seemingly
objective siting criteria can be readily manipulated).
347. For example, serious technical flaws were discovered in the studies leading to the
selection of an LLRW site in Martinsville, Illinois. ENGLisH, supra note 10, at 64; Martins-
ville, supra note 244, at 1. Major questions have been raised as well about the application of
siting criteria in locating an LLRW facility in New York State, see generally U.S. GAO, PuB.
No. GAO/RCED-92-172, NUCLEAR wASTE: NEw YORK'S ADHERENCE TO SrrE SELECTION
PROCEDURES Is UNCLEAR 1-2 (1992) (examining New York low-level radioactive waste man-
agement), in siting an industrial liquid waste disposal facility in Ontario, see Edward J. Farkas,
The Nimby Syndrome, 10 ALTEmATrVES 47, 47 (1981), as well as the selection of Yucca
Mountain, see supra text accompanying notes 196-208.
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on a site selected since the enactment of RCRA in 1 9 7 6 .34 8 The
EPA found that about seventy percent of all land-based HW treat-
ment, storage, and disposal facilities would fail the EPA's current
siting criteria for protecting groundwater.34 9  One sample found
pote.tial releases of hazardous wastes from about ninety percent of
such facilities. 5 ° Some old facilities still operate in locations that
would be inconceivable under current rules. For example, Radiac
Research Corp. operates a commercial hazardous and radioactive
waste storage facility in a row building in Brooklyn, New York.3
When the waste management industry wants to add new
capacity, it is much more likely to seek to expand existing sites
than to move to new sites.3 52  Both anecdotal experience 3 53 and
formal public opinion research 35 4 confirm that communities are
much more likely to accept expansions of existing HW/RW facili-
ties than the introduction of new ones.
348. See infra note 659 and accompanying text.
349. Guidelines, supra note 343, at 48 (statement of Marcia E. Williams, Director,
Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response, EPA). Within this sample, on-site facilities
tended to be in somewhat worse locations than commercial facilities. ld.
350. U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-91-79, HAZARDOUS WASTE: LIMrrED PROGRESS
IN CLOSING AND CLEANING UP CONTAMINATED FACILITIES 44 (1991).
351. Hameline v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv., 572 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348
(App. Div. 1991).
352. See generally Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned:
Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 69, 70 (1991) (reporting on the proposed construction of hazardous waste incinerators
in Kettleman City, California, at the site of an existing hazardous waste landfill); Reg Lang,
Fair Siting in Waste Management, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 38, at 237 (reporting the
expansion of landfill sites in Ontario); Pat Medige, No More Waste, CWM Told, NIAGARA
GAZErrE, June 15, 1990, at 1 (discussing a proposal, since abandoned, for construction of a
hazardous waste incinerator in Porter, New York, at the site of an existing hazardous waste
landfill).
353. See generally JACOB, supra note 203, at 161 (explaining that "a legacy of externali-
ties already evident in the environments of Hanford and Yucca Mountain lowered political
opposition to additional increments of environmental degradation"); McKewen & Sloan, supra
note 334, at 249 (discussing the successful siting of a hazardous waste landfill in an area of
Baltimore surrounded by existing landfills); Gretchen D. Monti, "All Politics Is Local": Inte-
grating Local Concerns into Facility Site Selection, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 38, at 36, 38
(observing that a study of experience in Illinois shows that "[i]t is much easier to expand a
waste facility that a community has become accustomed to").
354. MICHAEL R. EDELSTEIN, CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHO-
LOGICAL IMPACTS OF RESIDENTIAL TOXIC ExPosuRE 17 (1988); Barry G. Rabe, Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Disposal and the Revival of Environmental Regionalism in the United
States, 7 ENvrL. & PLAN. L.J. 171, 177 (1990) ("Survey research has demonstrated that public
trust of power generation and waste disposal facilities increases with greater proximity to and
familiarity with such facilities." (citing evidence from areas of Beatty, Richland, and Bamwell
LLRW facilities)).
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The law makes it immensely easier for companies to continue
and expand existing facilities than to create new ones,355 and much
harder for opponents to shut down existing facilities than to block
new ones.356 In an extension of the doctrine in zoning law that
"prior nonconforming uses" may continue,357 hazardous waste
facilities have been held to have vested rights to continue their
operations, 358 and in some states, the "natural expansion doctrine"
even requires municipalities to allow landfills and similar facilities
to expand. 9
When Congress enacted RCRA in 1976, it decided not to
require existing facilities to meet the new siting and technology
standards, for fear that most of them would have to shut down,
leaving hazardous waste with no place to go. 360 Instead, facilities
that filed a short form, called a Part A application, and met certain
minimal requirements were granted "interim status," which
allowed them to continue to operate. 361 A far more elaborate Part
B application, typically running many volumes, had to be filed
355. For some of the psychological issues in on-site storage of hazardous waste, see
infra text accompanying notes 641-55.
356. Statistical analysis confirms that citizens have seldom succeeded in shutting down
existing HW facilities. G. Stephen Mason, Jr., Closure and Rejection of Waste Facilities:
What Effect Has Public Pressure?, HAzARDous MATERIALS CoNRoL, July-Aug. 1989, at 54,
55. It is practically universal in regulatory law that products and activities in existence at the
time of a rule's enactment receive far more lenient treatment, both substantively and procedur-
ally, than do products and activities that are sought to be introduced later. Peter Huber, The
Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1029-37 (1983). For an economic
analysis of aspects of this phenomenon, see generally Charles D. Kolstad et al., Ex Post Liabil-
ity for Hann vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, 80 Am. ECON.
REv. 888 (1990).
357. CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN
AMERICA 144-45 (1977).
358. Niagara Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Niagara, 443 N.Y.S.2d 939, 946-47 (App. Div.
1981). A contrary result occurred in Clean Harbors of Braintree v. Braintree Bd. of Health,
570 N.E.2d 987, 990-91 (Mass. 1991), but in response to this decision, state legislation was
enacted exempting preexisting HW incinerators from municipal approval requirements. Clean
Harbors of Braintree v. Braintree Bd. of Health, 616 N.E.2d 78, 80-81 (Mass. 1993); see also
CECOS Int'l, Inc. v. Jorling, 895 F.2d 66, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding a state statute that
repeals exemptions for expansion of existing landfills from state siting laws).
359. E.g., Speedway Grading Corp. v. Barrow County Bd. of Comm'rs, 373 S.E.2d 205,
208 (Ga. 1988); Township of Chartiers v. William H. Martin, Inc., 542 A.2d 985, 989 (Pa.
1988); Sturgis v. Winnebago County Bd. of Adjustment, 413 N.W.2d 642, 642 (Wis. Ct. App.
1981); see also Bruce J. Parker & John H. Turner, Overcoming Obstacles to the Siting of Solid
Waste Management Facilities, 21 N.M. L. Rv. 92, 111 (1991).
360. LANDY sr A., supra note 58, at 109. Such choices are common in environmental
law. Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual
Framework, 69 CAL. L. Rv. 1259, 1314 (1981) (discussing the varying treatment of new and
old plants and products).
361. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e) (1988).
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later.362 By 1984, when Congress reauthorized RCRA, this process
was moving so slowly that Congress grew impatient, 363 requiring
landfills to file Part B applications and meet certain groundwater
monitoring and financial responsibility requirements by November
8, 1985 or lose their interim status.364 Only about one-quarter of
all the then-existing HW landfills-and fifty of the fifty-nine larg-
est commercial facilities-met this deadline.3 65 As a result, most
of the smaller landfills shut down, but the larger ones stayed open.
Most of the facilities in the Nuclear Weapons Complex are also
under interim status. 66 The old landfills still operating under
interim status are subject to far laxer rules367 than are new units.
3 68
For example, many have no liners to protect the groundwater,
because the EPA determined that retrofitting them might do more
harm than good.369 Old hazardous waste incinerators under interim
status are also subject to far laxer standards than are those with
new pernits.37 0 Certain facilities are also allowed to expand their
capacity considerably while still under interim status.
371
362. Alex S. Karlin, Hazardous Waste Management, in 3 ENvIRONMENTAL LAW PRAc-
ricE GuIDE, supra note 22, at 29-1, 29-97.
363. JOHN E. BONNE & THOMAS 0. McGARrY, THE LAW OF ENvmRONMrAL PRoTEC-
TION 771 (2d ed. 1992).
364. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2).
365. U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/T-RCED-92-64, HAZARDOUS WASTE: IMPEDIMENTS
HAVE DELAYED THE CLOSING AND CLEANUP OF LAND DISPOSAL FAcILITIEs 2 (1992) (state-
ment of Richard L. Hembra, Director, Environmental Protection Issues, Resources, Commu-
nity and Economic Development Division); BONmNE & McGARITY, supra note 363, at 771.
366. OFFIcE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 219, at 28.
367. 40 C.F.R. pt. 265 (1992).
368. 40 C.F.R. pt. 264 (1992).
369. GAO, supra note 350, at 13; CHRISTOPHER HARRIS ET AL., HAzAmOUS WASTE:
Co orNTmNO THE CHALLENGE 111 (1987).
370. See U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-92-21, HAZARDOUS WASTE: INCINERATOR
OPERATING REGULATIONS AND RELATED AIR EMISSION STANDARDS 3 (1991).
371. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13-IE-87 (West 1991); GAO, supra note 2, at 24. This partial
or total "grandfathering" of existing facilities extends beyond RCRA to many of the other
relevant legal requirements. See generally DUERKSEN, supra note 338, at 162-65. These
include the Clean Air Act's stationary source standards, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (1988), preven-
tion of significant deterioration permits, id. § 7475(b), and solid waste combustion rules, id.
§ 7429(b); the Clean Water Act's rules for publicly owned treatment works, 33 U.S.C.
§ 131 1(b)(1)(B) (1988); the National Environmental Policy Act's environmental impact state-
ment requirements, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1988 & Supp. 1I 1991); restrictions on trade
in endangered species, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(b)(1) (1988); the designation of areas unsuitable for
mining under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C.
§ 1272(a)(6) (1988); the prohibition on commercial activities in designated wilderness areas
under the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1988); and EPA's regulations on MSW land-
fills, Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 51,042 (1991); 40 C.F.R.
§ 258.16(a) (1992).
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D. The Overlay of Permits and Other Regulatory Obstacles
The federal and state statutes designed to find sites for HW/
RW facilities have received considerable commentary. 2  Much
less attention has been devoted to the dense overlay of permits that
must be obtained and other legal strictures that must be met by
HW/RW facility operators. 73 This focus on the siting laws has
somewhat misdirected the academic inquiry, because practitioners
know that the highest hurdles faced by project proponents arise in
the permit laws, not the siting laws. To build a facility, a devel-
oper must obtain each and every required permit; to stop a project,
opponents must merely block one. As Benjamin Walter and Mal-
colm Getz have pointed out, "[d]ispersing authority among
independent veto points strikingly resembles a string of bulbs on a
Christmas tree that have been wired in series. When one goes out,
so do all the others. 374
In examining these laws, it is remarkable how many of the
strongest ones-those with the most absolute prohibitions-are
aimed at preserving wildernesses, endangered species, wetlands,
parks, and historic buildings. These irreplaceable resources are
preserved for future generations in a strong expression of society's
moral and aesthetic values,3 7 5 and current community concerns are
largely relegated to the political process. Health impacts, the pri-
mary basis for most opposition,376 are implicit in the laws protect-
ing groundwater, air quality, and the like, but they tend not to
enjoy the same favored status as does protection of natural areas.
Lawyers for project opponents are thus forced to focus on grounds
that are often well removed from their original clients' basic con-
cerns, a paradox exemplified by the snail darter that stopped the
Tellico Dam 377 and the striped bass that stopped the Westway
372. See sources cited supra note 341.
373. A plethora of federal and state permit requirements have been enacted, mostly in
the 1970s. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE PsRMrr EXPLOSION: COORDINATION OF THE
PROLIFERATION (1976); DUERKSEN, supra note 338, at 79-88; Katharine J. Teter et al., Long
Arm of Uncle Sam: Federal Environmental Issues in Siting Decisions, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Winter 1993, at 9.
374. Benjamin Walter & Malcolm Getz, Social and Economic Effects of Toxic Waste
Disposal, in CONTROVERSIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 223, 240 (Sheldon Kamieniecki et
al. eds., 1986).
375. See Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorum, 1986 U. ILL. L.
REv. 337, 344-46, 348-49.
376. See infra text accompanying notes 590-606.
377. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 158 (1978); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In
the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 J.L.
REFORM 805, 805-06 (1986).
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highway. 378 Only limited overlap exists between the subjects dis-
cussed in the permit hearings and lawsuits about a project, on the
one hand, and the community and political meetings about the pro-
ject, on the other.37 9
Given the often decisive role of legislatures in selecting sites,
the legal processes can be effective at stopping projects by causing
one of the "Christmas tree lights" of the permit process to go out,
but they can do little to help build facilities.
IV. EVALUATING THE CURRENT SITING PROCESSES
At the outset of this Article, I framed the HW/RW siting prob-
lem as how to find the system of HW/RW management that maxi-
mizes social welfare, takes full account of social and
environmental costs, and still achieves fairness. The purpose of
Part IV is to evaluate the current system by this measure. This
requires addressing five questions:
1. Does the system allow the sound remediation of waste that
has already been created but still lingers, while also providing suf-
ficient disposal capacity for waste that, despite efforts at waste
minimization, will be created in the future?
2. Does the system ensure that the full costs of disposal facil-
ities are borne by the users of the facilities?
3. Does the system protect human health and the
environment?
4. Is the system fair?
5. Is the system politically viable?
In the course of this discussion, I will also explore some of
the hidden economic forces and psychological factors at play in the
siting process.
A. Needed Disposal Capacity
Federal and state governments are taking extraordinarily
intrusive steps to site HW/RW facilities. The federal government
is trying to force facilities on the states and states are trying to
force facilities on municipalities through incursions on the normal
378. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 772 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir.
1985).
379. Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus expressed a comparable idea when he blocked a ship-
ment of HLw: "The legal grounds are not near as important as the moral and political
grounds, and I can use the courts till you can step on my beard." Fox Butterfield, Idaho Finn
on Barring Atomic Waste, N.Y. Timas, Oct. 23, 1988, at A32.
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concepts of sovereignty and home rule.38 0  There must be some
compelling rationale to justify these steps.
The explanations vary between hazardous waste and radioac-
tive waste. For HW, the usual reasons given are that there is a
serious shortage of disposal facilities, that illegal dumping will be
rampant without more facilities, and that a shortage of facilities
will harm the economy. For RW, the usual reasons offered are that
government control is necessary to prevent fissile materials from
falling into the wrong hands, that anything less than permanent
disposal is unsafe, and that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
require more facilities.
1. Hazardous Waste
A severe shortage of HW facilities is usually assumed.38 ' A
long history exists of crying wolf about pressing demands, both for
waste disposal facilities382 and for large unwanted installations in
general. 3  It is therefore necessary to look more closely to see if
the wolf is really at the door. The question is so difficult that one
state siting board conducted a week-long trial to determine whether
a new hazardous waste landfill was needed and in the end threw up
its hands and said it could not decide.384 Many agencies examining
the issue take a private company's interest in building a facility as
380. See infra part V.B.1.
381. NOBLE, supra note 344, at 17; EMILIE SCHMEIDLER & PETER M. SANDMAN, GET-
TING TO MAYBE: DECISIONS ON THE ROAD TO NEGOTIATION IN HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY
SrrING 22 (1988); Audrey M. Armour, The Siting of Locally Unwanted Land Uses: Towards a
Cooperative Approach, 35 PROGRESS PLAN. 1, 7 (1991); see also supra note 7 and accompa-
nying text.
382. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(8) (1988) (preamble to RCRA, enacted in 1976)
(stating that "many of the cities in the United States will be running out of suitable solid waste
disposal sites within five years unless immediate action is taken"); Harvey Alter, The Myths of
Municipal Solid Waste, SOLID WASTE & POWER, July-Aug. 1992, at 46 (asserting that govern-
ment officials have consistently proclaimed an imminent crisis in garbage disposal since the
turn of the century).
383. For example, Western LNG Terminal Co. waged a ten-year battle to site a liquified
natural gas (LNG) terminal in California, claiming dire need. However, the company with-
drew the application when deregulation of domestic natural gas prices in 1978 destroyed the
market for imported LNG. Howard Kunreuther et al., A Decision-Process Perspective on Risk
and Policy Analysis, in RESOLVING LOCATIONAL CONFLICT, supra note 17, at 260, 261-63;
Lawrence E. Susskind & Stephen R. Cassella, The Dangers of Preemptive Legislation: The
Case of LNG Facility Siting in California, in RESOLViNG LOCATIONAL CONFLICT, supra note
17, at 408, 411-12. Similarly, at least twenty-four attempts between 1970 and 1980 to site a
new oil refinery somewhere along the eastern seaboard have failed. PILLER, supra note 315, at
161. Yet, it is unclear whether a pressing need exists for these facilities.
384. In re CECOS Int'l, Inc., Application No. 90-85-0551, at *7-*10 (N.Y. Dep't. of
Envtl. Conserv., Mar. 13, 1990), available in LEXIS, ENVIRN library, NYENV file. The
Board denied the landfill permit, because it found the site to be geologically unsuitable. Id.
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prima facie proof of need, reasoning that the company would not
otherwise risk its own capital.3 5 But this merely proves that the
company believes the facility can turn a profit, not that society
desperately needs it-the fact that Chrysler still wants to sell cars
does not prove there is a shortage of cars. The need for new facili-
ties is also justified by the argument that, without them, illegal
dumping will increase. As shown below, this too has no basis in
fact.
386
Central to ascertaining need is determining whether people
seeking to dispose of hazardous waste can consistently find a law-
ful place to send it; the answer seems to be yes, as evidenced by
the national estimates of an adequate or even excessive supply of
disposal capacity.387 By simple reference to the Yellow Pages-
typically under the heading "Waste Reduction, Disposal, &
Recycling Services"-one can find hazardous waste brokers that
will gladly connect waste generators with waste transporters and
disposal facilities. Other brokers arrange for the pickup of LLRW
for shipment to licensed facilities.88
To be sure, prices have soared. Between 1976 and 1991-a
period during which producer prices doubled3 819 -average waste
disposal costs increased from less than $10 to more than $250 per
metric ton for landfilling and from about $50 to more than $2600
per metric ton for sludge incineration.390 It seems likely that the
385. See Industrial Fuels & Resources/Ilinois, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 592
N.E.2d 148, 150 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); GREEN, supra note 37, at 74; Robert W. Craig & Terry
R. Lash, Siting Nonradioactive Hazardous Waste Facilities, in HAzARDous WAsTE MANAGE-
MENT, supra note 344, at 99, 101-03; Gary Davis & William Colglazier, Siting Hazardous
Waste Facilities: Asking the Right Questions, in AMERICA'S FUTuRE, supra note 35, at 167,
175-76. Approaches used by Wisconsin state agencies in determining the need for MSW facil-
ities are discussed in Mary B. Amett, Comment, Down in the Dumps and Wasted: The Need
Determination in the Wisconsin Landfill Siting Process, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 543 566-67;
Joseph C. Gergits, Comment, Enhancing the Community's Role in Landfill Siting in Illinois,
1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 97, 121-22. Approaches used in determining the need for HW facilities
are discussed in Dennis M. Toft, Site Selection for Hazardous Waste Facilities, NAT.
REsoURcEs & ENV'T, Winter 1993, at 6, 7-8.
386. See infra part IV.C.2.
387. See supra notes 34-55 and accompanying text. The one major exception appears to
be mixed hazardous and radioactive waste. See supra text accompanying note 301.
388. NEw YORK STATE DEP'T op ENVTL. CONSERV., 1990 NEw YORK STATE LOW-
LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WAsTE TRANSPORTATION REPORT 2-1 to 3-2 (1992).
389. The Bureau of Labor Statistics' Producer Price Index for all industrial commodities
rose from 58.4 in 1976 to 116.5 in 1991.
390. D. Kofi Asante-Duah et al., The Hazardous Waste Trade: Can It Be Controlled?,
26 EN TL. Sci. TECH. 1684, 1685 (1992); see also MAZMANiAN & MoRr.L, supra note 6, at
128-29; Hsin-Neng Hsieh & Haydar Erdogan, Cost Estimates for Several Hazardous Waste
Disposal Options, 5 HAzARDous WASTE & HAzARDous MATERIALS 329,333-35 (1988); Ellen
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limited number of disposal facilities caused much of this price
increase by enabling the few remaining facilities to charge more
for their services. It is clear, as discussed below,39 1 that rising
prices for waste disposal significantly reduce waste generation.
Given the variability of price and the elasticity of demand, there is
no "shortage" of HW disposal facilities in strict economic terms, as
quantity demanded does not exceed quantity supplied.
2. Radioactive Waste
The federal government has assumed-though not yet ful-
filled-responsibility for off-site disposal of HLW and TRU, for
the compelling reason that plutonium must be held securely.
Because LLRW is not useful to putative bomb makers, its disposal
is a commercial enterprise. There is plainly no surplus of radioac-
tive waste disposal capacity; Yucca Mountain has not been built,
WIPP is built but not open, and only two or three LLRW disposal
facilities remain operating. Whether the paucity of most kinds of
RW facilities has major adverse impacts, however, is debatable.
The NWPA statutorily determined the need for the Yucca
Mountain facility.392 Critics claim that no pressing need exists for
a repository, because HLW can be safely stored at reactor sites for
many decades. They argue that the principal impetus behind the
Yucca Mountain project was that "[t]he lack of a disposal solution
had long been a political albatross around the neck of the nuclear
industry. ' 393  In 1989, the NRC determined that no significant
safety or environmental impacts would result from a delay in the
Goodbaum & David Rotman, Hazardous Waste: Faced with Dwindling Choices, Companies
Must Seek New Ways to Manage It, CHEMICAL WK., Aug. 23, 1989, at 18. Disposal fees for
solid waste landfills also escalated. Peter S. Menell, Beyond the Throwaway Society: An
Incentive Approach to Regulating Municipal Solid Waste, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655, 665-66
(1990). For a theoretical discussion of how disposal prices should be set, see generally Jay R.
Lund, Pricing Solid- and Hazardous-Waste Landfill Capacity, 116 J. UPB. PLAN. & DEv. 17
(1990).
391. See infra part IV.B.
392. 42 U.S.C. § 10,131(a)(1)-(2) (1988). Note that the NWPA also provides that the
EIS for Yucca Mountain need not consider the need for the facility, id. § 10,134(f)(6), and that
the NRC may not consider the need for the monitored retrievable storage facility in licensing
it, leaving that decision to DOE and Congress, id. §§ 10,161(d), 10,168(c).
393. MAKHJAMN & SALEsKA, supra note 191, at 39; see also JACOB, supra note 203, at
40, 182 (explaining how nuclear utilities capitalized on fear of financial disaster and nuclear
waste disposal crisis to force federal relief); Roger E. Kasperson et al., Confronting Equity in
Radioactive Waste Management: Modest Proposals for a Socially Just and Acceptable Pro-
gram, in EQurry Issuss, supra note 180, at 331, 352; Eliot Marshall, Thirty Ways to Tempo-
rize on Waste, 237 ScIENcE 591, 591 (1987); Carol Polsgrove, Where Will We Dump the
Nuclear Trash?, PRoGRassrv, Mar. 1983, at 22, 25-26.
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availability of Yucca Mountain until 2025,194 and in 1990 the
National Academy of Science concluded that continued at-reactor
storage of spent fuel should be safe for at least 100 years.395
The absence of facilities-namely, Yucca Mountain and
WIPP-for the disposal of waste from nuclear weapons production
poses greater problems. Much of the waste destined for these
facilities is kept in crude conditions, posing a significant threat to
the environment.396
The economics of LLRW resemble those of hazardous waste,
except that LLRW appears to be even more price elastic. Nation-
wide LLRW volumes declined by about half between 1981 and
1989. These quantities are expected to drop still further as the
remaining LLRW repositories increase their disposal charges to
almost $300 per cubic foot and waste generators learn that materi-
als substitution and better operational practices can reduce the
amount of LLRW created. 97 Temporary shutdowns of disposal
facilities have, however, briefly disrupted the operations of some
LLRW generators. 98
B. Internalization of Costs
Waste disposal costs significantly affect the demand for facili-
ties for commercial HW/RW disposal.399 Under classical eco-
nomic theory, the market is distorted if the price of a good or
service does not fully reflect its social cost.4 0 Given the demand
elasticity of waste disposal, if the price of waste disposal is artifi-
cially low, then the amount of waste generated will be inefficiently
high.4° '
394. Waste Confidence Decision Review, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,767, 39,790 (1989) (to be
codified at 10 C.F.R. § 51).
395. BOARD ON RADIOACrTIVE WASTE McONrr., supra note 195, at 8-9.
396. See supra text accompanying notes 182-85.
397. OmcE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 226, at 7-8; Radioactive Waste: States
Outside Southeast Compact Face Sharply Higher Fees to Use Barnwell, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 19, at 1313 (Sept. 4, 1992); Reinhold, supra note 249, at 1, 8. The average cost of dispos-
ing of one cubic foot of Class A LLRW, which is the least radioactive, rose from $1 in 1975 to
$42 in 1988. Contreras, supra note 2, at 529.
398. Contreras, supra note 2, at 520-21.
399. See infra text accompanying notes 791-94. Waste generation from nuclear weap-
ons production does not seem sensitive to disposal costs.
400. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1-
44 (1960) (analyzing the role of social costs in economic analysis).
401. See A. MYRICK FREEMAN r ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENrAL POLICY
27 (1973); TALBOT PAGE, CONSERVATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: AN APPROACH TO
MATERIALS POLICY 83-84 (1977); KENNETH S. SEwALL, THE TRADEoFF BETWEEN COST AND
RISK IN HAzARDous WASTE MANAGEMENT 209 (1990); Roberta G. Gordon, Legal Incentives
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If it succeeded in siting facilities, the current system of HW/
RW facility siting would keep the price of waste disposal artifi-
cially low in two important ways. First, the cost of building facili-
ties, which is ultimately reflected in disposal prices, would be
lowered by federal and state override of local zoning controls.
Second, under prevailing tort doctrines, facility operators would
be-and indeed are-able to escape payment for many of the
external costs they impose on their neighbors. These two market
distortions are examined below.40 2
1. Zoning Override
One of the favorite legislative techniques in siting HW/RW
disposal facilities is to override local zoning and other land use
controls.403 Removing a zoning restriction from a piece of land
ordinarily provides a financial benefit to the property owner.
Every developer knows that securing the consent of local officials
to a project with hostile neighbors is an arduous, expensive process
that often requires community compensation, reductions in project
size, and changes in design. Eliminating the issue of consent
would be a tremendous benefit to the developer. Assuming a com-
petitive market for waste disposal, a zoning override at disposal
facilities might well be reflected in lower disposal prices.
Although in practice, zoning overrides have been unsuccessful in
HW/RW siting,4 °5 this analysis suggests that, even if they worked,
they would be economically inefficient.40 6
for Reduction, Reuse, and Recycling: A New Approach to Hazardous Waste Management, 95
YALE L.J. 810, 815-16 (1986); see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OmcICE, FEDERAL OPrIONS
FOR REDUCING WAsTE DIsPosAL 4 (1991) (stating that optimal level of waste disposal is the
point where the demand for waste disposal services equals the marginal social cost); C. Miller,
Efficiency, Equity and Pollution: The Case of Radioactive Waste, 19 ENV'T & PLAN. A 913,
914 (1987).
402. For a more theoretical discussion of the interaction of zoning law and nuisance law,
see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
403. See infra part V.B.1.
404. See Norman Karlin, Zoning and Other Land Use Controls: From the Supply Side,
12 Sw. U. L. REv. 561, 575 (1980-81).
405. See infra notes 751-56 and accompanying text.
406. Cf. Michael F. Sheehan, Economism, Democracy, and Hazardous Wastes: Some
Policy Considerations, in CONTROVERsIEs IN ENViRONmENTAL POLICY, supra note 374, at
108, 122:
Allowing economic bargaining between the waste facility industry and the com-
munities involved would, within the logic of the economic system, establish a mar-
ket where the value of a particular site could be weighed relative to other sites and
relative to the feelings of the local population. Prices established in this way would
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2. External Costs
If HW/RW facilities are able to inflict costs on their neighbors
without compensating them-in economists' jargon, if the nega-
tive externalities are not internalized-then the neighbors are, in
effect, subsidizing the waste generators.4 °7
The state of the art in quantifying the externalities from waste
disposal facilities is extremely crude. °8 In recent years numerous
studies have been performed, however, on the impact of such facil-
ities on one useful measure of externalities: property values.
40 9
Most of these studies show a strong negative correlation between
proximity to a HW/RW disposal site and property values,41 0 espe-
cially after publicity concerning the site41' or concerning other
internalize a range of local costs otherwise not included in the price of the services
offered to waste producers or in lower profit rates.
407. Id. at 122.
408. For one attempt, see JoHN SCHALL, DOES THE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT HIR-
ARCHY MAKE SENSE? A TECHNIcAL, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL JusTIFICATION FOR THE
PRIORITY OF SOURCE REDUCTION AND RECYCLING (School of Forestry and Envtl. Studies, Yale
Univ. 1992). For pertinent information (relevant especially to the externalities of incinerators),
see generally PACE UNIV', supra note 276.
409. These studies follow extensive earlier work on the effects of air pollution on prop-
erty values. See generally Lester B. Lave, Air Pollution Damage: Some Difficulties in Esti-
mating the Value of Abatement, in ENViRONMENTAL QUALITY ANALYSIS: THEORY AND
METHOD IN TMa SOCIAL SCIENCES 213,234-36 (Allen V. Kneese & Blair T. Bower eds., 1972);
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Market Approaches to the Measurement of the Benefits of Air Pollution
Abatement, in APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION 240, 241-43 (Ann F.
Friedlaender ed., 1978). For studies on the effects of nuclear power plants on property values,
see generally Hays B. Gamble & Roger H. Downing, Effects of Nuclear Power Plants on
Residential Property Values, 22 J. REG. ScI. 457, 457-58 (1982); Jon P. Nelson, Three Mile
Island and Residential Property Values: Empirical Analysis and Policy Implications, 57
LAND ECON. 363, 363 (1981).
410. Kusum Ketkar, Hazardous Waste Sites and Property Values in the State of New
Jersey, 24 APPLIED ECON. 647, 647-48 (1992); Gary H. McClelland et al., The Effect of Risk
Beliefs on Property Values: A Case Study of a Hazardous Waste Site, 10 RIsK ANALYSIS 485,
491-96 (1990); R. Gregory Michaels & V. Kerry Smith, Market Segmentation and Valuing
Amenities with Hedonic Models: The Case of Hazardous Waste Sites, 28 J. URB. EcoN. 223,
223-29 (1990); Arthur C. Nelson et al., Price Effects of Landfills on House Values, 68 LAND
ECON. 359, 364 (1992); V. Kerry Smith & William H. Desvousges, The Value of Avoiding a
LULU: Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 68 REv. ECON. & STAT. 293, 293 (1986); Gerald E.
Smolen et al., Hazardous Waste Landfill Impacts on Local Property Values, REAL EST.
APPRAISER, Apr. 1992, at 4, 8-9; see also Dana Milbank, Back in Love Canal, Neighborhood
Spirit Isn't Going to Waste, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1992, at A5G (reporting that the sale of
homes in reinhabited Love Canal take place at about 20% below market value).
411. Janet E. Kohlhase, The Impact of Toxic Waste Sites on Housing Values, 30 J. URB.
ECON. 1, 1-2 (1991); B.A. Payne et al., The Effects on Property Values of Proximity to a Site
Contaminated with Radioactive Waste, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 579, 579, 584-86 (1987).
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contamination incidents.412 A strong negative effect can result
from the mere announcement that a facility will be built.4 1 3 A few
studies found no negative impacts,414 and several studies examined
theoretical or practical issues without determining the effects.415
Overall, evidence exists that in at least some communities HW/RW
facilities are lowering property values.416
Compensation for these losses is quite limited. The NWPA
provides for compensation to state and local governments and
Indian tribes for their financial losses in the development of HLW
repositories and storage facilities 4 17 but it does not provide for
compensation to private parties. The other major federal siting
statutes do not provide for compensation at all. CERCLA allows
private parties to recover the "response costs" they suffer in inves-
tigating and cleaning up hazardous substances,41 8 but this does not
include personal injury or property damage.4 19 A few state statutes
provide for damage awards against HW facilities for property dam-
ages,42 but other state statutes arguably preclude such awards.421
412. Brian Baker, Perception of Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities and Residential
Real Property Values, 6 IMPACT ASSESSMENT BULL. 47, 47-51 (1988) (noting that publicity
concerning Love Canal affected property values in other upstate New York communities near
hazardous waste sites).
413. Smolen et al., supra note 410, at 4,4-6 (discussing a proposed LLRW facility). But
see William C. Metz, Perceived Risk and Nuclear Waste in Nevada: A Mixture Leading to
Economic Doom?, 10 IMPACT ASSESSMENT BULL. 23, 23-32 (1992) (arguing that the proposed
siting of an HLW facility near Las Vegas has not had discernable impact on the gaming-
related tourist industry in Nevada).
414. GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 309, at 145-46; Michael Elliot-Jones, Rents
& Proximity to Toxic Sites (Spectrum Economics, n.d.).
415. DAVID L. BEZER & BEVERLEY S. PHILLIPS, CONTAMINATED PROPERTY VALUATION
IssuEs: AN OVERVIEW 675 (Industrial Dev. Section 1990); Bill Mundy, The Impact of Haz-
ardous Materials on Property Value, APPRAISAL J., Apr. 1992, at 155.
416. See Greiner v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection & Energy, OAL No. ECA
5401-92 (A.L.J. Apr. 26, 1993) (awarding $6,500 on behalf of NJDEPE for loss in value of
home approximately one mile from NPL site); New York: Sludge Landfill Would Lower Val-
ues of Nearby Homes, SOLID WASTE DIG. (Northeast ed.), May 1993, at 5 (discussing a report
which states that a proposed landfill for paper mill sludge would cause bordering properties to
lose 12% of their value, with the effect diminishing over distance for a two-mile radius).
417. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,136(c)(2), 10,138(b)(3), 10,156(e), 10,161(f), 10,167, 10,169,
10,173, 10,173a (1988).
418. Id. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
419. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1535-37 (10th Cir. 1992); Brewer v. Ravan,
680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New
Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1285-86 (D. Del. 1987), affid and remanded, 851 F.2d 643
(3d Cir. 1988).
420. See Duffy, supra note 341, at 788 (discussing UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14a-7 (Supp.
1981)).
421. See James F. McAvoy, Hazardous Waste Management in Ohio: The Problem of
Siting, 9 CAP. U. L. REv. 435, 448-49 (1980) (discussing Ohio law).
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In general, neighbors must resort to common-law tort reme-
dies.422 Although RCRA does not preempt such remedies,42 both
practical and doctrinal problems accompany their use. Among the
practical problems are the multiple sources of contamination that
are likely to make proof of causation difficult, the long latency
periods for most toxic injuries, the resemblance of the illnesses
caused by toxic substances to diseases stemming from other
causes, and the high costs of litigation.424 The principal doctrinal
problem is that most applicable tort remedies, such as nuisance,
look not only to the injury suffered by the plaintiff but also to the
social utility of the actions of the defendant, thereby denying
redress to many people injured by activities deemed by the courts
to be socially necessary. 425 Although plaintiffs may occasionally
prevail under a nuisance theory,426 more often they are defeated.427
The barriers to recovery become even higher when the damage is
anticipated but has not yet occurred; the harm must generally be
both imminent and highly probable before plaintiffs can suc-
422. In one case, the plaintiff sought the remedy of rescission. Smith v. Clark, No.
28019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Cortland County Mar. 23, 1990) (dismissing the complaint of parties
who had contracted to buy land and then attempted to rescind when a LLRW site was pro-
posed nearby).
423. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1985); see Environmental Defense Fund v. Lamphier, 714
F.2d 331, 336-37 (4th Cir. 1983).
424. See Stewart, supra note 360, at 1263-64, 1337-38 (1981).
425. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1970); Denis J.
Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive Justice, 15 B.C. ENvmL.
A'. L. RE,. 437, 454-59 (1988); Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and
Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STU. 49, 50-53, 74-79 (1979). Application of the strict
liability standard would solve many of these problems, but few courts have used it in hazard-
ous waste cases. An exception is T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 1261
(N.J. 1991); see also Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1544-54 (10th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that Colorado law might apply strict liability standard to hazardous waste disposal). Con-
Ira Fox v. McCoy Elec. Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1945, 1946-47 (M.D. Pa. 1984)
(holding that the strict liability language in the "criminal penalties" section of the state solid
waste management act does not apply in the current civil proceeding).
426. See Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs. Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 831 (Ill. 1981)
(ordering the shutdown of a hazardous waste facility after a lengthy trial based on the nuisance
doctrine); see also Warner v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 521 N.E.2d 1091, 1092 (Ohio 1988) (certify-
ing class in action against HW facility for negligence, trespass, strict liability, and nuisance).
427. E.g., Ortega Cabrera v. Municipality of Bayamon, 562 F.2d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 1977);
Twitty v. State, 354 S.E.2d 296,301 (N.C. CL App. 1987), review denied, 358 S.E.2d 69 (N.C.
1987); Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 290 So. 2d 821, 824 (La. 1974); Toxic Chemicals: Waste-Site
Residents Lack Commonality, California Court Says in Denying Class Status, 7 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 34, at 974 (Jan. 27, 1993); Radioactive Chemicals: Property Damage Suit by
Residents Barred by Federal Court Based on De Minimis Defense, 8 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 11 at 300, 301 (Aug. 18, 1993).
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ceed.428  Similarly, efforts to stop429 or to obtain compensation
for43 on-site investigations before final siting decisions are made
have been unavailing.
As discussed in detail below,431 among the most common and
severe impacts of the HW/RW siting process is the emotional
anguish suffered by the neighbors of 'planned facilities. A few
courts have awarded damages for such fears,432 but these cases are
428. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Brenham, 865 F.2d 662, 663-65 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 813 (1989); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1204-05 (6th Cir.
1988); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 299-300 (N.J. 1987); Green v. Castle
Concrete Co., 509 P.2d 588, 591 (Colo. 1973); see also FRANK B. CROSs, ENVIRONMENTALLY
INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW: RisKs, REGULATION, AND VICTIM COMPENSATION 184-94
(1989); Donald F. Pierce, Recovery for Increased Risk of Developing a Future Injury from
Exposure to a Toxic Substance, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,256, 10,256-58 (1989);
Charles J. Doane, Comment, Beyond Fear: Articulating a Modem Doctrine of Anticipatory
Nuisance for Enjoining Improbable Threats of Catastrophic Harm, 17 B.C. ENvTL. AiF. L.
REv. 441, 442-43 (1990); Andrew H. Sharp, Comment, An Ounce of Prevention: Rehabilitat-
ing the Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine, 15 B.C. ENvTL. AiF. L. REv. 627, 630-32 (1988);
Edward Felsenthal, Risk-of-Illness Cases Are Getting Unsympathetic Ear from Courts, WALL
ST. J., July 7, 1993, at B8 (reporting that courts in a majority of states have rejected risk-of-
disease cases). Two states do, however, have statutes that permit injunctive relief for anticipa-
tory nuisances when the consequences are "to a reasonable degree certain." See ALA. CODE
§ 6-5-125 (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-4 (1990 & Supp. 1993).
429. See, e.g., Nevada v. Burford, 918 F.2d 854, 855 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2052 (1991); Granville County Bd. of Comm'rs v. North Carolina Hazardous Waste
Mgmt. Comm'n, 407 S.E.2d 785, 786 (N.C. 1991); see also North Carolina Court Rejects Site
Challenge, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 2691 (Feb. 12, 1993).
430. Elizabeth A. Barba, Note, Constitutional Law-Eminent Domain-Designation of
Property as Potential Site for Hazardous Waste Facility Does Not Constitute a Compensable
Taking, 20 SEroN HALL L. REv. 335, 336-38 (1989); Kara M. Bruge-Holland, Comment,
Constitutional Law-Pre-Taking Activities Pursuant to the New Jersey Hazardous Waste
Facility Siting Process Do Not Implicate Constitutional Just Compensation Privileges; Rather,
Administrative Recognition of Certain Property Rights Resulting Therefrom Should Be Con-
sidered. Littman v. Gimello, 22 RUtrERs L.J. 485, 485-86 (1991). But see Hendler v. United
States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (requiring compensation to be paid for sinking
monitoring wells on property adjoining CERCLA site); see also Philip Weinberg, Hendler v.
United States: "I'll Let You Save Me-If You Pay Me for the Privilege", 17 CoLUM. J. ENvm.
L. 233, 234-35 (1992) (arguing that compensation should be paid only where regulatory tak-
ings deny owner use of property and when permanent).
431. See infra text accompanying notes 590-606.
432. See, e.g., City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 845 P.2d 753, 757 (N.M. 1992) (awarding
land owner damages because highway through his property would carry nuclear waste to
Waste Isolation Pilot Project, diminishing value of land due to fear of the waste); Lunda v.
Matthews, 613 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (allowing emotional distress damages for
air emissions from cement plant); Heddin v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Co., 522 S.W.2d 886, 888
(Tex. 1975) (awarding damages to landowner who feared that pipeline on adjoining land
would explode); Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v. Nelon, 546 S.W.2d 864, 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)
(allowing landowner to recover for fear of land adjacent to railroad through which nuclear
wastes were transported); see also Federal Court in Ohio Certifies Class of Workers, Family
Members with Cancer Fear, 7 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 371 (Aug. 26, 1992) (report-
ing on a class action against a nuclear fuel facility in Fernald, Ohio).
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the exception, not the rule.4 33 One state statute calls on the HW
facility licensing agency to consider "community perceptions and
other psychic Costs, '434 but the DOE has taken the opposite stance
and advised that, in siting a HLW repository, "[p]erceived risk...
is not an appropriate topic for general repository-siting guidelines;
it is a subjective condition that cannot be fairly compared among
sites.""35 A West Virginia statute allowed the state to deny a per-
mit for a solid waste facility that was "significantly adverse to the
public sentiment." 3 6 However, the Fourth Circuit declared the
statute unconstitutional because it bore no substantial relationship
to the state's legitimate interests. 37 In a hearing on the expansion
of a hazardous waste landfill in Niagara Falls, New York, five days
of testimony was taken on the facility's psychological impact on a
community that was, the opponents argued, already scarred by
Love Canal. The state environmental commissioner ruled,
As a public policy matter, if the Department were to deny an
application for a facility after concluding that it met all regulatory
criteria and that the risk of its construction and operation was
within acceptable limits merely because of fears in the host com-
munity, the agency would be abdicating its responsibility ....
Therefore, I conclude that any psychological impact caused by
this facility cannot, standing alone, be grounds for denial of the
applications. 38
433. Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1992), illustrates the more
common outcome. In Adkins, the court rejected claims by homeowners for compensation
based on fears of decreased property values because of soil and water contamination in area.
Id. at 721; see also Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 8 Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 458 (D. Colo.
Sept. 9, 1993). Many of the cases concerning recovery for emotional distress are discussed in
Martha A. Churchill, Arguing Public Policy as a Defense to Environmental Toxic Tort Claims,
8 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 505 (Sept. 29, 1993).
434. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.46-830(2)(a) (Baldwin 1992).
435. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982; General Guidelines for the Recommendations
of Sites for the Nuclear Waste Repositories, 49 Fed. Reg. 47,747 (1984).
436. Geo-Tech Reclamation Indus. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662, 663 (4th Cir. 1989) (cit-
ing W. VA. CODE § 20-5F-4(b) (1989)).
437. Id. at 666-67; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
440 (1985) (prohibiting a city from zoning out a home for the mentally retarded based on
impermissible motives); In re Combined Air & Solid Waste Permit No. 2211-91-OT-1, 489
N.W.2d 811, 812 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that generalized concern over possible
adverse effects is insufficient to support permit denial). Cases concerning the courts' shifting
attitudes toward the ability of local governments to prohibit feared land uses are reviewed in
David Bernstein, From Pesthouses to AIDS Hospices: Neighbors' Irrational Fears of Treat-
ment Facilities for Contagious Diseases, 22 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 1, 2-6 (1990); Harold
A. Ellis, Neighborhood Opposition and the Permissible Purposes of Zoning, 7 J. LAND USE &
ENvrt.. L. 275, 276-97 (1992).
438. In re CECOS Int'l, Inc., Application No. 90-85-0551, at *3 (N.Y. Dep't. of Envtl.
Conserv., Mar. 13, 1990), available in LEXIS, ENVIRN library, NYENV file. This hearing is
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After reviewing the law on recovery for psychic distress,
Roger A. Bohrer aptly summarized the issue:
At the very least, the issue of emotional distress recovery in the
face of technological risk and uncertainty may be seen for what it
is-a social choice between subsidy and compensation. A deci-
sion to impose liability and to require the internalization of
"psychic costs" would not stop progress altogether, but it would
simply make the products of new technology cost more in the
marketplace. By forcing the market to recognize the social costs
of technology, a more socially desirable level of consumption of
technological products is achieved.439
The foregoing shows that the legal system, by denying recov-
ery to many of those injured by HW/RW facilities, subsidizes the
generation of hazardous and radioactive waste and would therefore
encourage more than the socially optimal number of disposal facil-
ities.440 The political system, however, acts as a safety valve, for it
does reflect psychic costs and largely counteracts this encourage-
ment by stymieing virtually all new facilities, although allowing
many old units to stay open.
C. Protecting Health and the Environment
Does the current system of HW/RW facility siting protect
health and the environment? Much of the pertinent information
has already been presented. At this point, I will address two addi-
tional points. First, because the current siting system perpetuates
the life of old facilities while sites are sought for modem new ones,
I will look at the widespread notion that new, modem facilities can
operate with few environmental impacts. Second, I will test one of
the key assumptions underlying current siting laws: that a shortage
of facilities increases illegal dumping.
discussed in detail in Michael R. Edelstein, Psychosocial Impacts on Trial: The Case of Haz-
ardous Waste Disposal, in PSYCHOSOCIAL EFFEcrs OF HAZARDOUS ToxIc WASTE DISPOSAL
ON COMMUNITIES 153, 159-67 (Dennis L. Peck ed., 1989) [hereinafter PSYCHOSOCIAL
EFFEcrS]; see also Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766,
776 (1983) (holding that the NRC need not consider neighbors' fears on reopening of undam-
aged nuclear power plant at Three Mile Island).
439. Robert A. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling in the Twentieth Century: Technological
Risk, Uncertainty and Emotional Distress, 1984 Wis. L. Rav. 83, 111. For a discussion of
litigation techniques and strategy, see generally WiLLiAM A. BARTON, RECOVERING FOR PSY-
CHOLOGICAL INJURIES (2d ed. 1985).
440. This does not mean that exclusive reliance on a liability system guarantees optimal
economic efficiency. For example, if living near a facility caused an individual $10,000 worth
of psychic damage but the person could move for $6000, the socially optimal rule might limit
payment to moving costs plus, perhaps, some increment for the psychic costs of moving.
1114 [Vol. 68
1994] WASTE FACILITY SITING 1115
1. Impacts of New Facilities
Much of the siting literature assumes that new HW/RW dis-
posal facilities can be built and operated with a high degree of
health and environmental safety." The environmental impact
statements and health risk assessments for these facilities, which
are typically prepared by their proponents, 442 usually predict that
the risks will be trivial.443 However, the actual evidence is far less
clear.444 Because there are so few new HW facilities and no new
RW facilities, it is hard to answer confidently whether new facili-
ties will offer much greater protections than old ones. Neverthe-
less, actual operating experience is illuminating. The hundreds of
civil and criminal enforcement cases brought by the EPA under
RCRA every year attest to the fact that many current hazardous
waste operations still violate the law.44 5 These statistics unfortu-
nately do not differentiate old from new units.
Most indicative of the likely performance of new HW/RW
facilities is the experience of those most units recently built (usu-
ally on existing sites) in the 1970s and 1980s. The largest hazard-
441. See, e.g., GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 309, at 207; SCHMEIDLER &
SANDMAN, supra note 381, at 29; Caskey, supra note 7, at 58; Letty G. Lutzker, Making the
World Safe for Chicken Little, or the Risks of Risk Aversion, in Low-LEvEL RADIOACTIVE
WASTE REGULAION, supra note 188, at 175, 178-79; Paul Slovic et al., Perceived Risk Trust,
and the Politics of Nuclear Waste, 254 SCIENCE 1603, 1603 (1991); Tarlock, supra note 338,
at 432-33.
442. See Michael B. Gerrard, The Dynamics of Secrecy in the Environmental Impact
Statement Process, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279, 280 (1993).
443. E.g., Michael P. Scott & Stephen T. Washburn, The Role of Risk Assessment in the
Siting of the OWMC Waste Management Facility (Environ Corp., n.d.) (paper on file with the
Tulane Law Review); see Luke W. Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View from
the Field, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1991, 1994 (1992); see also Suzanne Keller, Ecology and Com-
munity, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 623, 624 (1992) (noting several reports prior to the
Three Mile Island accident which predicted that risks of a serious accident at a nuclear power
plant were virtually nonexistent).
444. This is in part because of the enormous uncertainty in the practice of risk assess-
ment, requiring risk assessors to make scores of subjective judgments from inconclusive data.
See Mary L. Lyndon, Risk Assessment, Risk Communication and Legitimacy: An Introduction
to the Symposium, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289, 291 (1989). In one not uncommon incident,
the opponents and proponents of a proposed LNG terminal prepared risk assessments that
differed by three orders of magnitude. Howard Kunreuther et al., Decision-Process Perspec-
tive on Risk and Policy Analysis, in RESOLVING LOCATIONAL CONFLICT, supra note 17, at 260,
261.
445. See OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. EPA, PUB. No. 300-R92-008, ENFORCEMENT
ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT FY91, at 2-1 (1992); Hazardous Waste: 'Cluster' Enforcement
Action Brought Against Hazardous Waste Combustion Units, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at
995, 995-96 (Oct. 1, 1993). It also appears that the enforcement cases actually brought under
RCRA are but a small subset of those that could be brought if a more thorough inspection
system were in place. Clifford S. Russell, Monitoring and Enforcement, in PUBLIC PoLIcIEs
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 243, 262 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990).
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ous waste landfill in the country is the Emelle, Alabama facility of
Waste Management, Inc., the largest company in the industry. In a
recent lawsuit, the Emelle facility was found to have released haz-
ardous substances and noxious fumes into the environment on sev-
446eral occasions. Waste Management's large HW landfill in
Niagara County, New York has had similar experiences, 447 as have
several HW landfills operated by the second-largest company,
Browning Ferris Industries. 448
Events at incinerators have proven even more troubling. In
1992, regulators closed the largest commercial HW incinerator in
the country, located in Chicago, after finding improper operating
practices such as disconnected pollution monitoring devices, the
burning of unpermitted wastes, and false labelling of waste bar-
rels.449 The experience at many other commercial incinerators is
not much better.450 A court ordered another large incinerator, in
North Carolina, to shut down in 1989 following ten years of
trouble-filled operations.45 1 A brand new hazardous waste inciner-
ator in New York, built after years of permit proceedings, encoun-
tered significant technical problems in 1987 during trial bums and
never opened.452 Elevated levels of PCBs have been detected in
rodents captured near a new HW incineration/treatment/landfill
facility in Swan Hills, Alberta, Canada and in the blood of about
half a dozen waste handlers at the plant.453 Unannounced inspec-
tions by the EPA and the Office of Safety and Health Administra-
tion of twenty-nine HW incinerators in 1991 found 395 violations
of standards, two-thirds of which the agencies considered "seri-
446. Hunt v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1375 (Ala. 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
447. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., REPORT OF ON-Srr' MONITORING
AcTivrrY AT CWM CHEMICAL SERVICES, INC. BY NYS DEC REGION 9 (quarterly reports).
448. In re CECOS Int'l, Inc., Application No. 90-88-9021, slip op. at 72-78 (N.Y. Dep't
and Envtl. Conserv., A.L.J. Aug. 21, 1989) (discussing violations at BFI landfills in New
York, Louisiana, and Ohio), rev'd on other grounds, Application No. 90-85-0551 (N.Y. Dep't.
of Envtl. Conserv. Mar. 13, 1990).
449. JEFF BAILEY, Environment: Concerns Mount over Operating Methods of Plants
that Incinerate Toxic Waste, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1992, at B1.
450. Bailey, supra note 449, at BI; Julia Flynn, The Ugly Mess at Waste Management,
Bus. WK., Apr. 13, 1992, at 76; Waste Management Unit's Plant Is Curbed by EPA, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 31, 1992, at A18.
451. U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-92-78, HAZARDoUs WASTE: A NORTH CARO-
LINA INCINERATOR'S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH EPA AND OSHA REQUIREMENTS 1-3 (1992).
452. NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE COMM'N ON Toxic SUBSTANCES & HAZARDOUS
WASTES: THE EVOLUTION OF A PROMISING PUBLIC POLICY 9 (1989).
453. Robert Tomsho, Unlikely Guest. Small Town in Alberta Embraces What Most
Reject: Toxic Waste, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1991, at Al.
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OUS." 45 4  Several epidemiological studies have found elevated
levels of respiratory and other disorders near commercial HW
incinerators. 55 In 1992, the EPA expressed concern that even
well-operated incinerators were having difficulty meeting permit
limits for dioxin.456 At a controversial new HW incinerator in
Ohio, dioxin emissions during the test bum were up to five times
greater than the level used in the risk assessment.457 Examinations
of the results of trial bums of several other hazardous waste incin-
erators show that emissions of certain heavy metals, particularly
cadmium and chromium, may pose significant risk to public
health.458 In sum, even state-of-the-art disposal facilities can, and
do, fail in a multitude of ways.459
Occupational, as opposed to public, health risk has been well
established. Numerous instances of occupational diseases among
workers at nuclear weapons complex facilities460 and in the hazard-
ous waste461 and solid waste462 industries have been documented.
Although the above incidents did not necessarily involve
injury to public health, they certainly challenge the commentators'
assumptions of assured safety. They also suggest that new facili-
ties will be no panacea and that reducing the creation of HW/RW
454. Feds Target Hazardous Waste Incinerator Safety, ENG'G Naws-Rnc., June 17,
1991, at 5.
455. Environment: Hazardous Incinerators?, 143 Sci. Nuws 334, 334 (1993).
456. Memorandum from Sylvia K. Lowrance, Director, Office of Solid Waste & Emer-
gency Response, EPA, to Waste Management Division Directors, Assuring Protective Opera-
tion of Incinerators Burning Dioxin-Listed Wastes, Sept. 22, 1992 (on file with author); see
also New EPA Study Indicates WTI Dioxin Risk May Be 1,000 Times Above Previous Esti-
mates, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 2714 (Feb. 19, 1993).
457. Hazardous Waste: Test Burn Data Show Dioxin Emissions Higher than Expected
from WTI Incinerator, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 346 (June 25, 1993).
458. Richard M. Sedman & John R. Esparza, Evaluation of the Public Health Risks
Associated with Semivolatile Metal and Dioxin Emissions from Hazardous Waste Incinerators,
94 ENvL. HEALTH PERsPEc-nvEs 181, 181-85 (1991).
459. For a theoretical analysis of failure of disposal facilities, see generally Venu G.
Balagopal, Total Probable Risk Analysis: A Technique for Quantitative Risk Evaluation of
Hazardous Waste Disposal Options, 6 HAzAPDous WAsTE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 315,
315-18 (1989).
460. Employee Health Risks at Toxic Waste Sites: What Don't We Know?: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on the Civil Service of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Ser-
vice, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 99, 100 (Sept. 18, 1990) (statement of David A. Lewis, Physicians
for Social Responsibility); Mary H. Melville, Temporary Workers in the Nuclear Power Indus-
try: Implications for the Waste Management Program, in EQurry IssuEs, supra note 180, at
229.
461. George Friedman-Jimenez, Occupational Disease Among Minority Workers, 37
Ass'N OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH NuasEs J. 64, 64 (1989).
462. Ravinder Mamtani & Joseph A. Cimino, Work Related Diseases Among Sanitation
Workers of New York City, 55 J. ENvTL. HEa.LT 27, 27 (1992).
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will still deserve high priority. This conclusion is reinforced by the
fact that the federal regulations governing the design and operation
of HW/RW facilities clearly allow even new units to pose a
residual, though slight, health risk.463 Moreover, environmental
risks in the transportation of hazardous wastes are at least as great
as those in storage and disposal.4 4
2. Illegal Dumping
A major impetus behind facility siting legislation and the pre-
emption of local authority over siting has been the fear of illegal
dumping of hazardous wastes. Congress, 465 the courts,466 adminis-
trative agencies, 4 67 and many commentators on facility siting
468
463. The large degree of legislative and regulatory confusion in the setting of health-
based and technology-based standards for hazardous waste facilities is discussed in John S.
Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Sub-
stances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1991); Donald A. Brown, EPA's Resolution of the
Conflict Between Cleanup Costs and the Law in Setting Cleanup Standards Under Superfund,
15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 241 (1990); Thomas A. Cinti, Comment, The Regulator's Dilemma:
Should Best Available Technology or Cost Benefit Analysis Be Used to Determine the Applica-
ble Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Technology?, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 145 (1990).
464. BEN AMrN A. GOLDMAN ET AL., HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT: REDUCING
THE RISK 246-47 (Alice T. Marlin & Steven S. Ross eds., 1986); Hazardous Waste: Truck
Transport of Wastes as Risky as Treatment, Disposal, Consultant Says, 14 Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 18, at 733 (Sept. 2, 1983); see also infra text accompanying notes 987-97.
465. GREEN, supra note 37, at xviii (noting that the fear of illegal dumping resulting
from capacity shortfalls was one of the reasons Congress enacted the capacity assurance provi-
sions of CERCLA).
466. See eg., Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 838 (Ill.
1981).
467. Interim Standards for Owners and Operators of New Hazardous Waste Land Dispo-
sal Facilities and EPA Administered Permit Programs: The Hazardous Waste Permit Program,
46 Fed. Reg. 12,414, 12,416 (Feb. 13, 1981); HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL ADVISORY COMM.
AND THE ENVTL. FACILrEs CORP., A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE
DISPOSAL IN NEW YORK STATE: A REPORT TO GOVERNOR HUGH L. CAREY AND THE NEW
YORK STATE LEGISLATURE 13 (1980).
468. See, e.g., LANDY ET AL., supra note 58, at 125; MORELL & MAGORIAN, supra note
10, at 69, 184; Andreen, supra note 10, at 847; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 6, at 267-268;
Colglazier & English, supra note 10, at 622-25; Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBY" Is a National
Problem, 35 S.D. L. REV. 198, 200 (1990); Farkas, supra note 347, at 48-49; Craig & Lash,
supra note 385, at 99, 104; Robert W. Hahn, An Evaluation of Options for Reducing Hazard-
ous Waste, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 201, 211 (1988); Jeffrey Kehne, Encouraging Safety
Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial Responsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96
YALE L.J. 403, 424 (1986); Matheny & Williams, supra note 341, at 78; Popper, supra note
17, at 10; Robert C. Mitchell & Richard T. Carson, Property Rights, Protest, and the Siting of
Hazardous Waste Facilities, 76 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 285, 285 (1986); Peter M. Sandman,
Getting to Maybe: Some Communications Aspects of Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities, 9
SEToN HALL LEoIS. J. 437, 442 (1985); Harlan T. Snider, A New Approach to Pennsylvania's
Hazardous Waste Siting Problem, 5 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 49, 52 (1986); Tarlock,
supra note 11, at 5; R. George Wright, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the Problems of Stig-
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have uncritically adopted the idea that a shortage of disposal facili-
ties leads to illegal dumping. In all the siting literature, I have
found only one statement questioning this view.469 Fear of encour-
aging illegal dumping also prompted Congress to reject proposals
for a tax on the generation of HW,470 and it is one reason why old
grandfathered landfills have been allowed to remain open.471
When the available data are examined, however, it becomes appar-
ent that illegal dumping has almost no relationship to inadequate
disposal capacity and would not be reduced by building more
capacity.4
72
As noted above, HW and RW brokers will, for a price,
arrange for the shipment of virtually any waste stream to a licensed
disposal facility.473 The price can be extremely high; the cost of
legitimate disposal of hazardous waste is in the hundreds or
thousands of dollars per ton, depending on the method used.474
The price of illegal disposal, on the other hand, is dramatically
lower. Information about these prices can be gleaned from past
criminal prosecutions. An illegal landfill in Kentucky, known as
the Valley of the Drums, accepted up to 100,000 drums between
1976 and 1978 for 75 cents each.475 An illegal dump in Plainfield,
Connecticut, which was closed in 1978, charged $1.50 per drum.
476
matic and Racial Injury, 23 ARiz. ST. L.J. 777, 792 n.86 (1991); Gergits, supra note 385, at
101; Gerard M. McCabe, Comment, The Validity of State Symmetry Requirements Banning
Hazardous Waste from Environmentally Indolent States, 10 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 169,
173 (1991).
469. Richard F. Anders, Public Participation in Hazardous Waste Facility Location
Decisions, 1 J. PLAN. LrrERATuRE 145, 147 (1986).
470. Douglas W. McNiel et al., New Superfund Legislation: Major Provisions, Revenue
Sources, and Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection, 35 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 610,
617 n.18 (1987).
471. MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 6, at 107 (explaining that landfill owners used
the regulators' fear of illegal dumping to prevent the phaseout of land disposal).
472. This statement is meant to apply to the United States; it may not be accurate in
certain other regions of the world. See Emma Chynoweth, Asia/Pacific Moves to Address
Mountainous Waste Problem: Lack of Infrastructure Leads to Indiscriminate Dumping,
CHEMICAL WK., Mar. 24, 1993, at 42, 43.
473. See supra note 388 and accompanying text. The only exception appears to be
mixed hazardous and radioactive waste, for which there is virtually no licensed treatment
capacity. Discrepancies in storage volume figures suggest that some of this material is unlaw-
fully entering nonqualified disposal facilities. OFFICE OF TECH. AssFssMEirr, supra note 226,
at 3, 15. There are also occasional "stigmatized" loads, which cannot be lawfully disposed
because of political problems rather than because of a lack of disposal facilities. See infra note
628 and accompanying text.
474. See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
475. Brown, supra note 463, at 262.
476. Id. at 257.
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An illegal operation near Philadelphia also accepted drums for
$1.50 each.477
A government investigation in New York provides more dra-
matic evidence of the underground market. In 1992, the district
attorney's office in Suffolk County, New York set up a "sting"
operation to catch businesses that were willing to dispose of their
HW illegally. Undercover investigators approached businesses
and offered plainly unlawful disposal services. They found them-
selves being forced to reduce their prices to as low as twenty dol-
lars a ton to meet the competition from genuine illegal dumpers.478
One court has noted the existence of a "vast, unmonitored secon-
dary toxic disposal market-one which ... weaves across state
lines and reaches to every comer of this nation." 479
A survey in the San Francisco area further evidences the
extremely low prices in this underground market. The surveyors
asked small businesses how much they would be willing to pay for
legal HW disposal services. Thirty-four percent said they would
pay nothing, and another eighteen percent indicated they would
pay no more than twenty-five dollars per month. The authors con-
cluded that, "[ijf the firms are not willing to pay anything, or are
unwilling to pay more than twenty-five dollars per month, their
present disposal costs must be very small. The very small amounts
they will pay for waste disposal indicates that they are probably
using illegal methods. 48 °
Limitations on HW/RW disposal capacity do greatly increase
the price of legal disposal, and real capacity shortages would drive
the price still higher. It does not follow, however, that this will
lead to more illegal dumping. If a four-star restaurant raises its
dinner prices from $100 to $120, that will not increase the business
at McDonald's; the two establishments serve entirely different
markets. The same holds true for HW disposal: There are very
distinct legal and illegal markets. If the price of a licensed landfill
goes from $250 to $300 per ton, not many of its customers will
477. Id. at 250.
478. Josh Barbanel, Elaborate Sting Operation Brings Arrests in Illegal Dumping of
Toxic Wastes by Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1992, at 15; Jerry Cassidy, Toxic Avenger
Busts 5 in Sting, N.Y. DAILY NEws (Long Island ed.), May 13, 1992, at QLI 1; Letta Tayler,
Waste-Dumping Sting, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 13, 1992, at 4.
479. O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 711 n.1 (D.R.I. 1988), affd, 883 F.2d 176 (1st
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
480. SEYMOuR I. ScHwARTZ & WENDY B. PRATT, HAZARDOUS WASTE FROM SMALL




switch to the twenty dollars method; conversely, a drop from $250
to $200 will not lure the twenty dollar crowd.
481
Several recent studies have revealed the nature of the legal
and illegal markets. Of all the HW generated in the United States,
99.6% comes from large quantity generators, and 0.4% comes
from small quantity generators482-those that generate less than
1000 kilograms of hazardous waste per month.48 3 The large quan-
tity generators are overwhelmingly concentrated in a few indus-
tries, particularly chemical manufacturing, primary and fabricated
metals, and petroleum refining.484 These companies have much to
lose if they are caught in illegal dumping, and they also tend to
have sophisticated compliance staffs to advise them on legal
requirements. 485 Thus, it is not surprising that several studies have
shown that the great bulk of illegal dumping comes from small
quantity generators, and particularly from dry cleaners, auto repair
shops, metal cleaners or platers, printers, and pest exterminators.486
Some estimates indicate that only about half of all small quantity
generators dispose of their HW properly.48 ' According to several
investigations, organized crime is responsible for much of the ille-
gal HW hauling and disposal.488
481. The restaurant analogy is not perfect, because many intermediate choices are avail-
able between a four-star restaurant and McDonald's. However, the huge gap between the
prices of legal and illegal disposal-$250/ton versus $20/ton-suggests that price shifts of
much less than an order of magnitude will not swing many waste generators from the illegal to
the legal market or vice versa. Significant changes in the probability of being caught are likely
to have a much more decisive effect on which businesses go to which market.
482. McCARmTY & REIscH, supra note 28, at CRS-16; see also OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE
& EMERGENCY REsPoNsE, supra note 23, at 1.
483. 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1992).
484. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
485. Bruce W. Piasecki & Gary A. Davis, Restructuring Toxic Waste Controls: Intrin-
sic Difficulties and Historical Trends, in AMERICA'S FurtmE, supra note 35, at 1, 1-8.
486. JAMES K. HAMMrrr & PETR REUTER, RAND CoP., PUB. No. R-3657-EPAIJMO,
MEASURING AND DETERRING ILLEGAL DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: A PRELIMINARY
ASSESSMENT 11, 16 (1988); DONALD REBOVICH, UNDERSTANDING HAZARDOUS WASTE CRIME"
A MULTISTATE EXAMINATION OF OFFENSE AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS IN THE NORTH-
EAST 22 (1986); ScHWARTZ & PRATT, supra note 480, at 13-30; Bruce A. Williams & Albert
R. Matheny, Testing Theories of Social Regulation: Hazardous Waste Regulation in the
American States, 46 J. POL. 428, 452 (1984).
487. HAMMrrr & REU-TaR, supra note 486, at 18.
488. Nnw YORK STATE AssEMiLY ENvrL. CONSERV. COMM., ORGANIZED CRIME'S
INvOLVEMENT IN THE WASTE HAULING INDUSTRY 1-13 (1986) [hereinafter ORGANIZED
CRIME]; ALAN A. BLOCK & FRANK R. SCARPrIrI, POISONING FOR PROFIT: THE MAFA AND
Toxic WASTE IN AMERICA 102-05 (1985); Andrew Szasz, Corporations, Organized Crime,
and the Disposal of Hazardous Waste: An Examination of the Making of a Criminogenic
Regulatory Structure, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2-3 (1986); Joseph F. Sullivan, 12 Held in Trucking
of Untaxed and Contaminated Oil, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1993, at B5. Readers of the Block &
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The I-W that is most susceptible to illegal dumping is the
0.4% from small quantity generators. It makes no sense, in my
view, to distort HW policy and create potentially excess HW dis-
posal capacity for the 99.6% of the waste created by large genera-
tors in the hopes of luring the small generators. This is especially
true when, given the extraordinary discrepancies between legal and
illegal prices, this lure is unlikely to be taken. The solution to ille-
gal dumping lies instead in enforcement. On a nationwide basis,
very few resources are devoted to inspecting small quantity gener-
ators.489 More frequent and thorough inspections of small quantity
generators, more crosschecking of toxic release filings, sting oper-
ations, and other techniques hold great promise of reducing illegal
dumping.490
The current system of HW/RW facility siting does not harm
the environment by creating a shortage of facilities that encourages
illegal dumping. The prevalence of illegal dumping is a failure of
the enforcement system, not of the siting system. However, the
current siting system does harm the environment by perpetuating
old, substandard facilities. The promise of new facilities unfortu-
nately offers no panacea for this harm.
D. Affording Fairness
Fairness is an essential consideration in evaluating the current
system of HW/RW facility siting. Other commentators have
explored the meanings of the concepts of "fairness," "justice," and
"equity" in facility siting,491 and I will not step into that philosoph-
ical debate here. The discussion below is limited to allocative fair-
Scarpitti work should be cautioned that its publisher, William Morrow & Co., was sued for
libel after the book's publication; the suit was settled under terms that were to be kept confi-
dential, but the book was allowed to go out of print and the publisher has no plans to reprint it.
Telephone Interview with Robert Hawley, Law Department, William Morrow & Co. (Oct. 28,
1992).
489. ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 488, at 137; HAMrrr & REUTER, supra note 486,
at 22-25; SCHWARTZ & PRATr, supra note 480, at 25-26.
490. Donald J. Rebovich, Policing Hazardous Waste Crime: The Importance of Regula-
tory/Law Enforcement Strategies and Cooperation in Offender Identiflcation and Prosecution,
9 CRiM. Jus. Q. 173, 183-84 (1987); see U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-85-2, ILLEGAL
DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: DIFFICULT TO DETECT OR DETER 25-31 (1985).
491. ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 117-60; PETER S. WENz, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSICE 5-
21, 5-21 (1988); Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383 (1994); Kasperson et al.,
supra note 393, at 331; Ted F. Peters, Ethical Considerations Surrounding Nuclear Waste
Repository Siting and Mitigation, in NUCLEAR WASTE: SOCIOECONOMIC DIMENSIONs OF




ness and specifically to the distribution of benefits and burdens
among geographical areas, classes and races, and generations.
1. Fairness Between Geographical Areas
Fairness between regions is a central theme in siting legisla-
tion. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, written in 1982, contem-
plated both an eastern and a western HLW repository-although
this plan was abandoned in 1987 when the eastern states politically
overwhelmed Nevada492 -and a monitored retrievable storage
facility in a third state.4 93 The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Pol-
icy Act was designed to relieve the burden on the three states with
LLRW repositories: South Carolina, Nevada, and Washington.4 94
The capacity assurance provisions of CERCLA aimed to assure
that every state made provisions to dispose of its own HW. 4 Sev-
eral states have their own statutes calling for geographic equity.4 96
There are three generally accepted principles in achieving
regional fairness:
1. The benefits and burdens of waste disposal should be cor-
related. An area that enjoys the fruits of waste generation should
bear the costs of waste disposal.497
2. No place should bear a disproportionate share of the
region's (or the country's) environmental hazards.498
3. Facilities should be placed in the technically best loca-
tions in order to minimize adverse health and environmental
impacts.499
Unfortunately, these three principles are irreconcilable with
each other and with other important values. The first and second
principles are incompatible, because if the first is observed, then
disposal facilities will be located near the polluting industries-the
chemical waste landfill will be next to the chemical plant, the radi-
492. JACOB, supra note 203, at 169-70.
493. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,161(g), 10,165(g) (1988).
494. ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 127; Contreras, supra note 2, at 517-19.
495. See supra text accompanying note 324.
496. E.g., MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 299.509(2)(f) (West 1984); N.Y. ENVT . CON-
SERV. LAW § 27-1102(2)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
497. E.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH CoUNcH, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF RADIO-
ACTVE WAsTE DISPOSAL: CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT 73 (1984).
New York State adopted this approach in choosing a site near a General Electric plant for
disposal of PCBs dumped by that plant into the Hudson River. See Washington County Cease,
Inc. v. Persico, 473 N.Y.S.2d 610, 612 (App. Div. 1984), aff d meme., 477 N.E.2d 1084 (N.Y.
1985).
498. E.g., EDELSTEIN, supra note 354, at 186; Kasperson, supra note 285, at 24, 50.
499. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
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oactive waste repository will be next to the nuclear power plant-
thereby creating a disproportionate burden on these communities,
in violation of the second principle.5° The first and third princi-
ples are incompatible, because the technically best locations are
usually remote from people and water and, therefore, unlikely to
generate much waste or to enjoy the benefits of its creation.
Observing both the second and third principles would proliferate
small waste disposal sites throughout rural America, since each
county with suitably dry and remote land would receive a little bit,
not much, of the country's waste.
Because of these contradictions, it is perhaps inevitable that
all three principles are infringed by aspects of the current siting
system. The first principle, correlation of burdens and benefits, is
badly violated, for example, by the planned location of the nation's
repository for spent nuclear fuel in Nevada-a state that has no
nuclear power plants-and by the location of the nation's largest
11W landfill in rural Alabama, where little HW is generated. The
second principle is violated because some communities, like Niag-
ara Falls, New York,01 the adjacent Illinois communities of East
St. Louis and Sauget,5 °2 Vernon, California, °3 and Toole County,
Utah,5 4 voluntarily or not, have major concentrations of disposal
facilities, polluting industries, CERCLA sites, or a combination
thereof. The third principle is violated because many of the older
waste disposal facilities, which continue in operation while the sit-
ing of new units is paralyzed, are in technically inferior
locations. 0o
These tensions are likely to remain in any siting system,
because it is not apparent which of these three principles should
trump the others. These tensions can, however, be significantly
reduced in a system that comprehensively addresses all different
500. See Tom Anderson, Residents Plead: Reject Sludge Plan, REPORTER-DISPATCH
(Westchester County, N.Y.), Jan. 22, 1993, at 5B ("Yonkers residents who said they were
already burdened by a sewage treatment plant in their neighborhood beseeched county officials
last night to reject a proposal for a sludge-processing facility next to the sewage plant").
501. See Olsen, supra note 309, at 473-74.
502. See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
15-20 (1991); Scott McMurray, Denying Paternity: Monsanto Case Shows How Hard It Is to
Tie Pollution to a Source, WALL. ST. J., June 17, 1992, at Al.
503. Miles Corwin, Vernon Redevelopment Plan Is Sticky Business, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
10, 1991, at BI.
504. Hearings Set for Proposed Incinerator, UPI, July 4, 1989, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File; Utah Board Grants RCRA Permit to USPC Facility, ENv'T WK.,
Nov. 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NWHRS File.
505. See supra text accompanying notes 348-51.
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kinds of HW/RW and requires all states to bear some burdens, as
discussed in Part VI.
2. Fairness Between Classes and Races
The hottest issue in facility siting today is whether HW/RW
facilities are intentionally placed in minority communities. 50 6 Over
the years, numerous studies have demonstrated that poor people
are disproportionately exposed to pollution,0 7 and a 1983 study
revealed that three of the four commercial HW landfills in the
southeast are in minority communities.0 However, the racial
issue did not come to the forefront until 1987, with the publication
of Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States by the Commission
for Racial Justice of the United Church of Christ.509 This study
examined the location of "uncontrolled toxic waste sites"-those
on the EPA's "CERCLIS' '510 list of sites with known or suspected
contamination-and commercial HW treatment, storage, and dis-
posal facilities. It searched for correlations between the location of
commercial facilities and five variables in the community (defined
as a five-digit zip code area): minority percentage, mean house-
hold income, mean home value, number of CERCLIS sites per
506. See Robert Suro, Pollution-Weary Minorities Try Civil Rights Tack, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 1993, at 1.
507. See, e.g., THE SOCIAL BURDENS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION: A COMPARATIVE
METROPOLITAN DATA SOURCE (Brian J.L. Berry ed., 1977); TEXAS CmR. FOR POLICY STUDIES,
Toxlcs IN TEXAS AND THEIR IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES OF COLOR (1993); JEFFREY M. ZUPAN,
THE DISTRItBUTON OF Am QUALITY IN THE NEw YORK REGION (1973). Most of these studies
are assembled in Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing 'Environmental Justice': The Distributional
Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787 (1992); Paul Mohai & Bunyan
Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as Factors in the Distribution of
Environmental Hazards, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 921, 925-27 (1992); see also MAURICE D.
HINCHEY ET AL.., NEw YORK STATE ASSEMBLY ENVTL. CONSERV. COMM. PROCEEDINGS FROM
THE 1991 PUBLIC HEARING SERIES, MINORITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT: AN EXPLORATION
INTO THE EFFECTS OF ENVIONMENTAL POLICIES, PRACICES AND CONDITIONS ON MINoRrrY
AND Low-INcoME COMMUNmES 1-5 (1991) (stating that minority residential areas in urban
New York are especially prone to illegal dumping in vacant lots); LOUISIANA ADVISORY
COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE BATrLE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN
LOUISIANA... GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY AND THE PEOPLE 8-11 (1993).
508. U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LAND-
FILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COM-
MUNITIES 1 (1983). This study did not "determine why the sites were selected, the population-
mix of the area when the site was established, the distribution of the population around the
landfill, nor how the communities' racial and economic status compared to others in the State."
Id. at 3.
509. This study has been favorably cited at the highest levels of government. See AL
GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 149 (1992).
510. CERCLIS stands for Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Information System.
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1,000 persons, and pounds of hazardous waste generated per per-
son.5 11 The study found that "[r]ace proved to be the most signifi-
cant [factor] among variables, tested in association with the
location of commercial hazardous waste facilities. This repre-
sented a consistent national pattern. 512 The study further deter-
mined that in communities with one operating commercial facility,
the mean minority percentage in the zip code area was approxi-
mately twice that of areas without such facilities (twenty-four ver-
sus twelve percent).5 3 The mean white percentage in such
communities was not revealed nor was there any discussion of the
racial composition at the time the facility was first built.
The study was less conclusive about the correlation between
race and CERCLIS sites, finding that 57.11% of the nation's black
population, 56.63% of its hispanic population, and 53.6% of its
white population lived in a zip-code area with at least one CER-
CLIS site.5 14 No correlations with income or wealth variables
were presented.
Other studies have demonstrated a strong racial correlation in
the siting of MSW landfills and incinerators in Houston, 51 5 com-
mercial hazardous waste facilities in Detroit, 6 and hazardous
waste incinerators nationwide. 7 A 1984 study found that
National Priorities List sites in New Jersey were in communities
with high percentages of blacks, low-income people, foreign-born
people, and very young and very old people, but it did not compare
the strength of the racial and income correlations. 518 A 1992 study
found some correlation between community racial composition
and the presence of NPL sites.51
511. COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, Toxic WASTES AND
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1987).
512. Id. at xiii.
513. Id. at 13.
514. Id. at 53.
515. See Robert D. Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 53
Soc. INQUIRY 273 passim (1983).
516. Mohai & Bryant, supra note 507, at 927.
517. PAT COSTNER & JOE THORNTON, PLAYING wrrT FIRE: HAZARDOUS WASTE INCIN-
ERATION (1990).
518. GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 309, at 158-59.
519. The study found only slight differences in average community racial composition
in communities with NPL sites when compared to their geographic regions or to the nation as a
whole, on an aggregate basis-which means adding up the minority populations in the com-
munities with NPL sites and then dividing by the total population of those same communities.
However, the percentage of blacks and hispanics in communities with NPL sites was found to
be greater than the nationwide average. No comparable pattern was found for persons below
the poverty line. RAE ZIMMRMAN, Executive Summary to RISK AND PUBLIC CONTROVERSY
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Additional work has focused on enforcement and cleanup
efforts. A 1990 study found that CERCLIS sites in low-income
rural communities are being evaluated as quickly as sites nation-
ally but that disproportionately few are placed on the NPL,520 prob-
ably because the size of the affected population lowers the hazard-
ranking score.5 21 A 1992 analysis concluded that penalties against
polluters are lower when the violation occurs in a minority area,
that EPA takes longer to investigate and clean up NPL sites in
minority areas, and that EPA accepts less stringent remedial
efforts. 
522
The impacts of any disproportionate exposure to pollutants
would be worsened by the already substandard health status of
many minority communities, which stems from such influences as
inferior health care, poor eating habits, hazardous occupations, and
high consumption of cigarettes, alcohol, and illicit drugs.52 3
Some have concluded that government and corporations make
a conscious effort to place HW facilities in minority communi-
ties.524 More prevalent, and more persuasive, explanations for the
AT HAZARDOUS WASTE SIms at i, iv-vii (1992); Rae Zimmerman, Social Equity and Environ-
mental Risk, 13 RIsK ANALYsis 649, 663 (1993). Likewise, a 1993 study found that counties
with higher concentrations of nonwhites have more NPL sites than do counties with fewer
nonwhites; furthermore, but also that the more economically advantaged counties are likely to
have more NPL sites-in other words, race is a much stronger indicator than income of the
presence of highly contamined sites. John A. Hird, Environmental Policy and Equity: The
Case of Superfund, 12 J. POL'Y ANALYSis & Mo~nr. 323, 330-35 (1993).
520. CLEAN SITEs, INC., HAZARDOUS WASTE SrEs AND THE RURAL PooR: A PRIMI-
NARY ASsEssMENT at viii (1990).
521. Id. at ix.
522. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in
Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1. But see Georgia: State Report Looks
at Waste Site Fines, Finds No Discrimination in Minority Areas, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6,
at 284 (June 11, 1993). A separate 1992 study also examined the correlation between the pace
of cleanup of NPL sites and community racial composition. Zimmerman, supra note 519, at
16-22. Anecdotal evidence is contained in Marc Cooper, The Sickness on Evelina Street, Vn.-
LAGE VoicE, Sept. 7, 1993, at 33.
523. U.S. EPA, ENvIRoNmENTAL EQurrY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL CoMMUNImS 11
(1992); Austin & Schill, supra note 352, at 76-77; see Memorandum from Philip W. Johnston,
Secretary, Executive Office of Human Services, Commonwealth of Massachusetts to John
DeVillars, Secretary, Executive Office of Environmental Affairs 12-13 (Sept. 14, 1990) (on
file with the Tulane Law Review) (disapproving site in Braintree for new hazardous waste
incinerator, largely because the nearest communities have high rates of respiratory disease due
in part to large elderly populations). This finding was criticized by the facility's proponents as
the result of a simple statistical error. See Michael O'Hare & Debra Sanderson, Facility Siting
and Compensation: Lessons from the Massachusetts Experience, 12 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
Mor r. 364, 374 (1993).
524. See, e.g., Kelly M. Colquette & Elizabeth A. Henry Robertson, Environmental
Racism: The Causes, Consequences, and Commendations, 5 TuL. ENvrL. L.J. 153, 170
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location of HW sites in minority areas relate to land use patterns
and to political power.
According to the land use explanation,525 factories formerly
tended to be sited in center cities, often accompanied by working
class housing. With suburbanization and the decline of central cit-
ies after World War II, housing values declined and low-income
people, including minorities, were attracted. Most HW is disposed
at the factory where it is generated,526 and when the factory shuts
down, a Superfund site is often left behind.5 27 Grandfathered HW
disposal facilities often persist in these areas, but poor minorities,
with limited mobility options, are unable to flee. 28
The political explanation, which is not at all inconsistent with
the land use explanation, points out that facility siting decisions are
often made by government and that minority communities tradi-
tionally are underrepresented in government, which was the rea-
son, of course, for the Voting Rights Act.5 29  Low-income and
minority groups have long had low participation rates in political
activity in general530 and in environmental politics in particular.
531
Studies evaluating whether a statistical correlation exists between
political power and siting decisions have been inconclusive, 32 but
several particular siting outcomes were blatantly political
(1991); Daniel Suman, Robert Bullard: Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental
Quality, 19 EcOLoGY L.Q. 591, 596-97 (1992) (book review).
525. See Austin & Schill, supra note 352, at 69-70; Bernstein, supra note 32, at 83-84;
Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to Environmental
Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495, 506-10 (1992); Michael O'Hare, "Not On My Block You
Don't": Facility Siting and the Strategic Importance of Compensation, 25 PUB. POL'Y 407,
454 (1977); see also Been, supra note 491 (providing statistical analysis of demographic char-
acteristics of communities at time HW facilities were sited).
526. See supra text accompanying note 29.
527. See GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 309, at 158 (discussing the authors'
survey which shows that towns with economic bases oriented toward industry are far more
likely to have numerous dumpsites).
528. ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DixIa: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALrrY 7, 10 (1990).
529. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1988).
530. Max Neiman & Ronald 0. Loverridge, Environmentalism and Local Growth Con-
trol: A Probe into the Class Bias Theories, 6 ENV'T & BEHAVIOR 759, 760 (1981).
531. Id. at 768; see MORELL & MAGORIAN, supra note 10, at 155; KENT E. PORTNEY,
SrrING HAZARDoUs WASTE TREATMENT FACILITIES: THE NIMBY SYNDROME 71 (1991);
Dorceta E. Taylor, Blacks and the Environment: Toward an Explanation of the Concern and
Action Gap Between Blacks and Whites, 21 ENVT & BEHAVIOR 175, 176-80 (1989).
532. Two studies have examined this question. One found a negative correlation
between voter turnout rates and HW facility expansion. James T. Hamilton, Politics and
Social Costs: Estimating the Impact of Collective Action on Hazardous Waste Facilities 24
RAND J. ECON. 101, 115 (1993). The other, which looked at other surrogates for political
power, found no such correlation. GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 309, at 157.
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(although they did not involve minority areas). The bypassing of
the normal siting studies and the placement of the nation's HLW
repository in a state with little political power, Nevada, is one
obvious example.5 33 Another illustration presented itself in 1981,
when the Arizona legislature designated a spot for the state's HW
facility, bypassing the home counties of the state senate's majority
and minority leaders. 34 As one proponent of the political explana-
tion has written:
Environmental laws, and the siting of polluting facilities, are
products of a political process which has historically excluded
poor people, and in which poor people are grossly under-repre-
sented .... Because siting decisions are political decisions, the
outcome-more facilities in poor communities-is neither sur-
prising nor unpredictable. 5
Several lawsuits have challenged disposal facility siting in
minority communities on equal protection grounds. All the suits
that have been decided have been dismissed,536 primarily because
the plaintiffs could not meet their burden of proving discriminatory
intent or purpose.537 Several commentators have urged alternative
approaches to challenging discrimination in HW facility siting,
533. See Easterling, supra note 342, at 465; Foster Church, Can Nevada Keep
America's Sizzling Nuclear Waste Out of Its Backyard?, GOVERNING, Apr. 1990, at 21; Sha-
piro, supra note 201, at 63.
534. Kenneth M. Bachrach & Alex J. Zautra, Assessing the Impact of Hazardous Waste
Facilities: Psychology, Politics, and Environmental Impact Statements, in ExPosuRE TO HAZ-
ARDOUS SuBsTrANCEs: PSYCHOLOGICAL PARAMETERS 71, 74 (Allen Lebovitz et al. eds., 1986)
[hereinafter ExposuRE]; see also Bullard, supra note 515, at 275 (1983) (providing a political
explanation for the siting of MSW facilities in Houston).
535. Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Equal Protection: The Need for Envi-
ronmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 646 (1993).
536. R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 997 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'g 768 F. Supp. 1144
(E.D. Va. 1991); East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt.
Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 681 (S.D. Tex. 1979). But see El Pueblo Para el Aire y Agua Limpio
v. County of Kings, [1992] 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacra-
mento County, Dec. 30, 1991) (holding that environmental impact statement and other docu-
ments for proposed hazardous waste incinerator in Spanish-speaking area should have been
translated into Spanish); Bowman v. City of Franklin, 980 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1992)
(dismissing equal protection challenge to waste management facility for failure to allege racial
discrinination), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2417 (1993).
537. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270
(1977). One equal protection challenge to a facility siting was successful, but its success may
have been attributable to the bias of the local elected judge, who believed that his county in
Texas had so much natural beauty and that the site was too close to a seismic fault and an
aquifer. See County of El Paso v. Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Auth., No.
2588-34 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Hudspeth County Apr. 25, 1991).
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such as use of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,538 use of equal
protection clauses in state constitutions,539 and enactment of a new
statute creating a "disparate impact" model for discrimination.540
Other, more cynical commentators have said that "civil rights law
has so far miserably failed to combat racism, so why should we
think that it will be better able to combat environmental
racism? '5
41
Apart from the probably insurmountable obstacle of proving
intent to discriminate racially, those challenging proposed sitings
on equal protection grounds have another formidable hurdle. A
new HW facility will not receive a permit without an administra-
tive finding that it is safe and poses no undue health threat. The
plaintiffs will have a very difficult time persuading the court to
disregard that finding and to conclude that the proposed facility
will endanger the population. By the time the facility is built and
its dangers become concrete, it will have achieved grandfathered
status and will be very difficult to shut down.
Moreover, the theory that race accounts for many siting deci-
sions requires much more factual development. Several groups are
now working to replicate the United Church of Christ study to cor-
rect some of its acknowledged methodological shortcomings, espe-
cially its inattention to timing questions, for example, when
facilities were sited and when current racial patterns came into
being, and to geographic patterns.542 Most of the anecdotes and
much of the data concerning discriminatory siting come from the
southeastern United States. That, however, is a region where, for
obvious historic reasons, rural areas have large black populations;
in the Northeast, where the rural areas are mostly white, most pro-
posed sites have been in white areas. The three sites that are most
538. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); Lazarus, supra note 507, at 834-39.
539. Naikang Tsao, Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizens' Guide to Combat-
ting the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 366, 397 (1992).
540. Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 Micn. L. REv. 394, 421-
22 (1991); see also Edward P. Boyle, Note, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of
Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection
Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REv. 937, 980 (1993).
541. Cole, supra note 443, at 1996-97.
542. In 1992, Waste Management, Inc. (WMI) circulated an analysis showing that 76%
of its disposal facilities nationwide are located in five-digit zip code areas with a white popula-
tion equal to or greater than the host-state average. Letter from Charles J. McDermott, WMI,
to Luke Cole 1 (Sept. 8, 1992) (letter on file with the Tulane Law Review). However, this
analysis counted white Latinos as white and did not adjust for facility size or type. WMI has
commissioned a follow-up study from the University of Massachussets at Amherst. Ronald
Begley & Elisabeth Kirschner, The Demand for Environmental Justice, CiHEMICAL WK., Sept.
15, 1993, at 27, 28.
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often pointed to as examples of environmental racism are the HW
landfills in Emelle, Alabama; Warren County, North Carolina; and
Kettleman Hills, California; but at least facially plausible explana-
tions have been offered why all three sites were technically
superior.543
Returning again to our evaluation of the fairness of the current
siting system, more work needs to be done to establish whether
current efforts to site new HW facilities are racially or economi-
cally unfair. There have been few such charges against the pro-
posed new radioactive waste facilities, most of which would be
placed in lightly populated areas anyway. One fact does seem
clear: to the extent that the current siting system perpetuates
"grandfathered" facilities and does not allow new sites to open,
much HW disposal will continue to take place in poor and minority
areas.
3. Fairness Between Generations
A just society will consider the effects of its actions on its
descendants. 544 The Constitution states that one of its purposes is
to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Poster-
ity. ' 545 Few current human activities will have more impact on
distant future generations than the disposal of hazardous and radio-
active wastes that may remain dangerous for millenia. Iodine-129,
for example, has a half-life of 15.7 million years.546 A theologian,
Ted F. Peters, has asked the question starkly:
[HIow can we morally justify the bequeathal on the part of the
present generation of risks and responsibilities that might gravely
endanger the health and safety of future generations? How mor-
ally appropriate is it for one group to satisfy its own consumptive
desires for a few decades and then exact payment from countless
as yet to be born civilizations for hundreds of thousands of
years? 547
543. See GAO, supra note 508, at 9 (concerning Warren County); Bernstein, supra note
32, at 86 (concerning Emelle); Lawrence J. Straw, Jr., Environmental Equity: A Controversial
Catchphrase Confronts Environmentally Sensitive Projects, 1992 CAL. ENVTL. L. REP. 507,
510 (concerning Kettleman Hills). But see BuuArm, supra note 528, at 35-38, 70.
544. See JoHN RAwLS, A THEoRY op JUSTICE 284-93 (1971).
545. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
546. MAKHuANi & SALEsKA, supra note 191, at 41.
547. Peters, supra note 491, at 41. For a contrary view, see Robert L. Heilbroner, What




As shown earlier, environmental law affords the highest
degree of protection to preserving for future generations such items
as endangered species, wilderness areas, and historic buildings.
Doctrines from completely separate areas of law, such as limita-
tions on the public debt and the rules against perpetuities and
against restraints on alienation of property, are also designed to
prevent the dead hand of the past from restricting the choices of the
present and the future. 48 These principles of protecting the future
are constantly violated by today's choices in HW/RW disposal.
The best way, of course, to protect future generations from
HW/RW is to not create it in the first place. If that is not possible,
disposal is necessary. The principal disposal options can be
arrayed in a spectrum from most to least permanent: destruction,
irretrievable disposal, retrievable disposal, long-term containment,
and storage. These options are discussed in turn below.
a. Destruction
The primary destruction technique is incineration, although
bioremediation and other alternative technologies are now being
introduced.5 49 Incineration works for certain kinds of HW, but not,
for others (such as heavy metals) and not for RW. Unfortunately,
incineration of certain wastes creates byproducts such as dioxins
and furans that, if released into the environment, can create their
own problems for future generations. 55° Thus, although incinera-
tion is a permanent remedy in theory, the reality is more
complicated.551
b. Irretrievable Disposal
Permanent shielding of exceptional items has been an aspira-
tion of many civilizations, from the builders of the pyramids, who
relied on secret passageways and the curses of the gods to keep out
548. See Harold P. Green, Legal Aspects of Intergenerational Equity Issues, in EQurrY
IssuEs, supra note 180, at 189.
549. See infra part V.C.5.
550. RECYCLING & INCINERATION: EVALUATING THE CHOICES 8, 201 (Richard A. Deni-
son & John Ruston eds., 1990).
551. GoRE, supra note 509, at 157. Then-Senator Gore stated:
The principal consequence of incineration is ... the transporting of the commu-
nity's garbage-in gaseous form, through the air-to neighboring communities,
across state lines, and, indeed, to the atmosphere of the entire globe, where it will
linger for many years to come. In effect, we have discovered yet another group of
powerless people upon whom we can dump the consequences of our own waste:
those who live in the future and cannot hold us accountable.
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trespassers, to the believers in the legend of the Holy Grail, who
looked to a race of knights to guard the cup. Geological reposito-
ries for radioactive waste, such as Yucca Mountain and WIPP,
continue that hope. Recognizing the danger that some future soci-
ety might forget about these facilities and inadvertently drill for oil
or water there, DOE has spent several million dollars designing a
"keep out" sign for WIPP that would be effective for 10,000 years
and recognizable by any future earthling.552 A perpetual care fund
is also being established for WIPP, with the theory that the income
from a permanent endowment will allow DOE to pay for the moni-
toring and security for, say, the life of the sign. 53 Perpetual care
funds are a well-established feature of cemetery finance,554 and
have been set up for some HW landfills as well.55 The Uranium
Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act requires perpetual surveillance
of tailings disposal facilities,556 which EPA expects will be
designed to last at least 1000 years.557 Although good intentions
may underlie these plans, no great cynicism is required to scoff at
the notion of maintaining a sign, or a bank account, or a federal
department for 10,000 years. (After all, the oldest continually
operating organization in the western world, the Catholic Church,
is less than 2000 years old.)
c. Retrievable Disposal
The idea behind retrievable disposal is that waste would be
kept just as environmentally secure as in irretrievable disposal but
that a future generation could obtain access in the event the mate-
rial can later be used or treated differently. One example of this
approach was discussed before the signing of the Antarctic Treaty.
During talks, a proposal was made to place a radioactive waste
canister in a shallow hole in the Antarctic ice sheet and allow the
canister to melt its own way to the bottom; under one variation of
the proposal, a cable would be attached to the canister that would
552. Alan Burdick, The Last Cold-War Monument, HARPER'S, Aug. 1992, at 62.
553. Kneese et al., supra note 224, at 203.
554. See, e.g., In re Getman's Will, 291 N.Y.S.2d 395, 397 (App. Div. 1968).
555. E.g., NEw YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., PERPETUAL MoNrrORINO,
MAINTENANCE, AND CARE (1989) (containing Module II of permit for SLF-12 hazardous waste
landfill in Model City, N.Y.) see also Ray Pospisil, Radical Change for Hazardous Waste
Services, CHEMICAL WK., Aug. 18, 1993, at 26, 28 (observing that "perpetual post-closure
monitoring" was imposed on HW landfill in Ohio).
556. 42 U.S.C. § 7914(f)(2) (1988); 10 C.F.R. § . 40, App. A (1992).
557. Jack A. Calwell, Engineering Perspectives for Near-Surface Disposal, in DESERTS
AS DUMPS, supra note 222, at 161, 165.
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allow its retrieval . 5 8 Earth-mounded bunk&rs, which are increas-
ingly used for LLRW worldwide, present a less exotic example.
The principal negative aspect of retrievable disposal for RW is that
the wrong people might do the retrieving. Fears of this escalated
after workers at the West Valley, New York facility stole radioac-
tive tools and sold them at a public auction a few miles away. A
similar incident occurred at the Beatty, Nevada LLRW facility. 59
Retrievable disposal is disfavored for HLW and TRU for fear of
plutonium theft.
d. Long-Term Containment
Underlying proposals for geologic disposal is the assumption
that the waste will remain isolated from the environment, so that if
future generations somehow forget about the facility, the odds are
that nothing bad will happen. Conversely, with long-term contain-
ment, it is assumed that, some day, the waste will reach the envi-
ronment. The most common waste disposal method in place
today-the landfill-is the principal example of long-term con-
tainment. The EPA has repeatedly stated that, regardless of sound
construction and operation, all landfill liner systems will eventu-
ally fail, resulting in the migration of the hazardous constituents of
the waste into the broader environment.5 60 This is the principal
reason why the geology of sites selected for landfills is so
important.
The remedy selected in many CERCLA cleanups offers
another important example of long-term containment.5 61 At many
sites, especially those being cleaned up by their owners rather than
by the EPA, the contamination is left in the ground but is enclosed
in a liner and a cap, much like a landfill. Eventually, possibly
decades or centuries later, the site may have to be cleaned up all
558. Earl R. Hoskins & James E. Russell, Geologic and Engineering Dimensions of
Nuclear Waste Storage, in NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 491, at 19, 28.
559. RESNIKOFF, supra note 186, at 50.
560. EPA Proposed Rules, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,126, 11,128 (1981); Requirements for
Authorization of State Hazardous Waste Programs, 47 Fed. Reg. 32,373 (1982); see also Hunt
v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1374 (Ala. 1991), rev'd on other grounds,
112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992); U.S. GAO, HAZARDOUS WASTE: FUNDING OF PosTcLosURe LIABnU-
TIES REMAINS UNCERTAIN 18 (1990); G. Fred Lee & R. Anne Jones, Landfills and Ground-
Water Quality, 29 GROUND WATER 482, 483 (1991); Peter Montague, The Limitations of
Landfilling, in BEYOND DUMPING 3 (Bruce Piasecki ed., 1984).
561. See generally Jeffrey Spear, Remedy Selection Under CERCLA and Our Responsi-
bilities to Future Generations, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 117 (1993).
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over again after the liner leaks.5 62 The methods used to address
leaking underground storage tanks are also often temporary,
requiring later cleanup. 63 Most of the cleanups now underway at
the nuclear weapons complex involve either containment of the
contamination in place or excavation and storage of the waste in
containers,5 4 often under "marginal conditions." 65 Landfills and
containment remedies are the waste disposal equivalent of timed
release capsules. Such "containment" remedies have been used in
about half of the NPL sites where the cleanup work has been
completed. 66
e. Storage
The least permanent method of disposal, and the one that
most clearly shifts the burden to future generations, is storage.
There is every sign that storage is becoming the de facto method of
dealing with radioactive waste 67 and some hazardous waste. The
TRU destined for WIPP has long been sitting in barrels and boxes
in Idaho and elsewhere awaiting shipment.5 68 The civilian HLW
waiting for Yucca Mountain is stored at the nuclear power
plants.569 The HLW from nuclear weapons manufacture is stored
in large, leaking tanks at Hanford and Savannah River.570 The pro-
posed monitored retrievable storage facility may store the waste
562. OFFICE OF TECH. AssEssmr, supra note 63, at 140, 217; U.S. GAO, PUB. No.
GAO/RCED-92-138, SuP.RFuND: PROBLEMS WITH THE COMPLETENESS AND CONSISTENCY OF
SrE CLEANUP PLANS (1992).
563. See U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/NSIAD-92-117, HAZARDOUS MAmIALS:
UPGRADING OF UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS CAN BE IMPROVED To AvoiD COSTLY Ct.AN-
ups 18 (1992).
564. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 219, at 35-36.
565. Id. at 7.
566. U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-93-188, SuPERUNnD: CLEANUPS NEAINo COM-
PLETION INDICATE FUTURE CHALLENGES 28, 49 (1993).
567. BARL.m & STEELE, supra note 187, at 171-72.
568. See Schneider, supra note 2, at 56 (reporting that 129,000 drums and 11,000 boxes
of sludge, clothing, glass vials, and other debris contaminated with plutonium are stored at
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and that much of this has been there since the 1950s).
After success in early rounds of litigation, Idaho agreed to accept additional shipments of spent
naval fuel only after winning numerous concessions from the Navy. Idaho Agrees to Allow
Navy to Ship Spent Fuel to DOE Engineering Laboratory, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 624
(Aug. 13, 1993); Keith Schneider, Pact Allows Navy to Send Nuclear Waste to Idaho, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 1993, at A12.
569. Expansion of these storage facilities, necessitated by the delayed opening of Yucca
Mountain, has been controversial in some locations. See Michigan v. NRC, No. 4:93CV67
(W.D. Mich. May 10, 1993); Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Community v. North-
ern States Power Co., Nos. CI-92-2314, C3-92-2315, C9-92-2321, 1993 Minn. LEXIS 477
(Minn. July 15, 1993).
570. See supra text accompanying notes 182-85.
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for a very long time. Some leading commentators have advocated
leaving much of this material in storage for another 100 years or
so, awaiting improvements in technology and changes in the public
attitudes toward permanent repositories such as Yucca Moun-
tain. 71 Other nations have also, more or less explicitly, adopted a
de facto policy of long-term storage of HLW 72
The siting of LLRW facilities is equally problematic. Many
nuclear power plants are building storage facilities for LLRW until
repositories open. These facilities are often little more than steel-
frame, metal-siding buildings on a concrete slab, sometimes with
poured or precast concrete walls. 73 Many environmental groups
advocate storage of LLRW (medical and industrial, as well as util-
ity) at the nuclear power plants. 74
Congress has prohibited the extended storage of HW that is
banned from land disposal.5 75  Such storage poses real hazards
beyond the ever-present, and often-realized, danger of leakage. In
1984, a fire at a HW storage facility in Jacksonville, Florida
destroyed several tanks containing PCBs and other organic chemi-
cal wastes and spread oily droplets of HW onto nearby homes,
cars, and vegetation. 76 Nonetheless, several environmental groups
have called for above-ground storage of HW until better disposal
or destruction technologies are developed.577 The Dutch, who can-
571. See, e.g., MAKmuANI & SALESKA, supra note 191, at 108; Slovic et al., supra note
441, at 1607; see also INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR &
INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY & ENVTL. RESEARCH, PLUTONIUM: DEADLY GOLD OF THE NUCLEAR
AGE 152 (1992); Kai Erickson, Out of Sight, Out of Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, Maga-
zine, at 34 (arguing against permanent disposal of HLW because that removes the choice from
future generations).
572. FRANS BERKHOUT, RADIOACTIVE WASTE: POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY 177-78
(1991); Zorpette & Stix, supra note 190, at 20.
573. Carol Homibrook & Michael D. Naughton, Lagging Regional LLRW Disposal
Spotlights On-Site Storage, POWER, Mar. 1992, at 76.
574. MAKmnANI & SALEsKA, supra note 191, at 93; SIERRA CLUB RADIOACTIVE WASTE
CAMPAIGN, "Low-LEVEL" NUCLEAR WASTE: OPTIONS FOR STORAGE (1985) (preferring
above-ground storage sites); RESNIKOFF, supra note 186, at 78; Richard J. Bord, The Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Crisis: Is More Citizen Participation the Answer?, in Low-LEVEL
RADIOACTIVE WASTE REGULATION, supra note 188, at 193, 210 (citing Sierra Club
publications).
575. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(j) (1988); see Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886
F.2d 355, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 849 (1990).
576. James M. Melius et al., Facility Siting and Health Questions: The Burden of
Health Risk Uncertainty, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 467, 470 (1984). A similar incident
occurred at a PCB storage facility in Quebec. See Armour, supra note 381, at 31.
577. CITIZENS CLEARINGHOUSE FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE, INC., How TO DEAL WITH A
PROPOSED FACILITY 5 (1986) [hereinafter CIZEs CLEARINGHOUSE]; SAMUEL S. EPSTEIN Er
AL., HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA 337-78 (1982) (Sierra Club publication); see also
Kemezis, supra note 89, at 14 (reporting the opposition of citizens to the incineration of old
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not build landfills because of their high water table, have already
largely adopted this approach for HW treatment residues. 78
The above discussion should make it clear that the current
system of RW/HW disposal is unfairly pushing many costs onto
future generations. 79 Moreover, by imposing many of the costs of
final disposal on our distant descendants, the current system is also
further depressing the cost of HW/RW disposal today and thus
subsidizing the creation of waste.
E. Political Viability
The final question in evaluating the current HW/RW facility
siting system is whether it is politically viable; that is, whether it
can achieve enough political and public consensus for facilities
actually to be built. One clear lesson of the past two decades is
that adamant, sustained citizen opposition, when backed by local
government, almost always wins.580 Since the passage of RCRA in
1976, not a single hazardous or radioactive waste disposal facility
has opened, and stayed open, on a new site in the United States in
violation of this principle. Because public opposition is so deci-
sive, its nature must be explored.
1. What Creates Public Opposition?
Several public opinion polls have shown that nuclear power
plants, RW facilities, and HW facilities are all lumped together as
the most feared land uses. These are far more feared than, for
example, chemical plants, oil refineries, or coal-fired power
plants.581 In some of the surveys, people said they would not want
chemical weapons at a depot in Alabama, even though the Centers for Disease Control said
that the health risk from continued storage of the weapons at the depot were greater than those
from incineration).
578. Gary A. Davis, Shifting the Burden Off the Land: The Role of Technical Innova-
tion, in AMERICA'S FUrTURE, supra note 35, at 43, 61.
579. But see Dan M. Berkovitz, Pariahs and Prophets: Nuclear Energy, Global Warm-
ing, and Intergenerational Justice, 17 COLUM. J. Ei~vTL. L. 245, 296-319 (1992) (arguing that
the transmittal of risk to future generations is inevitable and that the dangers of RW/HW
disposal are possibly lower than those associated with the continued use of fossil fuels).
580. MoPnuL & MAGORiAN, supra note 10, at 188; see BRioN, supra note 2, at 14;
Murray & Seneker, supra note 307, at 323.
581. See Owen J. Furuseth, Community Sensitivity to a Hazardous Waste Facility, 17
LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 357, 364 (1989) (largely replicating a U.S. Council on Environmen-
tal Quality (CEQ) study in Charlotte, N.C.); Popper, supra note 17, at 1, 5 (reporting on a
1980 survey taken by Resources for the Future for the CEQ); Slovic et al., supra note 441
(observing that a 1989 survey showed nuclear power plants to be more acceptable than HW/




a nuclear power plant or a HW/RW facility closer than 100 miles
from their homes;582 in others, ten miles was an acceptable
distance.5
83
This opposition has not always existed. In the first third of
this century, radium-laced patent medicines were hawked as cures
for rheumatism, diabetes, and lagging sexual powers; a toothpaste
containing radium was sold to "brighten the teeth," and tap water
was bubbled through radium.584 In 1975, sixty percent of Ameri-
cans told pollsters they favored the construction of new nuclear
power plants; by 1983, sixty percent were opposed.585 Years of
polling showed that concern over RW was imperceptible until
1973, when a leak of liquid HLW at Hanford received wide public-
ity.58 6 HW was also a matter of little public concern; a 1973 sur-
vey for EPA found that most people had positive attitudes about
HW facilities and would accept one in their county.587 Public
opinion took a dramatic swing in the late 1970s, however. Love
Canal came to light in 1978.588 In March 1979, the movie The
China Syndrome appeared, and two weeks later its warnings were
eerily confirmed at Three Mile Island. Since then public opposi-
tion to nuclear power and to HW/RW facilities has solidified.589
Many theories have been offered for the widespread public
opposition to HW/RW facilities, but I believe that the reasons can
be summed up with two words: dread and intrusion. These have
important implications for the siting dilemma.
582. Popper, supra note 17, at 5; Slovic et al., supra note 441.
583. Lyons et al., supra note 1, at 89, 91-92; Smith & Desvousges, supra note 410, at
294. Other surveys are reported in Easterling, supra note 342, at 442; Christopher J. Smith &
Robert Q. Hanham, Any Place but Here! Mental Health Facilities as Noxious Neighbors, 33
PROF. GEOGRAPHER 326 passim (1981). For discussions of the inconsistent roles of proximity
in shaping public opinion about facilities, see NATIONAL RESOURCE COUNCIL, supra note 497,
at 101-02; William Hallman & Abraham Wandersman, Perception of Risk and Toxic Hazards,
in PSYCHOSOCIAL EFFECTS, supra note 438, at 31, 45-47.
584. Michael E. Bums & William H. Briner, Setting the Stage, in Low-LEVEL RADIOAC-
TIVE WASTE REGULATION, supra note 188, at 1, 24.
585. JACOB, supra note 203, at 47.
586. Stanley M. Nealey & John A. Hebert, Public Attitudes Toward Radioactive Wastes,
in Too HOT TO HANDLE? SOCIAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE
WASTES 94, 95 (Charles A. Walker et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter Too HOT TO HANDLE].
587. B.S. Forcade, Public Participation in Siting, in POLITICS, supra note 341, at 111,
111.
588. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
589. See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CuTURE 10 (1982);
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 497, at 9, 16-21 (1984); Paul Slovic, Perception of
Risk and the Future of Nuclear Power, 9 ARIz. J. INr'L & CoMP. L. 191, 191 (1992).
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a. Dread
Polls confirm that by far the most important reason behind
opposition to HW/RW facilities is concern over the impact on
health,590 particularly the health of one's children.5 91  Apprehen-
sion about health effects is also at the root of the emergence, since
about 1980, of thousands of grassroots organizations of facility
opponents and "toxic victims." These groups are organized into
two nationwide coalitions: the Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazard-
ous Wastes (CCHW), based in Arlington, Virginia, and the
National Toxics Campaign, based in Boston.592 Each issue of
CCHW's newsletter, Everyone's Backyard, contains reports from
regional correspondents about successful efforts to stop HW/RW
facilities. These groups differ markedly in style, agenda, and con-
stituencies from the mainstream national environmental
organizations.593
Every era has had its own dreads. The Israelites cast out
Moses's sister Miriam when she contracted leprosy.5 94 Successive
590. PORTNEY, supra note 531, at 89, 95, 134; James L. Regens, Siting Hazardous
Waste Management Facilities, in PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT AND SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
121, 124-25 (Gregory A. Daneke et al. eds., 1983).
591. EDELSTEIN, supra note 354, at 64; JOHN SoRENasEN ET AL., IMPACTS OF HAZARDoUs
TECHNOLOGY: THm PSYCHo-SoCIAL EFFEcrs OF RESTARTING TMI-1, at 154 (1987); Holly L.
Howe, Public Concern About Chemicals in the Environment: Regional Differences Based on
Threat Potential, 105 PUB. HEALTH REP. 186, 189 (1990); Chris Zeiss & James Atwater,
Waste Facilities in Residential Communities: Impacts and Acceptance, 113 J. URB. PLAN. &
Dev. 19, 21 (1987); John M. Halstead et al., An Examination of the NIBY Syndrome: Why
Not in My Backyard? 5 (Aug. 31, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Tulane Law
Review).
592. EDELSTEm, supra note 354, at 158-167; PLLER, supra note 315, at 165; Michael
Heiman, From 'Not in My Backyard!' to 'Not in Anybody's Backyard'!, 56 J. AM. PLAN.
ASS'N 359 (1990); see also Campaigning for Environmental Justice, EVERYONE'S BACKYARD,
Feb. 1993, at 6, 10 ("Perhaps the most common denominator in grassroots fights for environ-
mental justice is the issue of health effects. More people get involved in this movement
because their children or other members of their family are ill from exposure to toxic chemi-
cals than any other reason."); Walter A. Rosenbaum, The Politics of Public Participation in
Hazardous Waste Management, in POLITICS, supra note 341, at 176, 191-92 (noting the explo-
sion of citizen activism on hazardous waste issues at both national and local levels in the early
1980s).
593. WIuLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE 213-21 (1992). Lois Gibbs, who
founded CCHW after being evicted from her home near Love Canal, tells a story (possibly
apocryphal) that dramatically illustrates these differences. At a hearing in Louisiana concern-
ing a hazardous waste site, she recounts, citizens set up an aquarium filled with contaminated
drinking water from their wells. They loudly announced that the fish they were about to place
in the tank would be dead by the end of the hearing. When the government officials and
traditional environmentalists in the room protested, the crowd began to chant "kill the fish."
Gibbs said, "If we have to kill the fish to make the point, we'll do it. We're sacrificing our
children." EDEISTEIN, supra note 354, at 167.
594. Numbers 12:10-15.
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civilizations have had ample reason to be terrified of plague, small-
pox, and polio, until each was eradicated or controlled. These hor-
rors have manifested themselves in disputes over siting; Louis
Pasteur's effort to find a laboratory to develop a rabies vaccine was
hampered by residents of Paris who feared they would contract the
disease.595 Cancer and AIDS offer us contemporary medical pho-
bias. 96 Often people who have been exposed to agents that might
cause these diseases, or that simply fear such exposure, become
preoccupied with health problems. 97 When wastes are the source
of these agents, a further layer of revulsion is added, at least in the
view of Freudians. 98 When the waste is burned, as in incinerators,
the complex psychological reaction to fire comes into play.5 99 Yet
another layer of horror accrues when the waste is radioactive.
Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, fear of nuclear war has become
embedded in the culture. People over forty well remember the fall-
out shelter craze of the 1950s, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962,
films like On the Beach (1959), Fail Safe (1964), Dr. Strangelove
(1964), and any number of Grade B movies about post-nuclear-
war-mutants.6 0 0  These horrible images of nuclear war have
become melded in the public mind with nuclear waste. Polls con-
ducted around the world during the 1980s showed that nuclear
power and nuclear waste were regarded at the extreme negative
end of almost every attribute of risk perception, such as dread,
lethality (likelihood that a mishap would prove fatal), potential for
catastrophe (multiple fatalities), involuntariness, and uncontrolla-
bility.60' The mental linkage of nuclear weapons and radioactive
waste greatly impedes the siting of RW facilities. Although most
595. SELaY, supra note 217, at 5.
596. See Louise H. Feffer, AIDSphobia, A New Entity, N.Y. ST. B.J., Feb. 1993, at 14.
597. EDELSTEIN, supra note 354, at 49; Margaret S. Gibbs, Psychopathological Conse-
quences of Exposure to Toxins in the Water Supply, in ExposURE, supra note 534, at 47; see
also MICHAEL R. REICH, Toxic POLITICS: RESPONDING TO CHEMICAL DISASTERS (1991);
HENRY M. VYNER, INVISIBLE TRAUMA: THE PsycHosocIAL EFFECTS OF INVISIBLE ENVIRON-
MENTAL CoNTAMINANTs (1988).
598. See Richard Walker, The Return of the Repressed: Freudian Theory, Hazardous
Waste Siting, and Public Resistance, in PSYCHOsOCIAL EFFECTS, supra note 438, at 239.
599. See GASTON BACHELARD, THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF FIRE (Alan C.M. Ross trans.,
1964).
600. See WILLIAM CHALOUPKA, KNOWING NUKES: THE POLITICS AND CULTURE OF THE
ATOM (1992); ROBERT JAY LIFrON, THE BROKEN CONNECTION: ON DEATH AND THE CON-
TINUITY OF LIF' (1979); SPENCER R. WEART, NUCLEAR FEAR: A HISTORY OF IMAGES (1988).
601. See, e.g., Slovic, supra note 589, at 192-93; Slovic et al., supra note 441, at 1603.
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RW is not prone to atomic explosion,0 2 many members of the pub-
lic may not draw that distinction.
60 3
The sociologist Kai Erikson has written that "[m]aybe we
should understand radioactive and other toxic substances as natu-
rally loathsome, inherently insidious-horrors, like poison gas,
that draw on something deeper in the human mind.' '604 He says
that toxic emergencies possess two distinguishing characteristics
that add to the dread they induce. First, they are unbounded and
have no frame or end; the "all clear" is never sounded. Second,
they are without form. You cannot apprehend them through the
unaided senses; you cannot taste, touch, smell, or see them. That
makes them especially ghostlike and terrifying. Moreover, they
invert the process by which disasters normally inflict harm. They
do not charge in from outside and batter like a gust of wind or a
wall of water. They slink in without warning, do no immediate
damage so far as one can tell, and begin their deadly work from
within-the very embodiment, it would seem, of stealth and
treachery.6 °5
An invisible, ambiguous threat tends to induce what Irving Janis
calls hypervigilance: a complete, sometimes even obsessive atten-
tion to possible risks and ways to avoid them.60 6 There can be no
less fertile soil for a proposal to site a HW/RW facility.
b. Intrusion
The insidiousness of their threat is closely related to the sec-
ond major reason why HW/RW facilities are so hated. The facili-
ties themselves are seen as imposed on communities without
602. But see NucLEmAR WEAPoNs CoMrPLX, supra note 255, at 117 (finding that eight
"criticality accidents" have occurred in the NWC, when critical mass was achieved with pluto-
nium or uranium solutions, with several fatalities resulting); see also supra notes 183-184
(concerning explosions at Soviet nuclear waste facilities in 1957 and 1993).
603. See generally Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive
Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990) (discussing cognitive psychol-
ogy's explanation for the public's occassionally irrational fears).
604. Kai Erikson, Toxic Reckoning: Business Faces a New Kind of Fear, HARV. Bus.
REv., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 118, 121; cf. RHODES, supra note 311, at 594 (recalling that President
Franklin Roosevelt refused to authorize use of poison gas over Iwo Jima before American
invasion, even though it might have saved the lives of thousands of Allied soldiers, presuma-
bly because he remembered the world outcry that followed the German use of poison gas in
World War I.).
605. Erikson, supra note 604, at 122; see also CHARLES PERXow, NoRMAL AccEN-rs
326-28 (1984); Hallman & Wandersman, supra note 583, at 31; Kasperson, The Social Ampli-
fication of Risk- A Conceptual Framework, 8 RISK ANALYSIS 177 (1988).
606. Irving L. Janis, Psychological Effects of Warnings, in MAN ANDr) SocEY r11 DIsAs-
TaER 55 (G.W. Baker & D.W. Chapman eds., 1962).
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consent, and once they arrive, they do their damage silently. When
forced on unwilling localities, the facilities are seen as colossal
intrusions. Attempts to override local siting authority almost inva-
riably backfire and increase local opposition, partly by intensify-
ing the community's perception of risk.6 °7 Some studies have
shown that people will accept voluntary risks approximately 1000
times more hazardous than risks they perceive as involuntarily
imposed 60 8-they will parachute out of an airplane or smoke a cig-
arette, but they don't want anyone to build a waste plant near their
house.60 9 The Constitution places a high value on guarding against
intrusions in people's homes; the Third Amendment states that
"[n]o soldier shall... be quartered in any house, without the con-
sent of the owner.. .,,,610 and the Fourth Amendment guarantees
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their.., houses .... 6 11
An unwanted facility is another kind of intrusion. As Michael R.
Edelstein has written in his study of communities that had exper-
ienced toxic accidents:
Rather than a place to escape to, with the contamination home
had become a place that residents could not escape from. Parents
particularly feared the consequences of continued residence for
themselves and their children. Thus, home was inverted in the
sense that it now was accompanied by a strong sense of fear and
insecurity. Rather than buffering the family from the dangers of
the outside world, home embodies these dangers.612
This sense of intrusion is magnified when the waste is
imported from other areas. The EPA has acknowledged that public
opposition is greater when the facilities would accept out-of-state
waste.61 3 This poses an especially difficult problem, because all
fifty states export some HW to out-of-state treatment facilities, and
607. O'HARn ET AL., supra note 11, at 58; SCHMEIDLER & SANDMAN, supra note 381, at
54; Richard N.L. Andrews & Terrence K. Pierson, Local Control or State Override: Exper-
iences and Lessons to Date, 14 POL'Y STUD. J. 90, 97 (1985); Daniel Burchard & Robert
Hughes, Beyond Capacity: Addressing the Concerns of Local Opposition in the Siting Pro-
cess, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 151 (1986-87).
608. MoRuELL & MAGORIAN, supra note 10, at 63.
609. Inhaber, supra note 2, at 55 (observing that many opposed to the siting of a moni-
tored retrievable storage facility in Tennessee drove to the hearing without wearing seat belts
and smoked during the hearing).
610. U.S. CONST. amend. Im.
611. IL amend. IV.
612. EDELSTEN, supra note 354, at 64.
613. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, supra note 326, at 3. The same
phenomenon has been observed abroad. See Stephen Tromans & Kathy Mylrea, Siting Haz-
ardous Waste Facilities in the United Kingdom, NATURAL RESoURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1993,
at 29, 29.
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forty-eight states-all but Alaska and Montana-import such
waste.614 Approximately eight million tons of HW is shipped off-
site every year, and about half of that crosses state lines.6 15 The
Supreme Court has made clear that the Commerce Clause pre-
cludes states and localities from excluding or discriminating
against out-of-state waste. 6  Yet, the fear or the reality of import-
ing waste from other areas has been a major impetus behind public
opposition to HW landfills,617 HW incinerators, 618 sewage sludge
landspreading, 6 9 and MSW landfills.620 This is a major reason
why several states refused to enter into compacts with others for
regional disposal facilities for LLRW621 and HW.622 Opposition
has also been raised to acceptance of waste from elsewhere in the
same state,623 county,624 and city.625  In several celebrated inci-
614. Capacity Assurance Program, supra note 27, at 59 (statement of Doug MacMillan,
National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n); see also OFFIcE OF ToxIc SUBSTANcES, U.S.
EPA, THE Toxics RELEASE INVENTORY: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, 1987, at 17 (1989) (not-
ing the large amount of out-of-state transfers of toxic chemicals).
615. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EmERGENCY RESPONSE, supra note 23, at 6.
616. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S.
Ct. 2019, 2028 (1992); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2017 (1992);
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-26 (1978).
617. O'HARE ET AL., supra note 11, at 18-22 (operating facility in Wilsonville, Illinois
was shut down after neighbors learned that it would receive PCB-contaminated waste from
Missouri); Michael E. Kraft & Ruth Kraut, Citizen Participation and Hazardous Waste Policy
Implementation, in DimENSIONS, supra note 336, at 63, 69 (noting protests against a landfill in
Ohio that would accept waste from Kentucky and West Virginia).
618. Kemezis, supra note 89, at 14 (reporting opposition to the incineration of chemical
weapons).
619. Sarah Crim, The NIMBY Syndrome in the 1990s: Where Do You Go After Getting
to 'No'?, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 132 (May 4, 1990) (concerning an incident in Texas).
620. Editorial, Block Foreign Garbage, NIAOARA GAZErTT, Mar. 3, 1993, at IlA
(opposing importation of MSW from Canada); Jonathan Walters, Tempted by Trash, Gov-
ERNING, July 1991, at 29 (reporting opposition to a proposed landfill in West Virginia).
621. ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 127.
622. Sam H. Verhovek, New York Fears Burden and Leaves Waste Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1989, at B1.
623. See Olsen, supra note 309, at485 (conceming hazardous waste facilities in western
New York State that could take waste from remainder of state); Rae Zimmerman, Public
Acceptability of Alternative Hazardous Waste Management Services, in PSYcHosoCiAL
E-Eacrs, supra note 438, at 197, 212 (concerning power project in Prattsville, New York,
which would send electricity to New York City); see also BFI Medical Waste Sys. v.
Whatcom County, 983 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1993) (striking down county ordinance barring
medical waste from outside county).
624. Linda Yglesias, Dumpster: A Pastoral Upstate Town Decides It Isn't Taking Any
More Crap, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Oct. 29, 1989, Magazine, at 17 (reporting the opposition of the
town of Saugerties, New York to taking the entire county's MSW).
625. Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The
Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92
COLtJM. L. REv. 775, 783 nA6 (1992) (noting that the secessionist movements in Staten Island
have arisen partly from location of New York City's only MSW landfill there).
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dents, barges 626 or trainloads627 of waste (one of which, bearing
Baltimore sewage sludge, came to be known as the "Poo-poo
Choo-choo") 628  were forced to wander aimlessly after their
intended destinations refused to take them, and no one else would
accept them. A centerpiece of Daniel R. Coats' successful bid for
the Senate seat vacated by Dan Quayle was opposition to MSW
imports, especially from New Jersey. One of his television ads
featured a fat, cigar-chomping man wearing a Yankees cap and a
Cape May T-shirt littering the steps of the Indiana State Capitol.629
After his election, Senator Coats sponsored a bill, which passed the
Senate but not the House, allowing states to ban or tax out-of-state
shipments of MSW.
630
The EPA has promulgated a regulation under RCRA targeted
against any state action "which unreasonably restricts, impedes, or
operates as a ban on the free movement across the State border of
hazardous wastes .... ,,631 Nonetheless, many states have
attempted to restrict imports.632 There has been extensive litigation
in both the federal633 and state634 courts challenging, and usually
striking down, these attempts.
626. See BILL MOYERS, GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND: THE INTERNATIONAL TRAF c IN
HAZARDOUS WASTE 17-30 (Center for Investigative Reporting 1990); Shirley E. Perman, In
the Barge's Wake, in RUSH TO BURN: SOLVING AMERICA'S GARBAGE CRIusis? 243 passim
(1989).
627. See William Bunch, Another Stink over Roving Trash Trains, N.Y. NEWSDAY, July
30, 1992, at 32; Train Bearing Tainted Soil Rolls On, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1991, at A12.
628. J.S. Brown, Putting the Lid on Out-of-State Garbage, ST. GOV'T NEWS, Jan. 1990,
at 22.
629. John Holusha, In Some Parts the Battle Cry Is "Don't Dump on Me", N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 1991, at E5; see also J.C. Barden, Garbage Is One Thing, but Garbage from New
York? Forget It, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1989, at 26.
630. Allan R. Gold, Threat to Garbage Traffic Upsets 2 States, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
1990, at B1; Allan R. Gold, Vote in Senate Alarms Exporters of Garbage, N.Y. TIMs, Sept.
19, 1990, at B3; see also Sue Darcy, Pressured Congress Tackles Interstate Waste Legislation,
WORLD WASTES, Oct. 1991, at 42; John Krukowski, The War Between the States, POLLUTION
ENG'G, June 15, 1992, at 37.
631. 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(a) (1992).
632. Many of these attempts are recounted in Capacity Assurance Program, supra note
27, at 153 (statement of Richard C. Fortuna, Hazardous Waste Treatment Council); W. VIcTo-
RiA BECKER, LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING INTERSTATE DISPOSAL 13-24 (1989); Pn.LER, supra
note 315, at 73-74.
633. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian
Community, 991 F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 1993); In re Southeast Ark. Landfill, Inc., 981 F.2d
372, 373 (8th Cir. 1992); Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d
1267, 1277 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 977 (1993); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc.
v. Templet, 967 F.2d 1058, 1059 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1048 (1993);
National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Voinovich, 959 F.2d 590,592 (6th Cir. 1992); Hazard-
ous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 790 (4th Cir. 1991); Diamond
Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 939 F.2d 941, 944 (lth Cir. 1991); National Solid Wastes
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Another concept closely related to intrusion is trust. Opposi-
tion is magnified when the community does not trust the people or
institutions seeking to place HW/RW in their midst. The political
prospects for several proposed HW facilities were severely dam-
aged when it became known that their proposed developers had
histories of environmental or other violations.63 5 Especially since
Three Mile Island, large segments of the public mistrust the entire
nuclear industry, adding serious difficulty to siting RW facili-
ties.63 6 The DOE faces widespread distrust in its cleanup of the
Nuclear Weapons Complex. 637 This distrust can expand from indi-
vidual companies or agencies to entire industries and even to the
technological society. In the words of Professor Erikson:
If science and technology have become the source of risk... it is
because toxic peril has moved people so far up the scale of suspi-
cion that they come to distrust not only public officials and
experts, not only the social order and the natural world, but also
the very ethos of science and technology.638
Mistrust is often accompanied by despair. The forces behind
hazardous facilities are seen not only as evil but also as invincible.
As Peter Sandman has said, "[i]ronically, nearly everyone is
impressed by the community's power of opposition-except the
community, which sees itself as fighting a difficult, even desperate
Mgmt. Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. 910 F.2d 713,718 (1lth Cir. 1990), modified,
924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991); Washington State Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
913 (1983); TENNSV Inc. v. Illinois EPA, Nos. 92-503 & 92-522, 1993 WL 523386, at *1
(S.D III. Oct. 27, 1993); Southern States Landfill v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, 801
F. Supp. 725, 731 (M.D. Ga., 1992); Stephen D. Devito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island
Solid Waste Mgmt. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775, 779 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1004 (Ist Cir.
1991).
634. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns v. Secretary of State, 595 A.2d 1014, 1016
(Me. 1991); Gilliam County v. Oregon Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 837 P.2d 965, 970 (Or. Ct.
App. 1992), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993).
635. See, e.g., BARTLETT & STEELE, supra note 187, at 269 (concerning an incident in
Texas); BRION, supra note 2, ch. 1 (concerning an experience in Massachusetts); Arnold W.
Reitze, Jr. & Andrew N. Davis, Reconsidering Ocean Incineration as Part of a U.S. Hazard-
ous Waste Management Program: Separating the Rhetoric from the Reality, 17 ENvrL. AFF.
687, 708-09 (1990) (noting that problems with Marine Shale Co. are adding to its siting diffi-
culties); Ryan, supra note 334, at A4, A18 (reporting incidents in Florida and South Carolina).
636. Contreras, supra note 2, at 500-02; Kasperson, supra note 285, at 24, 48-49, 57-58;
Slovic, supra note 589, at 196.
637. Radioactive Waste: Distrust of DOE's Waste Management Activities Widespread,
Long-Lasting, Advisory Board Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 418 (July 9, 1993).
638. Erikson, supra note 604, at 125.
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uphill battle to stop the siting juggernaut." 639 During this battle,
residents feel themselves trapped because the threat of the facility
often makes it impossible for them to sell their homes at full
price-an injury for which there is no legal remedy.64°
2. What Reduces Public Opposition?
Although a complex of reasons, which can be grouped
together under the headings "dread" and "intrusion," intensify pub-
lic opposition to HW/RW facilities, several other factors reduce
opposition. These are discussed below.
a. Local Waste and Local Jobs
Although waste importation is mightily resisted, storage or
disposal of waste at the point of generation often proceeds
smoothly. Nuclear power plants around the country have
expanded their capacity for storing spent fuel, for example, with
very little public opposition.64 1 Many companies have been able to
build on-site storage or disposal capacity with little or no contro-
versy.642 This lack of opposition is attributable to the influence of
several factors. First, no importation of waste, and thus no intru-
sion into the community, is involved. Second, the waste genera-
tors are often industries that create many local jobs. 43  Third,
inertia and familiarity blunt opposition to what could be seen as
just more of the same. Finally, transportation risk is eliminated.
639. Sandman, supra note 468, at 444; see also Bachrach & Zautra, supra note 534, at
85 (explaining that many neighbors of proposed HW facility in Arizona believed they were
powerless to stop it, and "[a]s a consequence, the psychologically most fragile and vulnerable
residents were underrepresented in community activities and thus less visible to government
officials attempting to 'take the pulse' and assess the impact of the HWF on the local
population").
640. See supra part IV.B.2.
641. Walker, supra note 598, at 260.
642. See, e.g., GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 309, at 167 (concerning a facility
in Logan Township, New Jersey); Gail Bingham & Daniel S. Miller, Prospects for Resolving
Hazardous Waste Siting Disputes Through Negotiation, 17 NAT. RnsoRmcEs LAW. 473, 485
(1984) (concerning a facility in Providence, Rhode Island); Paul Slovic & Baruch Fischoff,
How Safe Is Safe Enough? Determinants of Perceived and Acceptable Risk, in Too HOT To
HANDLE, supra note 586, at 112, 116 (concerning a facility in Oregon); Walter & Getz, supra
note 374, at 240-41 (concerning facilities in Montana and Texas); see also Lyons et al., supra
note 1, at 93 (noting that a public opinion poll shows a strong preference for on-site disposal);
Zimmerman, supra note 623, at 197, 219, 225 (noting that a survey of newspaper coverage of
siting controversies shows a high degree of public acceptance of on-site disposal); supra notes
352-360 (concerning a relative ease in expanding existing facilities); Holman, supra note 166,
at 3 (statistical analysis showing much higher success rates for siting noncommercial (typically
on-site) HW facilities than for commercial facilities).
643. See MORELL & MAGORmAN, supra note 10, at 38, 41, 55.
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Some of the largest chemical companies employ on-site disposal as
a matter of policy.6" Even Lois Gibbs' CCHW has advocated on-
site disposal.64 5 When faced with the continuation of a polluting
industry or the loss of many local jobs, communities have often
agreed to keep the jobs and sacrifice the environment, even at dis-
cernable risk to public health. 6
Unfortunately for the waste disposal industry, off-site facili-
ties tend not to create many jobs.64 7 The nation's largest LLRW
facility, located at Barnwell, has fewer than 200 employees. 648
The West Valley nuclear facility at its peak had an operating staff
of 170.649 A new HW incinerator in Ohio would employ only 104
people.650 An integrated waste management facility in Alberta,
Canada operates with 94 employees. 651 These numbers are not
trivial, but unlike an automobile assembly plant, for example, they
are hardly so overwhelming that they can overcome intense local
opposition.
In several instances, the prospect of large numbers of local
jobs did succeed in mobilizing local support for HW/RW facilities,
although this local support did not always last. At one time, the
Yucca Mountain facility in Nevada enjoyed local support, in part
because the community believed that many of the 6800 jobs at the
Nevada Test Site, one of the state's largest employers, would be
jeopardized by a nuclear test ban treaty.652 When WIPP was first
conceived in the early 1970s, the nearby city of Carlsbad, New
Mexico, which was facing major layoffs in the local potash indus-
try, strongly supported the facility.653 The West Valley nuclear
644. Goodbaum & Rotman, supra note 390, at 18.
645. CnzENs CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 577, at 3.
646. See, e.g., Peter Dorman, Environmental Protection, Employment, and Profit: The
Politics of Public Interest in the TacomalAsarco Arsenic Dispute, 16 Rnv. RADICAL POL.
EcoN. 151, 155-57 (1984). See generally RICHARD KAZiS & RICHARD L. GROSSMAN, FEAR AT
WORK: JOB BLAcMILAu, LABOR AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1982) (discussing "environmental
job blackmail" whereby employers play on fears of unemployment by demanding that commu-
nities choose between jobs and environmental quality).
647. Walter & Getz, supra note 374, at 241. An exception is a HLW repository, which
is expected to create 870 to 1000 operation jobs. John K. Thomas et al., The Socioeconomic
Impacts of Repositories, in NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 491, at 103, 106.
648. ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 85.
'649. Robert W. Kates & Bonnie Braine, Locus, Equity, and the West Valley Nuclear
Wastes, in Equrry Isstms, supra note 180, at 94, 104.
650. Embattled Ohio Incinerator Wins Support; Hundreds Rally to Encourage Official
Start, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 2101, 2102 (Dec. 25, 1992).
651. Tomsho, supra note 453, at Al,
652. CARTI, supra note 224, at 424.
653. Reith & Fischer, supra note 222, at 303, 308; Schneider, supra note 2, at 56.
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project, which began in the early 1960s, received strong support
from local residents, who were promised that it would lead to
strong growth in the local economy.65 4 It is important to note,
however, that both WIPP and West Valley were initiated before
the onset of major opposition to nuclear power and RW.
Another reason for the favorable reception of on-site disposal
is its strong appeal to fairness. There is an obvious equity in hav-
ing each location take care of its own waste-an equity that has a
major impact on public reaction to siting proposals.655
b. Local Control
The opposite of intrusion is invitation. When a community
invites a facility into its midst, the risk is voluntary, not involun-
tary. Voluntary siting elicits a far different psychological
response, as the discussion later concerning the Canadian experi-
ence in facility siting will evidence.
656
Regardless of whether the facility comes to town by invita-
tion, local control over the facility's operations has a powerful
impact on local reaction. Numerous public opinion studies have
shown that the ability of a municipality to monitor a facility, to
participate in its management, and to shut it down if necessary, has
a far greater impact on local acceptance than any other measure-
considerably greater than financial compensation, for example.65 7
Some grassroots activists share this view.
6 5 8
654. SELEY, supra note 217, at 93.
655. See George Cvetkovich & Timothy C. Earle, Hazard Images, Evaluations and
Political Action: The Case of Toxic Waste Incineration, in COMMUNICATING RISKS TO THE
PUBLIC: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 327 (Roger E. Kasperson & Pieter J.M. Stallen eds.,
1991).
656. See infra part V.A.4.
657. NEw YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASSIST-
ANCE TO LOCALITIES AFFECTED BY HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES 23-24
(1988) [hereinafter NEw YORK STATE]; PORTNEY, supra note 531, at 37; see also Bachrach &
Zautra, supra note 534, at 71, 86; Richard I. Bord, Judgments of Policies Designed to Elicit
Local Cooperation in LLRW Disposal Siting: Comparing the Public and Decision Makers, 7
NUCLEAR & CHEMICAL WASTE MOMT. 99, 100 (1987); Colglazier & English, supra note 10, at
645; Charles Davis, Public Involvement in Hazardous Waste Siting Decisions, 19 J. NE. POL.
Sci. Ass'N 296 (1986); Patricia K. Freeman et al., Legislative Representation on a Technical
Policy Issue: Hazardous Waste in Tennessee, 26 Soc. ScI. J. 455,459-60 (1989); Lyoni et al.,
supra note 1, at 92; Mazmanian & Morell, supra note 7, at 137; Lawrence E. Susskind, The
Siting Puzzle: Balancing Economic and Environmental Gains and Losses, 5 ENVTL. IMPACT
ASSESSMENT. REv. 157, 162 (1985).
658. See FRED SETrERBERG & LONNY SHAVELSON, Toxic NATION: THE FIGHT TO SAVE




This finding was empirically confirmed by the success of
Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI) in siting a HW landfill and treat-
ment facility in Last Chance, Colorado-the only HW landfill sit-
ing success since the passage of RCRA in 1976. BFI initially
applied for county approvals in November 1980. The county
denied the permits in June 1982. In early 1983, the state amended
the siting law to confirm that local governments could veto facili-
ties but also that, if no locality approved a site within two years,
the state could step in and site one. The county then extracted
several concessions from BFI, including a reduction in volume,
prohibitions on certain types of wastes, specified engineering tech-
niques, and county determination of haul routes. The county also
secured the right to inspect the facility, to receive $100,000 per
year from BFI to pay for inspectors plus two percent of gross reve-
nues to review and approve detailed engineering and construction
drawings, and to require county approval of all fee schedules and
proposed hours of operation. Having obtained this degree of local
control and compensation, the county approved the project in
August 1983. Opposition from some environmental groups and
neighboring counties continued, but the state granted the necessary
permits in 1987, and the facility finally opened in 1991, although
by then BFI had sold it to another company.5 9
c. Local Culture
As Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky have written, "each
culture, each set of shared values and supporting social institutions,
is biased toward highlighting certain risks and downplaying
others."660 Some communities have cultures that are not averse to
HW/RW facilities. Survey research has demonstrated that public
trust of power generation and waste disposal facilities increases
with greater proximity to and familiarity with such facilities.66'
Experience confirms this.
A prime example is Richland, Washington, a city near the
Hanford Reservation, which dominates the local economy. The
659. NEw YORK STATE, supra note 657, at 35-39; Susan Saiter, Local Opposition Is
Stalling Development of Waste Sites, N.Y. TimEs, June 18, 1983, at 6; see also Colorado, USA
TODAY, July 22, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, USATDY file; Commissioners
Approve Dump Site, UPI, Aug. 15, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file.
660. DOUGLAS & WLDAVSKY, supra note 589, at 14; see also LEE CLARKE, ACCEPTA-
BLE RISK? MAKING DECISIONS IN A Toxic ENVIRONMENTr (1989) (discussing the role of orga-
nizational culture in reacting to risk, based on a study of response to a fire in a state office
building in Binghamton, New York in 1981).
661. Rabe, supra note 354, at 177.
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local high school basketball squad, "the Bombers," plays on a gym
floor inscribed with a mushroom cloud; local residents can bowl at
the Atomic Lanes or have a massage at the Atomic Health Center.
There is strong local support for RW management, and the com-
munity is now turning into an environmental boom town (no pun
intended) with thousands of new jobs devoted to cleaning up the
mess from weapons production. 662 Similar local cultures strongly
supportive of RW or HW facilities have been described in Barn-
well, South Carolina, home of the Barnwell LLRW facility and
near the Savannah River Reservation; 663 in Nye County, Nevada,
the home of Yucca Mountain, the Nuclear Test Site, and the Beatty
LLRW facility;66 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, whose economy is
based on nuclear technology and whose local government volun-
teered for the monitored retrievable storage facility for HLW;665 in
Los Alamos, New Mexico, a community dominated by a nuclear
weapons laboratory; 666 in Fall River County, South Dakota, an area
with extensive uranium mining, which indicated it would welcome
an LLRW facility;667 in Hermiston, Oregon, site of an army depot
where munitions and toxic chemicals had long been stored, which
was amenable to receiving nerve gas from Okinawa;66s in Pinawa,
Manitoba, the site of Canada's Whiteshell Nuclear Research Estab-
lishment, where the local government volunteered for Manitoba's
HW facility; 669 in the Bruce and Chalk River areas of Canada,
which have nuclear facilities; 670 and in Swan Hills, Alberta, a com-
662. CAtmER, supra note 224, at 165; Timothy Egan, Richland Journal: Little Sentiment
to Ban the Bomb, N.Y. TmwS, Jan. 14, 1988, at A14; Bill Richards, Nuclear Site Learns to
Stop Wonying and Love the Boom, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1992, at Al.
663. ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 110-11.
664. James Flynn et al., Trust as a Determinant of Opposition to a High-Level Radioac-
tive Waste Repository: Analysis of a Structural Model, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 417, 418 (1992).
665. See generally E. Brent Sigmon, Achieving a Negotiated Compensation Agreement
in Siting: The MRS Case, 6 J. PoLicY ANALYSIS & MGMr. 170 (1987); Dick Thompson,
Living Happily near a Nuclear Trash Heap, TimF, May 11, 1992, at 53 (reporting that a local
doctor who warned a community about risks from nuclear waste in Oak Ridge, Tennessee was
disciplined by his employer and largely ignored by the city).
666. Suzanne Ruta, Fear and Silence in Los Alamos, NATIoN, Jan. 4, 1993, at 9.
667. Colglazier & English, supra note 10, at 647 n.27.
668. Slovic & Fischoff, supra note 642, at 126; see also Ronald Smothers, Plan to
Destroy Toxic Weapons Polarizes a City, N.Y. TMEs, Sept. 24, 1992, at A16 (reporting that
some residents in Anniston, Alabama support a plan to destroy chemical weapons at a local
Army depot, while others oppose the plan).
669. Barbara Connell, The Siting Approach for a Hazardous Waste Management Facil-
ity in Manitoba: A Guide to Nonconfrontational Siting Procedures, in INNOVATIVE
APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 63, 72.
670. Armour, supra note 381, at 40-41.
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munity with a major oil and gas industry and the volunteer for
Alberta's HW facility.671
3. Implications
As the above discussion has shown, much opposition to HW/
RW disposal facilities is caused by some combination of dread (an
emotion largely derived from the nature and physical origin of the
waste) and intrusion (a concept that considers whether the facility
is imposed or invited, whether the waste is local or imported, and
whether the facility's builders are trusted). A number of factors,
however, increase public acceptance of such facilities: the treat-
ment of local waste, the provision or protection of local jobs, the
degree of local control, and the nature of the local culture.
This framework helps explains a number of apparent
anomalies:
1. There have been few, if any, siting successes with new
commercial HW incinerators, because they are both dreaded (the
byproducts of incineration, such as dioxin, are greatly feared) and
intrusive (they import waste from a wide area). MSW incinerators
attract much public opposition because their emissions are still
dreaded. Nonetheless, many MSW facilities have been success-
fully established, because they are not so intrusive-they are usu-
ally built by municipalities to bum local garbage.
2. Although experts proclaim their safety, medical waste
incinerators have met with ferocious local opposition largely
because of their psychological association with today's most
dreaded disease, AIDS.
3. Radon, a naturally occurring radioactive gas emitted by
many rock formations, has stirred relatively little public concern,
largely because it is not at all intrusive; that is, it comes from
nature, rather than being imposed by some outside, mistrusted
human agency. Furthermore, if it gets into a house, it is eminently
controllable.
4. Some activities that statistically pose a far greater risk of
injury than HW/RW disposal, such as the trucking of gasoline
around the country,672 stir little concern because they are neither
671. J. McQuaid-Cook, Siting a Fully Integrated Hazardous Waste Management Facil-
ity with Incinerator and Landfill, Swan Hills, Alberta, Canada, in INNOVATIVE APPROACHES,
supra note 2, at 123, 129.
672. See Transportation of Hazardous Materials: Hearings before the House Comm. on
Public Works and Transp., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 760-61 (1988).
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dreaded nor intrusive and also because their risks are spread over a
larger population.
5. To obtain gratification or other benefits, individuals
engage in personal activities such as smoking and car racing that
subject them to considerably greater risks than do HW/RW dispo-
sal facilities, but those activities are voluntary and therefore not
intrusive.
6. On-site disposal of HW/RW is generally accepted, because
it is not intrusive.
673
The above discussion of public opinion also has important
implications for the siting process. Most importantly, it shows that
the widespread practice of trying to preempt local control and force
disposal facilities on unwilling communities is much like the medi-
eval practice of bleeding the sick: it is exquisitely counterproduc-
tive. Not only does it never work, it actually increases opposition
exponentially by turning what might be a voluntary risk into an
involuntary, highly intrusive risk. Moreover, as previously demon-
strated, preemption (if it worked) would also amount to a hidden
subsidy for the creation of hazardous and radioactive waste.
Unfortunately, preemption is deeply embedded in national siting
policy and law.
A second implication is the flip side of the first: the search
for volunteer sites should be central to a sound siting policy. It
should be possible to find communities whose cultures will induce
them to volunteer. In Part V, prior successful attempts to find vol-
unteer communities are examined.
A third implication is that the opposition to importation, and
the relative ease of on-site disposal, are likely to lead to a prolifera-
tion of a very large number of very small disposal facilities. This
situation presents its own environmental hazards, and my proposed
solution to that dilemma is stated in Part VI.
Finally, to address the opening question of this section: The
current system of HW/RW facility siting is not politically viable.
It is based on a lack of understanding of the psychological and
sociological dynamics of siting, and it fosters public opposition
that is almost always fatal to siting attempts.
673. See HUGH F. HOLMAN, SrmNG, NEw HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIs: FINAL
REPORT 14 (1988) (statistical analysis showing far greater success in siting storage, treatment,
and recycling units than landfills and incinerators).
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V. PRIOR PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
This Section describes and assesses prior proposals to reform
the siting process. I have divided them into three categories: those
that seek to achieve local consent to build a facility (consensual);
those that seek to impose a facility (coercive); and those that seek
to avoid local siting altogether by eliminating, redefining, or
exporting the waste (avoidance).
A. Consensual
1. Compensation 674
Michael O'Hare published the seminal paper on compensa-
tion in HW/RW facility siting in 1977,675 and many writers have
since embraced and embellished his idea.676 The basic notion is
that "[s]iting of noxious facilities tends to concentrate costs within
an area proximate to the site while providing diffuse benefits over
a wide area. Compensation measures can rearrange this distribu-
tion of costs and benefits. ' 677 Under this theory, compensation
serves three purposes: it induces localities to accept facilities; it
makes the victims whole; and, by internalizing the external costs of
these facilities, it increases economic efficiency.
674. Strictly speaking, three separate concepts are involved. "Compensation" aims to
recreate the status quo, and make communities whole, by paying for actual damages. "Mitiga-
tion" prevents, reduces, or eliminates adverse impacts before they occur. "Incentives" or
"rewards" are positive inducements, beyond any actual or predicted damages, to reward com-
munities for accepting risk. See MORELL & MAGORIAN, supra note 10, at 173; S.A. Canes et
al., Incentives and Nuclear Waste Siting: Prospects and Constraints, in REsOLVING LOCA-
TIONAL CoNFLIcT, supra note 17, at 359. In the discussion that follows, the term "compensa-
tion" is used generically to cover all three concepts.
675. O'Hare, supra note 525; see also O'HARE Er AL., supra note 11. O'Hare draws on
the work of Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of Just Compensation Law, 80 HARV. L. 'REv. 1165 (1967). An earlier, less
detailed exposition of the idea articulated in O'Hare's article may be found in Anthony J.
Mumphrey et al., A Decision Model for Locating Controversial Facilities, 37 AM. INST. PLAN-
NEPs J. 397 (1971).
676. E.g., Bacow & Milkey, supra note 6, at 265; Bingham & Miller, supra note 642;
Carnes et al., supra note 674, at 353; Herbert Inhaber, Can We Find a Volunteer Nuclear
Waste Community?, PuB. UrL. FORT., July 15, 1991, at 19; Miller, supra note 401, at 918;
Ronald Pushchak & Ian Burton, Risk and Prior Compensation in Siting Low-Level Nuclear
Waste Facilities: Dealing with the NIMBY Syndrome, 23 PLAN CAN. 68 (1983).
677. MOPu.L & MAGORIAN, supra note 10, at 167. In many ways this is the inverse of
state land-use laws protecting environmentally fragile "critical areas," such as coastal zones,
shorelands, and wetlands. "These are areas where the benefits of development, in terms of
new jobs or an expanded tax base, will be enjoyed by local residents, while the environmental
losses will be felt statewide." Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of
Local Government Lav, 90 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 65 (1990).
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The idea of compensation has been widely embraced in HW/
RW siting legislation. The HW siting statutes of at least thirteen
states mandate some kind of compensation or economic incen-
tive.67 8 Twelve states offer compensation packages for communi-
ties getting LLRW facilities.67 9 The NWPA provides for payments
of twenty million dollars per year to the host state (or Indian tribe)
for the HLW repository, and ten million dollars per year to the host
of the monitored retrievable storage facility,680 with additional
"impact aid" to the state and affected local governments.681 The
state or tribe can also receive several million dollars per year prior
to the opening of the facilities but only if it waives its rights to
object to the siting.
682
Despite all this support, compensation has never been used
successfully in siting a HW/RW disposal facility in the United
States.683 The reason is clear: the opposition to these facilities
stems mainly from concern over their impact on health, particu-
larly children's health,684 and people will not accept any amount of
money that will allow others to endanger their children.685 Individ-
uals that perceive these facilities as dangerous will not change
these perceptions when offered money,686 and they view the offer
678. Green, supra note 37, at 93. Under some of these laws, the communities near
existing facilities receive a gross receipts tax. See Teresa H. Sharp, Tax Windfall Didn't Set
Off a Spending Spree, NIAGARA GAzE-rE, Nov. 28, 1992, at 1 (reporting that the towns of
Lewiston and Porter, New York each received $1 million in 1992 from Chemical Waste Man-
agement in compensation for its operation of hazardous waste landfills; the towns used a por-
tion of those funds for legal and expert fees to oppose the company's plans to build two HW
incinerators on the site).
679. U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-93-81, NUCLEAR WASTE: CoNNEcrIcuT's FIRST
SITE SELECTION PROCESS FOR A DISPOSAL FACILITY 28-31 (1993).
680. 42 U.S.C. § 10,173a(a)(1) (1988).
681. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,136(c), 10,161(f) (1988).
682. 42 U.S.C. § 10,173a(b) (1988).
683. PORTNEY, supra note 531, at 27. Compensation appears to be successful in siting a
temporary HLW storage facility in Japan. Nicholas Lenssen, Confronting Nuclear Waste, in
STATE OF THE WORLD 1992, at 46, 62 (Lester R. Brown ed., 1992).
684. See supra notes 590-97 and accompanying text.
685. That is not to say that people will not often endanger their own children, through
everything from passive smoking to nonuse of car seats to overt abuse. But these dangers are
imposed by parents, not by an intrusive outside force.
686. This is confirmed by extensive polling data. See PoRTNEY, supra note 531, at 31;
Richard J. Bord, The NIMBY Syndrome: Why Is Everyone So Upset? The Role of Risk Com-
munication, Knowledge, Attitudes, and Power Sharing on Public Reactions, in PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 38, at 30, 30; Howard Kunreuther & Douglas Easterling, Are Risk-Benefit Trade-
offs Possible in Siting Hazardous Facilities?, 80 AEA PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 252 (1990);
Kunreuther et al., supra note 9, at 469, 478; Lyons et al., supra note 1, at 92. The EPA
acknowledges this finding. See U.S. EPA, Pun. No. EPA/530-SW-90-019, SITES FOR OUR
SOLID WASTE: A GUIDEBOOK FOR EFFECTIVE PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 84-85 (1990).
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itself as immoral,6 87 "bribery," 688 or "blood money. '689 The moral
problems are amplified when money is offered to low income com-
munities. 690 The closest that compensation has come to siting suc-
cessfully a HW/RW facility was in 1981, when the City of
Baltimore agreed to locate a HW landfill in an industrial neighbor-
hood surrounded by other landfills. Under this proposal, the City
would receive a redeveloped park and five dollars per ton of waste,
and the twenty-two nearby families would be relocated. However,
the city also insisted on a ban on out-of-state wastes-a condition
that helped doom the project economically.691 As noted above,
compensation also contributed to the successful siting of the HW
landfill in Last Chance, Colorado. Local control, however, seems
to have played a much more decisive role there.
In conclusion, compensation works when, and only when, the
community does not believe the proposed facility poses an undue
hazard.692 Compensation has accordingly been quite successful in
siting MSW landfills and incinerators, which have much lower per-
ceived risks than HW/RW facilities.6 93
687. Some of the moral issues are discussed in DOUGLAS & WLDAVSKY, supra note
589, at 67; MARK SAGOPF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 68-69 (1988); Been, supra note 491;
Peters, supra note 491, at 50.
688. Carnes et al., supra note 674, at 362; Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon
of Siting and Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation
Slay the Monster?, 19 EtvTL. AFF. 239, 275 (1991).
689. Godsil, supra note 540, at 408; Lisa Aug, We're Selling Our Souls to Polluters,
NIAGARA GAZETrE, June 30, 1993, at 1 lA.
690. See BULLARD, supra note 528, at 91; SCHMEIDLER & SANDMAN, supra note 381, at
111-12; Walker, supra note 598, at 249-50; see also Austin & Schill, supra note 352, at 70;
Lynette Holloway, 28 Acres of Roof and a Place to Play in West Harlem, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
1992, at BI (reporting on a controversy over a park that is on the roof of a new sewage
treatment plant in minority community in New York City); Elizabeth Royte, Other People's
Garbage: The New Politics of Trash: A Case Study, HARPER'S, June 1992, at 54, 60 ("Gar-
bage tends to concentrate in depressions: it rolls downhill until it hits those places most des-
perate to deal.").
691. McKewen & Sloan, supra note 334, at 250.
692. Respondents to a few public opinion surveys have said that they would be more
willing to accept HW facilities if they received compensation. These surveys are discussed in
a 1993 unpublished manuscript by Professor Vicki Been (on file with author). However, such
results do not seem to have been translated into actual behavior.
693. See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 6, at 275 n.61; Jeff Bailey, Some Big Waste
Firms Pay Some Tiny Towns Little for Dump Sites, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1991, at Al; Marvin
G. Katz, YIMBYism is Coming, But. . ., WASTE AGE, Jan. 1990, at 40; Overcoming NIMBY:
New Approaches to Resolving Siting Disputes, PuBLIc's CAPITAL, Winter 1991, at 1 [hereinaf-
ter Overcoming NIMBY]; Roni Rabin, Ll's Trash Is Town's Treasure, N.Y. NEwSDAY, Oct.
21, 1991, at 5; Shuff, Bribes Work in Wisconsin, WASTE AGE, Mar. 1989, at 51; Jonathan
Walters, Tempted by Trash, GovEPrmm, July 1991, at 29; Randy Woods, Fighting NIMBY
with Fire, WASTE AGE, Sept. 1992, at 19.
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2. Negotiation and Mediation
Many commentators have urged that siting disputes be
resolved through negotiation, usually with the assistance of a medi-
ator.694 Several handbooks have been written to guide the pro-
cess.695  Nineteen states have procedures for negotiation or
mediation between facility developers and proposed host commu-
nities.696 The NWPA established a presidentially appointed posi-
tion, the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, whose job is to "attempt to
find a State or Indian tribe willing to host a repository or monitored
retrievable storage facility at a technically qualified site on reason-
able terms .... 697
Massachusetts pioneered mediation in HW siting disputes. In
1980, that state enacted a siting law which was conceived by three
scholars from MIT and Harvard, Michael O'Hare, Lawrence
Bacow, and Debra Sanderson, who had written widely on compen-
sation mechanisms.698 The statute involved a formal process of
mediator-aided negotiations between the state, the locality, and the
facility developer, leading to a compensation agreement; if no
agreement could be achieved, one would be decreed by an arbitra-
tor. This statute served as the model for laws soon enacted in
Rhode Island, Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Virginia, and it
received extensive scholarly commentary. 699 By now, however, it
694. See, e.g., Gail Bingham, Prospects for Negotiation of Hazardous Waste Siting Dis-
putes, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,249 (1985); James E. McGuire, The Dilemma of
Public Participation in Facility Siting Decisions and the Mediation Alternative, 9 SEToN HALL
LEGIS. J. 467, 470-73 (1985); John C. Sassaman, Jr., Siting Without Fighting: The Role of
Mediation in Enhancing Public Participation in Siting Radioactive Waste Facilities, 2 ALB.
L.J. Sci. & TECH. 207, 221-24 (1992); Katherine R. Shanabrook, Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Disposal Facility Sitings: Negotiating a Role for the Public, 3 J. Disp. RESOL. 219,
239-41 (1987); Snider, supra note 468, at 53; Lawrence E. Susskind, A Negotiation Credo for
Controversial Siting Disputes, NEGOTIATION J., Oct. 1990, at 309, 310-11.
695. See, e.g., OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, PUB. No.
SW-942, USING COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES WHEN SITING HAZARDous WASTE MANAGE-
MENT FACILITIES passim (1982); TEXAS WATER COMM'N, THE KEYSTONE SITING PROCESS
HANDBOOK: A NEw APPROACH TO SITING H~AZRDous AND NONHAZARDous WASTE MAN-
AGEMENT FACILITIES passim (1987).
696. HAZARDOUS WASTE FAcmrry SITING, supra note 1, at 16.
697. 42 U.S.C. § 10,242(b)(2) (1988). The negotiator has been hostilely received in
most of his rounds. See Matthew L. Wald, Hired to Be Negotiator, but Treated Like Pariah,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1991, at B5.
698. Mank, supra note 688, at 274 n.199.
699. See, e.g., BRION, supra note 2, at 7-29; SCHMEIDLER & SANDMAN, supra note 381,
at 276-92. See generally Bacow & Milkey, supra note 6 (discussing the innovative Massachu-
setts siting statute that requires developers to negotiate compensation agreements with host
communities); Bingham & Miller, supra note 642, at 479-80 (reporting that Massachusetts,
Wisconsin, and Rhode Island have passed siting statutes that incorporate negotiation between
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is clear that the law has not succeeded. There have been six seri-
ous siting attempts under the Massachusetts law since 1980, the
most recent one ending in 1992; every one of them failed.7° Nor
have any new HW disposal sites been created in the other states
that adopted the Massachusetts model, although an on-site waste-
water treatment facility was permitted in Providence, Rhode
Island.7 °'
Negotiation suffers from precisely the same shortcoming as
does compensation: outside threats to the health of one's children
are nonnegotiable. Negotiation and compensation both work when
the community does not fear for its children's health. Indeed, the
principal purpose of the mediation process is to negotiate a com-
pensation package. 712 In Wisconsin, thirty-four solid waste facili-
ties, but not a single new hazardous waste disposal facility, have
been sited using negotiation. 0 3 Negotiation does little to address
the usual underlying causes of public opposition, and citizen activ-
ists warn against even entering into the process; "industries already
have the battle more than half won when they can get their citizen
opponents to sit down with them and speak their language."
7°4
Low-income communities are also concerned that they do not have
sufficient bargaining power to extract necessary concessions. 0 5
the local community and developers); Caskey, supra note 7, at 64-66 (comparing Penn-
sylvania's statute to comparable laws in Wisconsin and Massachusetts); Bernd Holznagel,
Negotiation and Mediation: The Newest Approach to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 13
ENvTL. AFF. 329, 354-68 (1986) (discussing statutes in Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Rhode
Island, and Connecticut that authorize, or even require, negotiation and mediation of waste
facility siting disputes).
700. Mary R. English, The Search for Political Authority in Massachusetts' Toxic Waste
Management Law, 16 ENVTL. AFF. 39, 41 (1988); Zinc Recycler Run Out of Mass., U.S.
WATER NEWS, Oct. 1992, at 5. For a post mortem on this experiment, see O'Hare & Sander-
son, supra note 523, passim.
701. Bingham & Miller, supra note 642, at 484. At least two storage, as opposed to
disposal, facilities have been sited in Wisconsin. Another mediation process, known as the
Keystone Process, has been tested in Texas, with no greater success. Thomas 0. McGarity,
Public Participation in Risk Regulation, 1 RISK-IssuES IN HEALTH & SAFETY 103, 125-28
(1990).
702. Bingham & Miller, supra note 642, at 479.
703. Overcoming NIMBY, supra note 693, at 5; see also Arthur J. Harrington, The Right
to a Decent Burial: Hazardous Waste and Its Regulation in Wisconsin, 66 MARQ. L. Rav.
223, 262-66 (1983); Arnett, supra note 385, at 547-49; Terry A. Trumball, Using Citizens to
Site Solid Waste Facilities, PUB. WORKS, Aug. 1988, at 66.
704. Heiman, supra note 592, at 361.
705. See Anthony J. Mumphrey & Julian Wolpert, Equity Considerations and Conces-
sions in the Siting of Public Facilities, 49 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 109, 111 (1973); Julian Wolpert,
Regressive Siting of Public Facilities, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 103, 104-05 (1976).
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3. Public Participation and Public Information
Public participation is an important element of most environ-
mental permit processes.70 6 Sherry Arnstein has formulated a "lad-
der of citizen participation," ranging (top to bottom) from citizen
control to delegated power, partnership, placation, consultation,
informing, therapy, and manipulation. 70 7  Participation methods
currently used in HW/RW siting run the shortened gamut from pla-
cation (negotiated concessions) to manipulation (public relations
campaigns). The most common forms are public hearings, citizen
advisory committees, and membership on state siting boards.
Eleven states also give technical assistance grants.70 8
A strong undercurrent running through much of the facility
siting literature hints that public ignorance is at the root of opposi-
tion and that the mission of citizen participation and public infor-
mation is to correct or neutralize this ignorance.70 9  Not much
evidence exists, however, that public participation serves this pur-
pose, and it appears that public participation, especially when
poorly handled, can actually increase public opposition.710 More-
over, the undercurrent seems based on a false assumption; facility
opponents have been found to be just as knowledgeable, on aver-
age, as proponents.711
706. See 40 C.F.R. § 124 (1993); 132 CONG. REc. S14,925 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986)
(remarks of Sen. Chafee in floor debate on SARA, calling for full public participation); U.S.
EPA, PUB. No. SW-865, HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SrTNG: A CrMCAL PROBLEM 7
(1980) (calling on states to have full public participation in HW siting programs).
707. Sherry Amstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, in THE PoLrIcs OF TECHNOL-
OGY 243 (Godfrey Boyle et al. eds., 1977); see also MORELL & MAGORIAN, supra note 10, at
119. A different spectrum is presented in McGarity, supra note 701, at 113-30.
708. HAZARDOUS WASTE FAcuLIY SrnNG, supra note 1, at 16. For a description of a
process in Ontario in which intervenors were given several million dollars to hire lawyers and
experts for adjudicatory hearings, see Garr, supra note 2.
709. See, e.g., MORELL & MAGORIAN, supra note 10, at 23, 65, 117, 120; Bacow &
Milkey, supra note 6, at 269 ("[F]inding sites for the safe disposal and processing of hazard-
ous materials is largely a problem of managing local opposition."); Hazardous Waste: Educa-
tion Seen as Key to Overcoming Public Resistance to Incinerator Siting, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 52, at 3196 (Apr. 23, 1993); Matheny & Williams, supra note 341, at 73.
710. O'HARE ET At.., supra note 11, at 30; PORTNEY, supra note 531, at 65; Cynthia-Lou
Coleman, What Policy Makers Can Learn from Public Relations Practitioners: The Siting of a
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Facility in Cortland County, New York, PUB. REL. Q., Winter
1989-90, at 26; James E. Lukaszewski & Terry L. Serie, Public Consent Built on Credibility Is
the Goal, WASTE AGE, Feb. 1993, at 45, 46. For projects not perceived as threatening, how-
ever, public participation has been found to be helpful in securing public acceptance. Richard
A. Ellis & John F. Disinger, Project Outcomes Correlate with Public Participation Variables,
53 J. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FED. 1564 (1981).
711. Richard J. Bord & Robert E. O'Connor, Determinants of Risk Perceptions of a
Hazardous Waste Site, 12 RISK ANALYSIs 411, 415 (1992); Bruce B. Clary & Michael E.
Kraft, Impact Assessment and Policy Failure: The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 8 POL'Y
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Overall, public information campaigns have failed in their
purpose. Although such campaigns can increase perception of
risk,7 12 there is little or no evidence that they can reduce this
perception.7 3
4. Volunteers
The usual practice in siting has been called "decide,
announce, defend ' 714 (often followed by "surrender"). The oppo-
site approach entails requesting communities to volunteer to host
facilities.715 This method has three principal advantages and four
principal disadvantages. The advantages are: (1) it decreases intru-
sion-by making the risk voluntary, it reduces the perception of
risk; (2) it draws out those communities with cultures that will
accept these facilities; and (3) it usually leads to payment of the
full social costs of a facility, because the hidden subsidies of pre-
emption are eliminated. The disadvantages are: (1) it would be
coincidental if volunteering communities also happened to have
favorable geology and other physical conditions; (2) equity
problems can arise, because low income communities may be more
prone to volunteering; (3) it is difficult to define the borders of the
relevant community, and people just beyond the borders may
object; and (4) it is generally assumed that few communities will
volunteer.
Several Canadian provinces have managed to avoid all the
disadvantages and successfully site HW facilities in volunteer
communities. The methods they used are instructive. In 1982,
Alberta established a Crown (government-owned) corporation, the
Alberta Special Waste Management Corp. (ASWMC), to build a
centralized facility with HW incineration, treatment, landfilling,
STuD. REv. 105 (1988); Heiman, supra note 592, at 361; Nealey & Hebert, supra note 586, at
108.
712. V. Kerry Smith & F. Reed Johnson, How Do Risk Perceptions Respond to Informa-
tion? The Case of Radon, 70 REv. ECON. & STAT. 1, 8 (1988).
713. See PORTNEY, supra note 531, at 39, 41, 46; Kasperson, supra note 285, at 58;
Michael L.P. Elliott, Improving Community Acceptance of Hazardous Waste Facilities
Through Alternative Systems for Mitigating and Managing Risk, 1 HAZARDOUS WASTE 397
(1984); see also R.W. Lake & L. Disch, Structural Constraints and Pluralist Contradictions in
Hazardous Waste Regulation, 24 ENV'T & PLAN. A 663, 665 (1992) (arguing that the hazard-
ous waste management system narrows the frame of debate so that public participation "can
only be expressed in terms of self-interested local opposition to facility siting," rather than in a
more meaningful discussion about whether facilities are needed).
714. MoEe.L & MAGORiAN, supra note 10, at 128.
715. A voluntary approach to siting has been advocated by the World Health Organiza-




and deep-well injection. In 1984 the ASWMC asked all the
municipalities in the province if any would like to be considered
for the facility; seventy percent responded positively. After a
series of information presentations and community meetings, sev-
eral towns dropped out as they were free to do. The ASWMC
selected five finalists based on technical criteria. Referenda were
then held in the five towns to ensure that local support existed.
The ASWMC chose the town of Swan Hills, a community founded
in the 1950s as a camp for rig hands for the oil drilling companies
that still dominate its economy, where the referendum had passed
by a seventy-nine percent margin. The town hosted a champagne
celebration after the selection, and one of the losing communities
protested with newspaper ads. The facility, which is owned sixty
percent by a private company and forty percent by ASWMC,
opened in 1987. In 1990, it received local support for quadrupling
its capacity.
71 6
The Manitoba Hazardous Waste Management Corporation
(MHWMC) was established in 1986. It underwent a very similar
process. About fifty municipalities expressed interest in a HW
facility, and thirty-five open houses were held to determine initial
community support. Five communities became actively involved
in the siting process, four rural towns plus the City of Winnipeg.
Two of the towns dropped out after referenda, and one was dis-
qualified on technical and economic grounds. That left one rural
town, Montcalm, and Winnipeg. Montcalm is an agricultural area
with a population of about 1700. A major north-south highway to
the United States runs through it, accustoming the community to
truck traffic. Several neighboring communities have supported
Montcalm's efforts. Winnipeg, which has 625,000 of the prov-
ince's 1.1 million people, planned to locate the facility adjacent to
its MSW landfill, about three kilometers from the nearest residen-
tial area. In 1992, the MHWMC chose Montcalm and isued a con-
struction permit.7 17
716. AUDREY ARMOUR, SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF Naw HAZARDOUS WASTE
FACILITIES: CONTRASTING PROCESSES IN ALBERTA AND ONTARIO ILLUSTRATE PRACTICAL
VALUE OF SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 18-24 (1986); SCHMEIDLER & SANDMAN, supra note 381,
at 268-275; Jennifer McQuaid-Cook, Siting a Fully Integrated Hazardous Waste Management
Facility with Incinerator and Landfill, Swan Hills, Alberta, Canada, in INNOVATIVE
APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 123; Dave Wenger, Siting the Alberta Special Waste Treatment
Centre: A Public Consensus-An Alberta Success, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 38, at 124;
Tomsho, supra note 453, at Al.
717. Ed Brethour, The Attempted Siting of a Physical-Chemical Hazardous Waste Treat-
ment Facility in Hamiota, Manitoba, in INNOVATIVE APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 43; Alun
Richards, Implementing a Voluntary and Responsive Siting Process in Rural and Urban Set-
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One place that has been particularly receptive to new facilities
is Tooele County, Utah. The county covers 7000 square miles,
roughly the size of Connecticut, but has only 28,000 residents.
The Tooele Army Depot stores large quantities of chemical weap-
ons. The county has set aside a one hundred square mile hazard-
ous-waste-disposal district for a new hazardous waste incinerator
and a uranium mill tailings landfill. This district has created about
500 new jobs and brings in $2 million in annual "mitigation fees,"
which have allowed the county to freeze its property taxes.718
A new hazardous waste facility has also been sited in a will-
ing community in Quebec, 719 and Ontario is now attempting to site
a LLRW facility using the same process as Alberta and Manitoba,
with similarly positive responses.
720
Other than Last Chance, Colorado; Tooele County, Utah; and
Baltimore, Maryland, there have been no similar, locally desired
HW/RW sitings in the United States since 1976. This is largely
the result of state, rather than local, opposition. Martinsville, Illi-
nois, a rural town of about 1200, volunteered to host the LLRW
facility for the midwestern states, and sixty-eight percent of its res-
idents voted in favor in a 1988 referendum. Nonetheless, a state
board refused to issue a permit.72' One town in Michigan and two
in Wisconsin had also volunteered for this facility.722 Many resi-
dents of Nye County, Nevada, the home of Yucca Mountain, sup-
port the construction of a HLW repository there, but the state has
tings, 10 IMPACT AssEsMmENT BULL. 89 (1992); Audrey Armour et al., New Institutional
Approaches to Alleviating Facility Siting Problems 4 (paper presented to Workshop on
Nuclear as a Large-Scale Global Energy Option, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Sept. 28-29, 1993) (on file
with the Tulane Law Review); Barbara Connell, The Siting Approach for a Hazardous Waste
Management Facility in Manitoba: Comment and Critique (paper presented to International
Workshop on Innovative Approaches to Siting of Waste Management Facilities, Montebello,
Quebec, Apr. 27-30, 1991); R.J. Cooke & A.B. Richards, A Co-Management Approach to
Developing Environmentally Sensitive Projects (paper presented to Environment and the
Economy-Partners in the Future Conference, Winnipeg, Manitoba, May 18, 1989).
718. Justin Martin, 'Imby, Please', FORTUNE, Oct. 4, 1993, at 13-14.
719. Ristoratore, supra note 5; see also Mario Ristoratore, Siting Toxic Waste Disposal
Facilities: Best and Worst Cases in North America, in LAND RrrEs AND WRONGS: THE MAN-
AGEMENT, REGULATION AND USE OF LAND IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 201, 216-17
(Elliot J. Feldman & Michael A. Goldberg eds., 1987).
720. Audrey M. Armour, Opting for Cooperation: Process for Siting a Low-Level Radi-
oactive Waste Management Facility, in INNOVATIVE APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 31;
Armour, supra note 381, at 49-67.
721. ENGLJSH, supra note 10, at 55-57; Gretchen D. Monti, "All Politics Is Local":
Integrating Local Concerns into Facility Site Selection, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 38, at 36;
Martinsville, supra note 244, at 1.




vigorously fought the proposal.723  The voters of Fall River
County, South Dakota, a uranium mining region, voted in favor of
a LLRW facility in 1985, but the state rejected the proposal. 2
Fremont County, Wyoming expressed interest in a HLW storage
facility in 1992, but the governor vetoed the idea;72s the same thing
happened the same year in Apache County, Arizona.72 6 In 1969,
ninety-five percent of the residents of Hermiston, Oregon favored
an Army nerve gas storage facility, but ninety percent of the state's
residents were opposed.727 Other communities have supported
HLW or LLRW facilities, only to be thwarted by state opposition:
Naturita, Colorado; San Juan County, Utah; Edgemont, South
Dakota; Nye County, Nevada; Barnwell, South Carolina; Oak
Ridge, Tennessee; and Richland, Washington.728 Some other com-
munities initially volunteered but later changed their minds. This
occurred in Boyd County, Nebraska, which first supported and
then opposed a LLRW facility;729 Woodland, North Carolina,
which changed its mind about a hazardous waste incinerator;
730
and Carlsbad, New Mexico, which initially invited the WIPP pro-
ject.7 3 1 The town of Ashford, New York, the location of the West
Valley nuclear facility, had a referendum in 1991 on hosting New
York's LLRW repository. The vote was 702 opposed to 533 in
favor, but the Town Board soon thereafter voted to approve the
723. Flynn et al., supra note 664, at 418.
724. ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 104.
725. Nuclear Waste: On the Reservation, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1992, at 30.
726. Melinda Kassen, Siting the MRS-A Lesson in How Even Bribes Don't Work, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1993, at 16, 19.
727. Contreras, supra note 2, at 536 n.329.
728. CARTER, supra note 224, at 151-53, 166, 175-76, 423-24; ENGLISH, supra note 10,
at 87; JACOB, supra note 203, at 42; Barnaby J. Feder, The Saga of the Lonetree Landfill, N.Y.
TnMs, Dec. 22, 1992, at Dl; Shapiro, supra note 201, at 62-63; see also John T. Aquino, The
Politics of Landfills, WASTE AGE, March 1993, at 37 (reporting that a West Virginia town
agreed to accept a MSW landfill in exchange for monetary compensation, but governor
attempted to kill the deal); Peter T. Kilborn, Dying Town Considers Salvation in a Landfill,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, at 20; Royte, supra note 690, at 54.
729. U.S. GAO, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-91-149, NUCLEAR WASTE: EXTENSIVE PROCESS
To SITE Low-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITY IN NEBRASKA 2 (1991); Richard Paton, Issues
Management in Radioactive Waste Disposal Decisions, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 38, at 27;
Hugh Kaufman & Lynn Moorer, The Nuke Dump NIMBY Game: Why Nebraska Was
Targeted, PUB. UTL. FORT., July 15, 1991, at 17; Nebraskans Vote No on Nuclear Dump Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1992, at D19.
730. Hazwaste Incinerator Fight, CHEMICAL WK., Apr. 29, 1992, at 56.
731. CAREa, supra note 224, at 177-78.
1162 [Vol. 68
WASTE FACILITY SITING
facility anyway. The following November the Town Board was
reelected. The ultimate outcome in Ashford remains to be seen.732
Several MSW facilities have been sited after calls for volun-
teers,733 sometimes after favorable votes in local referenda.
734
Some fights have arisen between volunteer communities and their
neighbors,735 but this is an unusual result.
5. Risk Substitution
In 1991, two commentators independently suggested the
approach of risk substitution, that is, allowing a new H1W facility to
be built if a corresponding reduction in the risk results from some
other nearby facility.
Kent E. Portney, after reviewing the public opinion evidence,
posited that most siting schemes had failed because they attempted
to reduce risk perceptions, an approach, he soundly concluded, that
is all but futile. To address this problem, he suggested searching
for existing facilities, such as chemical plants, ammunition facto-
ries, and nuclear power plants, that neighbors regard as dangerous;
buying the old factory and shutting it down; and building the new
HW facility on the same site or nearby. This, Portney reasoned,
would be acceptable to the neighbors, because there would be no
net change in the risks to which they were exposed.736
Bradford C. Mank had a similar notion but focused on just
one type of old facility: contaminated sites such as orphaned
Superfund sites or MSW landfills. He suggested that waste man-
732. See Sassaman, supra note 694, at 211-12; Talk of a Nuclear Dump Again Splits a
Community, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 23, 1993, at B5; Sam H. Verhovek, Town Heatedly Debates
Merits of a Nuclear Waste Dump, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1991, at B1; see also Mayerat v. Town
Bd., 585 N.Y.S.2d 928, 929 (App. Div. 1992).
733. See, e.g., John A. Barnes, Learning to Love the Dump Next Door, WALL ST. J.,
June 25, 1991, at A22 (concerning Riverview, Michigan); Robert T. Nelson, Dealing with
Waste: Oregon, Here We Come, SEa-n.E TMsaS, Mar. 24, 1991, at BI (concerning Gilliam
County, Oregon).
734. See, e.g., Bull Market for Incinerators Stalled by Recession, Recycling, Local
Opposition, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 686 (June 19, 1992) (concerning Green Island,
New York); John Gayusky, Organizing Toolbox: Polluters' Secret Plan Update, EVERYONE's
BACKYARD, Apr. 1993, at 20 (concerning Eagle, New York); In Brief, N.Y. WASTE Rp., Sept.
1992, at 6; Michigan Voters Approve Incinerator, WORLD WASTES, June 1992, at 48 (concern-
ing Oakland County, Michigan); Aisling A. Swift, Green Island Says "Yes," RECORD (con-
cerning Troy, New York), June 3, 1992, at 1; Voters Accept Landfill Plan, N.Y. Bus. ENV'T,
Aug. 31, 1992, at 3.
735. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Town Fights with Neighbors over Burning of Tons of Tires,
N.Y. TIMms, Oct. 15, 1989, at 1 (concerning Sterling, Connecticut).
736. PoRTNEY, supra note 531, at 137-59. Peter Huber had earlier discussed risk substi-
tution in the products liability context. Huber, supra note 356, at 1073.
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agement companies be allowed to build new disposal facilities in
exchange for remediating an existing contaminated site in the
community.737
These proposals, although innovative, miss two important
psychological dynamics. First, as discussed earlier,7 38 people react
differently to old risks than to new ones. An existing facility, next
to where a person has been living for years, may appear less threat-
ening than a new one, even if objectively the latter poses far less
risk. Second, if people are really concerned about an existing risk,
they may demand that it be abated regardless of any plans for new
facilities. People may consider it unjust to be forced to accept a
new risk in order to eliminate an old one, especially because once
they have the new facility, they will never be rid of it.
B. Coercive
1. Preemption
Part IV demonstrated that preemption of local authority is
counterproductive as a HW/RW siting strategy, because it greatly
increases perception of risk by making siting involuntary (intru-
sive), and it in effect would subsidize the creation of HW/RW.
Moreover, it has also never succeeded in actually siting a new HW/
RW facility.7 39 Nevertheless, preemption remains a common fea-
ture in federal and state siting law and policy.740
RCRA provides that nothing in it "shall be construed to pro-
hibit any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any
requirements, including those for site selection, which are more
stringent than those imposed" under the EPA's regulations. 741
Nonetheless, the EPA announced in 1980 that "the process of site
737. Mank, supra note 688, at 282-85. It was reported in 1990 that the New Jersey
Legislature was considering a bill with similar features. W.B. Clapham, Jr., Some Approaches
to Assessing Environmental Risk in Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities, 12 ENVTL. PROF. 32, 37
(1990). Additionally, a citizens' task force in Oak Ridge, Tennessee proposed that the siting
of the monitored retrievable storage facility for HLW in that area be linked to a schedule for
DOE cleanup of existing contamination in the area. C.P. Wolf, The NIMBY Syndrome: Its
Cause and Cure, 502 ANmAr.s N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 216, 223 (1987).
738. See supra text accompanying notes 661-71.
739. William M. Sloan, What We Did Well, Good, and Wrong: A Critique of State
Hazardous Waste Facility Siting in the 80s at 3 (paper presented to National Governors' Ass'n
Conference on State Policies on Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities, San Francisco, Cal., Sept.
2-3, 1992) (on file with the Tulane Law Review).
740. See Neil R. Shortlidge & S. Mark White, The Use of Zoning and Other Local
Controls for Siting Solid and Hazardous Waste Facilities, NAT. REsouRcas & ENv'T, Winter
1993, at 3, 4.
741. 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1988).
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selection [should] not be hampered by blanket vetoes"'742 and, in
1983, promulgated a regulation disapproving "[a]ny aspect of
State law or of the State program [under RCRA] which has no
basis in human health or environmental protection and which acts
as a prohibition on the treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous
waste in the State ... ."' In 1985, during consideration of what
became the capacity assurance provisions of CERCLA, a Senate
committee declared that "the process of site selection should find a
way to transcend blanket local vetoes. No community should be
able to remove itself from consideration on political grounds alone.
Everyone must take responsibility for assuring that adequate sites
are available." 74" In 1986, the Eighth Circuit held that a county
ordinance which prohibited the storage, treatment, or disposal of
HW conflicted with RCRA because the ordinance did not allow the
wastes to be handled in the manner deemed safest by Congress and
the EPA.745 In 1988, after North Carolina enacted a law inhibiting
the siting of a particular HW facility, the EPA began proceedings
to revoke the state's authority to implement RCRA.746 Although
some environmentalists claimed at the time that the EPA's pro-
ceedings were motivated by improper influences from the waste
management industry,747 the EPA ultimately found that North Car-
olina's actions were legal because they did not amount to a state-
wide prohibition on HW facilities.748
For obvious reasons of national security, federal primacy in
the disposal of radioactive waste is well established, 749 although
742. EPA, supra note 706, at 7.
743. 40 C.F.R. § 271.4%b) (1992).
744. S. REP. No. 99-11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1985).
745. Ensco, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743, 744 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Ogden Envtl.
Servs. v. City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436, 1450 (S.D. Cal. 1988). But see Lafarge Corp.
v. Campbell, 813 F. Supp. 501,514-15 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (upholding a state law that prevented
the siting of hazardous waste incinerator within a half-mile of a residence). See generally
Patrick O'Hara, Comment, The N.I.M.B.Y. Syndrome Meets the Preemption Doctrine: Federal
Preemption of State and Local Restrictions on the Siting of Hazardous Waste Disposal Facili-
ties, 53 LA. L. Ray. 229 (1992) (discussing case law).
746. Green, supra note 37, at 6.
747. See Bill Gifford, Reilly's March to the Sea: How the EPA Is Sowing Toxic Waste
Through the Sea, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 27, 1990, at 25; Philip Shabecoff, Waste-Plant Inquiry
Taps Hot Water, N.Y. TIMEs, July 25, 1989, at A20.
748. North Carolina's Authority to Run Hazardous Waste Program Upheld by EPA, 21
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 307 (June 8, 1990); see Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v.
Reilly, 938 F.2d 1390, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
749. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1149 (8th
Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); R.C. Kearney & R.B. Garvey, American Feder-
alism and the Management of Radioactive Wastes, 42 PuB. ADmiN. REv. 14, 17-20 (1982).
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the states have been given the responsibility to find sites for
LLRW.75 °
Meanwhile, at least twenty-four states specifically reserve
state override authority of local zoning laws in the siting of HW
facilities,"5 and very few states leave facility siting decisions
entirely in the hands of localities.752 Judicial decisions present a
broad range of views on the degree of authority remaining to local
government.753
Several commentators have argued that local authorities
should be overridden when they unduly restrict HW facility sit-
ing,754 but others recognize that this is futile.755 As Gail Bingham
and Daniel S. Miller have written, "[s]imply preempting local
controls ... is unlikely to resolve the siting dilemma because it
does not address the causes of opposition. Rather than disappear-
ing, the opposition just surfaces somewhere else-in administra-
tive challenges that complicate permit proceedings or in lawsuits
that tie permits up in court.
'756
2. Penalties
Orlando E. Delogu has proposed federal legislation requiring
states to site HW/RW facilities, with a provision that "any state
that will not fashion an effective siting mechanism will lose all
forms of direct and indirect federal financial support... in those
program areas in which NIMBY-type activities [preclude] needed
750. See supra text accompanying notes 237-41.
751. HAZARDous WASTE FAcILrrY SIING, supra note 1, at 12; see also Illinois Low-
Level Waste Facility Law Eliminates Local Veto of Siting Decisions, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
47, at 3028 (Mar. 19, 1993).
752. See Godsil, supra note 540, at 406 (only California and Florida); Tsao, supra note
539, at 371.
753. The cases are reviewed in Melissa Thorme, Local to Global: Citizen's Legal
Rights and Remedies Relating to Toxic Waste Dumps, 5 TuL. ENwvL. L.J. 101, 104-22 (1991);
McCabe, supra note 468, at 179-86; William B. Johnson, Annotation, Validity of Local Regu-
lation of Hazardous Waste, 67 A.L.R.4th 822, 825-30 (1992).
754. See, e.g., Andreen, supra note 10, at 823; Davidson, supra note 341, at 550; A.
Dan Tarlock, State Siting Laws, Local Land Use Laws, and Their Interplay, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,236, 10,238 (1985); see also Laurie Reynolds, The Failure of Local Land-
fill Siting Control in Illinois, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 41-49 (1992) (arguing that excessive control
has been given to municipalities in siting MSW landfills in Illinois).
755. See, e.g., O'HArE Er AL., supra note 11, at 24; Andrews, supra note 336, at 117,
121-22; Colglazier & English, supra note 10, at 641. See generally Robert W. Lake &
Rebecca A. Johns, Legitimation Conflicts: The Politics of Hazardous Waste Siting Law, 11
URE. GEOGRAPHY 488 (1990); Daniel A. Spitzer, Maybe in My Backyard: Strategies for Local
Regulation of Private Solid Waste Facilities in New York, 1 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 87 (1993).
756. Bingham & Miller, supra note 642, at 477.
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sites. '757 The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act (LLRWPAA) imposes financial penalties on states that do not
make provisions for disposal of LLRW, and it originally required
such states to take title to the LLRW.7 5 8 Although mechanisms of
this sort require states to site facilities, they do not dictate any par-
ticular sites.
3. Governmental Facilities
The federal government, with requisite congressional authori-
zation, theoretically could pick a site, take it by eminent domain if
necessary, and build a facility on it. As we have seen, a compara-
ble approach was taken at Yucca Mountain and has been stymied
at every turn. States could do the same, but all such attempts to
date have failed.759
In addition to the obvious political problems, states may be
reluctant to build their own HW/RW facilities, because doing so
would make them liable under CERCLA for contamination caused
by the facilities.760 The states would, in effect, take title to the
waste, which is the same consequence that the Supreme Court held




Few would disagree that the ideal way to solve the HW/RW
siting dilemma would be to avoid generating the waste in the first
place, assuming this could be done with acceptable economic con-
sequences. Reducing generation of HW/RW has numerous bene-
fits in addition to reducing the need for, and the environmental
impact of, disposal sites: it increases the efficiency of raw materi-
als utilization; it reduces the potential liability of generators; it
reduces accidents in the transportation of the waste; it reduces
leakage of waste at the locations of production, storage, transporta-
tion, and disposal; and depending on the technology used, it can
757. Delogu, supra note 468, at 209-10. A comparable approach is proposed in William
D. Bridgers, Note, The Hazardous Waste Wars: An Examination of the Origins and Major
Battles to Date, with Suggestions for Ending the Wars, 17 VT. L. REv. 821 (1993).
758. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1988). The provision requiring states to take title to
the waste was struck down by the Supreme Court as a violation of the Tenth Amendment. See
New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2419 (1992).
759. See supra part V.B.1.
760. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988).
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reduce worker exposure to hazardous materials and reduce the
presence of such materials in consumer products. Moreover, facil-
ity opponents consistently demand greater waste reduction. 6
Despite these undisputed advantages, the law is strikingly
weak on waste reduction. The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water
Act are full of command and control mechanisms to reduce the
production of air and water pollutants, and the Clean Air Act con-
tains explicit marketplace incentives to reduce pollution. But the
laws governing hazardous waste and radioactive waste have no
comparable provisions.762 Some HW statutes urge waste reduc-
tion, but none of the provisions have any teeth. The RW statutes
offer nothing at all that requires or even encourages waste
reduction.
RCRA declared one of its objectives to be "minimizing the
generation of hazardous waste and the land disposal of hazardous
waste by encouraging process substitution, materials recovery,
properly conducted recycling and reuse, and treatment ' 763 and
announced a national policy "that, wherever feasible, the genera-
tion of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expedi-
tiously as possible.' ' a  The only enforcement mechanism, added
by the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984765
(HSWA), is that each generator must certify, in the manifests that
accompany all shipments of HW, that it "has a program in place to
reduce the volume or quantity and toxicity of such waste to the
degree determined by the generator to be economically practica-
ble."766 A small quantity generator must merely certify, in fine
print on the standard manifest form, that "I have made a good faith
effort to minimize my waste generation and select the best waste
management method that is available to me and that I can
761. See Cole, supra note 443, at 1996; Heiman, supra note 592; Lillie C. Trimble,
What Do Citizens Want in Siting of Waste Management Facilities?, 8 RISK ANALYsis 375, 376
(1988).
762. Clifford S. Russell, Economic Incentives in the Management of Hazardous Wastes,
13 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 257, 262 (1988).
763. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(6) (1988).
764. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (1988); see Robert F. Blomquist, Developing a Long-Term
Waste Management Strategy: Beyond the EPA and OTA Reports: Toward a Comprehensive
Theory and Approach to Hazardous Waste Reduction in America, 18 ENvTL. L. 817, 823
(1988).
765. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984) (codified at scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
766. 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b)(2) (1988).
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afford. 7 6 7 A lawyer would be hard pressed to find anywhere else
such a short sentence with so many loopholes. The biennial
reports each generator must file with the EPA must also state "the
efforts undertaken during the year to reduce the volume and toxic-
ity of waste generated. 768 It does not appear that any generator
has ever been sanctioned for inadequate or false certification of
waste minimization efforts. In mid-1993, the EPA published
guidelines on the elements of a waste minimization plan that would
allow a generator to issue a proper certification;769 the results
remain to be seen. President Clinton also directed all federal agen-
cies to develop and implement pollution prevention plans.770
Despite the name of the statute, the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, the EPA devoted such little funding and so little
priority to conservation and recovery that one disgruntled official
said RCRA should more aptly be called DRIP, the Dump Regula-
tory and Investigatory Planning Act.7 CERCLA contains no pro-
visions concerning waste minimization at all. The EPA's
directives to the states concerning capacity assurance reports stated
that waste reduction was the preferred method of addressing haz-
ardous waste problems;772 but again, no enforcement mechanism
exists.
In 1990 Congress enacted the Pollution Prevention Act,
declaring in even stronger rhetoric the national policy of reducing
pollution at the source.773 This enactment calls on the EPA to
develop and implement a strategy to promote source reduction, to
give grants to the states, and to collect data and establish an infor-
767. 40 C.F.R. pt. 262 app. (1992) see also 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d)(3) (1988) (applying
relaxed manifest requirements for small quantity generators).
768. 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a)(6)(C).
769. Guidance to Hazardous Waste Generators on the Elements of a Waste Minimiza-
tion Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,114 (1993) (interim final guidance).
770. Exec. Order No. 12,856, 58 Fed. Reg. 41,981 (1993); see President Directs Fed-
eral Agencies to Take Lead in Pollution Prevention, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 623
(Aug. 6, 1993).
771. Sidney M. Wolf, Public Opposition to Hazardous Waste Sites: The Self-Defeating
Approach to National Hazardous Waste Control Under Subtitle C of the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976, 8 ENvTL. AFF. 463, 525 (1980); see also LANDY Er AL., supra
note 58, at 125 (arguing that in writing the RCRA regulations in the late 1970s, "EPA could
have looked for ways to encourage product and process redesign and recycling in order to
lower the volume of waste requiring disposal. As public opposition to all disposal options has
built, one is struck by how little attention this approach received from EPA during the Carter
years").
772. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781,784 (4th Cir.
1991).
773. 42 U.S.C. § 13,101 (1988).
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mation clearinghouse, but it has no regulatory punch whatso-
ever.774 Congress authorized sixteen million dollars per year7 75 to
implement the act. This amounts to half the cost of cleaning up an
average National Priorities List site.776 Several states have enacted
their own pollution prevention statutes, but few of these laws are
any stronger than the federal laws.777
The environmental impact statement (EIS) process is ordina-
rily an important mechanism for examining alternatives, but the
builders of waste-generating facilities (such as chemical plants) are
not required to discuss waste minimization in their EISs. 778 EISs
for waste disposal facilities, such as landfills, typically devote a
page or two to waste minimization, compared to dozens of pages
on recycling and hundreds on technological alternatives.
Many industries are working to reduce the hazardous waste
they generate not because of the above toothless laws but because
of the high price of waste disposal779 and because of fears of liabil-
ity at disposal sites. 780 Because waste generators have been held
jointly and severally liable under CERCLA for cleanup of landfills
to which they sent waste,7 8 ' large generators have become very
skittish about using landfills. This has led to an increased prefer-
774. See E. Lynn Grayson, The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990: Emergence of a New
Environmental Policy, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,392 (1992); Stephen M. Johnson,
From Reaction to Proaction: The 1990 Pollution Prevention Act, 17 COLUM. J. ErNqV. L.
153, 154-57 (1992).
775. 42 U.S.C. § 13,109 (1988).
776. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
777. See Johnson, supra note 774, at 203; see also Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Ger-
rard, New York's Requirements for Reducing Hazardous Waste, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 21, 1990, at 3.
One exception is the New Jersey Pollution Prevention Act of 1991, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1D-
35 to -50 (West 1991), which requires firms within the state to reduce their use of hazardous
materials and reduce their production of HW by fifty percent over five years. Id. § 13:1D-40.
This statute was enacted in partial response to protests against proposals to site HW incinera-
tors in the state. Lake, supra note 10, at 90-91.
778. But see N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. L. § 8-0109(2)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (requir-
ing ElSs prepared under New York State Environmental Quality Review Act to discuss
"effects of proposed action on solid waste management where applicable and significant").
779. See supra text accompanying notes 389-391; see also OFFIcE oF Toxic Sua-
STANCES, U.S. EPA, THE Toxacs RELEASE INVENTORY: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, 1987, at
266 (1989) (noting that many reporting companies are attempting to reduce waste generation
because of high treatment or disposal costs).
780. Goodbaum & Rotman, supra note 390, at 18.
781. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808-810 (S.D.
Ohio 1983). But see Michael A. Brown, U.S. v. Alcan: A Crack in the Well of Joint and
Several Liability, 24 CHEMICAL WASTE LrrMG. REP. 306, 306-09 (1992) (asserting that, in
United States v. Alcan, the Third Circuit required a stricter test than did previous cases,
thereby providing companies with more leeway in Superfund negotiations).
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ence for HW incineration 82 and to the formation of consortia to
inspect disposal facilities.78 3 Fear of liability has also led to a
degree of overcompliance; many risk-averse companies send to
11W landfills, rather than to ordinary solid waste landfills, material
that technically may not be RCRA hazardous waste but that (it is
feared) may one day be listed as such or might be contaminated
with some HW, or material whose regulatory status is uncertain.
78 4
New York State has estimated that forty to sixty percent of the
waste disposed at its hazardous waste landfills is not legally haz-
ardous. 785 Whatever the reason, the amount of HW reduction and
recycling is reported to be steadily rising.78 6
Many estimates of the potential for waste reduction exist.
Because the various studies to offer these estimates employed dif-
ferent methods and terms, they are not comparable. Several of
them, however, calculated that more than half of all the hazardous
waste generated in the country could be eliminated through techno-
logical measures. 787 Such measures are not without precedent. In
the 1970s, comparable efforts enabled industry to reduce its energy
consumption significantly in the face of the oil crisis. In 1973, oil
prices soared in the wake of the first OPEC oil embargo, forcing
many industries to rethink their production methods. In just over a
decade-between 1973 and 1984-American industry cut energy
782. Atax. BROWN & SONS, supra note 51, at 9-10; CAROL DANSEREAU, SMOyEScREEN:
THE Mm OF INCINERATOR NEED 18 (1992); DAVID J. SAROKIN ET AL., CUrNG CHEMICAL
WASTE: WHAT 29 ORGANIC CHEMICAL PLANTS ARE DOING TO REDUCE HAzARDoUs WASTES
140, 142 (1985).
783. Goodbaum & Rotman, supra note 390, at 21; Letter from Edgar Berkey, Chemical
Hazardous Waste Management Evaluation Group, to Author (July 31, 1989) (on file with the
Tulane Law Review).
784. See Hunt v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1373 (Ala. 1991), rev'd
on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992); HAMMrIr & REUTER, supra note 486, at 13, 36. For
one example of regulatory uncertainty in the definition of HW, see Catherine L. LaCroix,
RCRA and Non-Traditional Hazardous Wastes, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1650 (Oct.
23, 1992).
785. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., NEw YORK STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE
FACILITY SITING PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 4-22 (1989) (revised draft).
New York State attempted to prohibit nonhazardous waste from being sent to its hazardous
waste landfills, but this effort was struck down on procedural grounds. CWM Chemical
Servs., Inc. v. Jorling, Index No. 70,900 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Niagara County July 23, 1991).
786. Ronald Begley, TRI and Pollution Prevention Data Show Positive Trend, CMA
Says, CHEMICAL WK., Apr. 21, 1993, at 12; Keith Schneider, Manufacturers Recycling Half of
Chemical Wastes, N.Y. TIMS, May 26, 1993, at AI5.
787. Warren, supra note 28, at 15.
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requirements per unit of output by thirty percent.788 As Ronald T.
McHugh wrote:
[T]he economics of waste minimization has frequently been the
driving force in process engineering evolving from the early
time-and-motion studies, through material shortages in World
War II, to the energy crisis of the 1970s, and finally to today's
emphasis on compliance and materials cost savings tied to the
direct and indirect costs of environmental requirements.789
Among the methods available for reducing generation of hazardous
waste are changes to process inputs, improved plant management
or housekeeping, changes in process equipment or technology,
recycling and reuse of materials within a process, and changes in
the design of end products.790
The amount of hazardous waste generated depends critically
on the price of waste disposal. This has been demonstrated both
theoretically791 and through extensive interviews with plant opera-
tors.792 The experience at Borden Chemical Plant in Richmond,
California illustrates this dynamic. The plant formerly generated
approximately 350 cubic yards of phenolic resin sludge per year.
When the cost of landfilling the sludge increased from $50 to $150
per yard, the plant changed its procedures for rinsing filters, rinsing
reactor vessels, and increasing employee awareness of how to pre-
vent small but significant losses of materials. These measures
reduced the amount of sludge produced by ninety-three percent.793
Conversely, low waste disposal costs can discourage waste mini-
mization. USS Chemicals disposes of its liquid wastes through
deep-well injection. Although it could recover phenol from the
wastewater prior to injection, or reduce phenol wastes at the
788. William R. Wiley, Energy Efficiency: Key to Economic Growth and Environmen-
tal Protection, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 114, at 84, 85.
789. Ronald T. McHugh, The Economics of Waste Minimization, in HAZARDOUS WASTE
MINIMIZATION, supra note 28, at 127, 128.
790. MARK H. DORFMAN Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DIVIDENDS: CUTrriNG MORE CHEMI-
CAL WASTES passim (1992); JOEL S. HIRSCHHORN & KIRSTEN U. OLDENBURG, PROSPERITY
WITHOUT POLLUTION: THE PREVENTION STRATEGY FOR INDUSTRY AND CONSUMERS passim
(1991); Johnson, supra note 774, at 157.
791. Clifford S. Russell & Walter 0. Spofford Jr., A Quantitative Framework for
Residuals Management Decisions, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrY ANALYSIS: THEORY &
MEMOD IN THE SOCIAL SCmNCS 115, 170-75 (Allen V. Kneese & Blair T. Bower eds., 1972).
792. SAROKIN ET AL., supra note 782; see also Rick Mullin, New Direction on
Hazwaste, CHEMICAL WK., Jan. 20, 1993, at 26.
793. SA.oKIN Er AL., supra note 782, at 32, 138-39, 183-201.
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source, the company continues to use injection because it is
cheaper.
794
Waste minimization efforts can greatly affect the need for dis-
posal facilities. For example, plans to build a new HW incinerator
in Washington State have been called into question as a result of
the vigorous waste minimization program of Boeing, without
whose waste the incinerator would not be economically viable.795
DuPont's waste reduction efforts allowed it to cancel an agreement
to supply one-third of the waste that was to feed a new HW incin-
erator in Ohio. 7 9 6 Large chemical and petrochemical plants are
rebuilt on a rolling ten to fifteen year cycle. As new plants,
designed after waste minimization became a major issue, are
developed, waste generation at these facilities-which are by far
the largest generators of HW-can be expected to decline
significantly.
797
The United States lags far behind Europe in the use of waste
minimization technologies. Bruce Piasecki and Gary Davis, who
have compared waste management on the two continents, attribute
this not only to the relative scarcity of land and materials in Europe
but also to the contrasting dominance of chemical engineers in the
European waste management industry, in comparison to the former
landfill operators in the United States. Piasecki and Davis write:
"The evolution of hazardous waste management from garbage col-
lection also helps explain America's peculiarly long reliance on
landfill disposal. Both the practitioners and regulators had long
experience with landfill disposal; thus both parties were slow to
address hazardous waste management as a chemical engineering
problem instead of a dirt-moving one."
798
2. Taxes and Charges
Much current discussion about reforming environmental law
centers on economic incentives that would use such mechanisms as
marketable permits and effluent charges.79 9 Reducing the genera-
tion of MSW by use of disposal charges has often been pro-
794. ld at 124-25.
795. DANsmtRAu, supra note 782, at 109.
796. Jeff Bailey, Costs of Toxic Waste Leave Landfills Unfilled, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30,
1993, at BI.
797. ALaex. BRowN & SONS, supra note 51, at 11.
798. Piasecki & Davis, supra note 485, at 6.
799. E.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 171, 171-72 (1988).
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posed, 00 and numerous municipalities have actually adopted
similar approaches. 01
The notion of financing the Superfund through a tax on waste
generation or disposal of hazardous waste, which is called a
"waste-end tax," was discussed when CERCLA was first enacted
in 1980 and also during the reauthorizations of RCRA in 1984 and
CERCLA in 1986. In each case the idea was rejected, largely
because of concern that such a tax would increase illegal dump-
ing.80 2 As shown above, this concern was misplaced. 0 3 Instead,
the Superfund is financed largely through a fee on chemical feed-
stocks,804 plus a surcharge on corporate income taxes.80 5  This
method creates little or no incentive to reduce waste generation. 0 6
However, several states have adopted waste-end taxes.807
Some commentators have described an intricate system in
which waste taxes or charges are fine-tuned to the external costs of
800. E.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFPCE, FEDERAL OPTIONS FOR REDUCING WASTE
DISPOSAL 5 (1991); TIMOTHY E. WIRTH & JOHN HEINZ, PROJECr 88-ROUND II-INcENTIVES
FOR ACTION: DESIGNING MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES 49 (1991); Britt A.
Bernheim, Can We Cure Our Throwaway Habits by Imposing the True Social Cost on Dispos-
able Products?, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 953 passim (1992); Menell, supra note 390, at 659-60;
Tom Arrandale, The Most Powerful Incentive For Reducing Waste at the Source, GOVERNING,
Jan. 1993, at 61.
801. See BEa K. FISHBEIN & CAROLINE GELB, MAKING LESS GARBAGE: A P.ANNINo
GUIDE FOR COMMUNITIES 101 (1992); Katya Andresen, Communities Weigh Merits of Variable
Rates, WORLD WASTES, Nov. 1992, at 18; Jeff Bailey, Pay-as-You-Throw Cuts Garbage Vol-
ume, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1993, at BI (reporting survey which shows that more than 1000
municipalities in U.S. have adopted some form of this method); Gary S. Fiske, Rates: A
Powerful Tool to Reduce the Waste Stream, SOLID WASTE & POWER, Apr. 1992, at 42; Robert
Hanley, Towns Adopt Pay-As-You-Throw Garbage, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1992, at BI; Chaz
Miller, Pay as You Throw: Less Weight? More Stuffing!, WASTE AGE, Sept. 1993, at 29;
Matthew Montavon, Taxing the Solid Waste Stream, WORLD WASTES, Oct. 1990, at 44, 44;
New Jersey Town Weighs In on Trash by the Pound, WORLD WASTES, Feb. 1993, at 36.
802. See LANDY ET AL., supra note 58, at 144-48; TIMOTHY E. WIRTH & JOHN HEINZ,
PROJECT 88-HARNESsING MARKET FORCES TO PROTECT OUR ENVIRONMENT: INITIATIVES
FOR THE NEw PRESm Nr 73 (1988); Blomquist, supra note 764, at 829; Hahn, supra note 468,
at 220; Joel S. Hirschhorn, Emerging Options in Waste Reduction and Treatment: A Market
Incentive Approach, in BEYOND DUMPING, supra note 560, at 129, 135.
803. See supra part IV.C.2.
804. I.R.C. §§ 4661-4662.
805. I.R.C. § 59A.
806. See Douglas W. McNeil et al., New Superfund Legislation: Major Provisions, Rev-
enue Sources, and Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection, 35 On. & GAS TAX Q.
610, 617 (1987); Douglas W. McNeil et al., Superfund Taxes and Expenditures: Regional
Redistributions, 18 REv. REG'L STUD. 4, 6 (1988); Richard A. Westin & Sanford E. Gaines,
The Relationship of Federal Income Taxes to Toxic Wastes: A Selective Study, 16 ENVTL.
AFF. L. REv. 753, 763-72 (1989).
807. Gordon, supra note 401, at 829.
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the disposal methods used."'8 However, these systems require
quantification of external costs in a way that is simply beyond the
current state of the art. 09 Any lawyer who has tried a toxic tort
case knows that it can take weeks of testimony to prove that a
particular incident of waste disposal led to a particular illness.
Quantifying the future adverse health and environmental effects of
numerous methods of disposal of thousands of different kinds of
wastes, and then defending that quantification in front of some tri-
bunal (for the taxed industries will surely demand a due process
right to challenge their assessments), would create a litigation
industry rivaling that which has arisen around CERCLA.
There is, however, another way to use economic incentives to
reduce hazardous waste generation: rather than create artificial
market mechanisms, eliminate the hidden subsidies and allow the
market itself to create those incentives. This proposal is explored
further in Part VI.
3. Recycling
810
In the public image, recycling involves such environmentally
benign activities as bundling newspapers and separating cans and
bottles. At the plants where those newspapers, cans and bottles are
actually processed into new products, however, considerable pollu-
tion is created.8 1' For certain materials, it is not clear whether sec-
ondary manufacturing (making products from recycled material)
produces less pollution per ton of material processed than does pri-
mary manufacturing.812 Proposed facilities to recycle and compost
ordinary MSW have attracted considerable community opposi-
808. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFIcE, supra note 800, at 5; Menell, supra
note 390, at 659, 727; see also MOLLY K. MACAULEY ET AL., USING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO
REGULATE Toxic SuBSTANCEs passim (1992); Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal. "Dead
Zones" and Toxic Death Risk Index Taxes, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 761,762 (1992). A much simpler
system of waste taxes is proposed in HiRSCHHORN & OLDENBURG, supra note 800, at 346-50.
809. See Applegate, supra note 463, at 261; Cinti, supra note 463, at 158.
810. The term "recycling" is used here in its colloquial sense and not in the technical
meaning provided by RCRA's exclusion of recycled materials from the definition of "solid
waste." See American Mining Congress v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1185-87 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Stephen Johnson, Recyclable Materials and RCRA's Complicated, Confusing, and Costly Defi-
nition of Solid Waste, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.), at 10,357 (1985).
811. See OFFICE OF TECH. AssEssmENT, supra note 136, at 192-93.
812. Id. at 191. But see ScHALL, supra note 408 (arguing that secondary materials pro-
duction has considerably lower environmental impact than primary production for most
materials).
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tion.813 The benefits of solid waste recycling lie, instead, in pre-
serving virgin materials, conserving landfill space, saving energy,
and reducing the need for incineration.
When the material to be recycled is hazardous waste, the
problems are considerably more severe. Some HW/RW recycling
operations, such as smelting of lead from automobile batteries,
14
reprocessing waste oil,8 15 and reprocessing spent nuclear fuel,
81 6
although often worthwhile, are highly polluting. A hazardous
waste recycling facility is not much more desirable as a neighbor
than any other kind of hazardous waste treatment plant. Thus, off-
site recycling offers little solution to the HW/RW facility siting
dilemma.
4. On-Site Treatment and Disposal
As discussed earlier, there are both legal817 and psychologi-
cal818 advantages to the treatment and disposal of HW at the point
of generation, if that is feasible. The use of mobile incinerators has
allowed exploration of these advantages. These units travel in a
convoy of several large trailers and are set up at Superfund sites for
a few months at a time to destroy on-site wastes. They are then
disassembled and moved to another location.81 9 These units attract
less opposition than commercial incinerators, because they do not
involve intrusion of waste from other regions and they are seen as
temporary. 820 They are far from universally accepted, 821 however,
813. See WILLiAM RATHE & CULLEN MURPHY, RUBBISH: THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF GAR-
BAGE 208-09 (1992); Daniel Pearl, Environment: Neighbors Resist Recycling Plants, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 14, 1991, at BI.
814. See Asante-Duah et al., supra note 390, at 26.
815. See KAYE H. KILBURN & RAPHAEL H. WARSHAW, CHRONIC NEUROBEHAVIORAL
EFFECTS OF ENvmO mENTAL ExPosuRE TO CHEMICALS FROM RESIDENCE NEAR A WASTE OIL
REPROCESSING FACILITY (1991).
816. See Goble, supra note 180, at 169.
817. See supra part III.D; see also Georgia: Rule Lets Facilities that Process Own
Waste Obtain Permits Simply by Notifying State Agency, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 242
(June 4, 1993).
818. See supra notes 641-55 and accompanying text.
819. See Stephanie Hunt, The Federal PCB Destruction Program: An Approach to the
Siting of Mobile PCB Incinerators in Canada, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 38, at 490;
Schreifels & Nelowet, supra note 38, at 62.
820. PORTNEY, supra note 531, at 148; David Morell, Siting and the Politics of Equity,
in RESOLVING LOCATIONAL CONFLICT, supra note 17, at 117, 129.
821. See Keith Schneider, E.P.A. Superfund at 13: A White Knight Tarnished, N.Y.
TIMESs, Sept. 6, 1993, at 7 (reporting opposition to on-site incineration of waste at a Superfund
site in Michigan). For discussion of one especially controversial proposal to use a mobile
incinerator, see Liane C. Casten, Toxic Burn: Agent Orange's Forgotten Victims, NATION,
Nov. 4, 1991, at 550; Judge Extends Ban on Dioxin Incinerator, N.Y. TIms, Feb. 15, 1993, at
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and some areas have expressed concern that, after installation, the
mobile unit will become permanent and will accept off-site
wastes. 22 This concern is not entirely without basis. Congress
initially directed that the on-site incinerators for destroying old
chemical weapons be dismantled after all the material had been
burned. Later, however, Congress rescinded this requirement, and
the military is reportedly studying the possible use of these inciner-
ators to destroy remedial waste from other sites.8 23 On-site incin-
eration at NPL sites peaked in 1988 and has been declining ever
since.8
24
On-site disposal is still in growing favor for waste from ongo-
ing production processes. s2- For remedial waste, however, on-site
disposal has the disadvantage of preventing the property from
obtaining a "clean bill of health," thereby scaring away potential
purchasers that are concerned about future liability.2 6
5. Alternative Treatment Technologies
Few communities look favorably on hazardous waste landfills
and incinerators. New treatment technologies currently being
developed have not, at least so far, acquired the same negative
image. Consequently, they do not attract the same opposition.
These alternative technologies are typically used on-site to
treat remedial wastes. One prime example is bioremediation,
which is the use of bacteria or fungi to destroy waste. A similar
As; Keith Schneider, Debate on Burning Dioxin Divides Arkansas Town, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28,
1992, at A14; Keith Schneider, In Arkansas Toxic Waste Cleanup, Highlights of New Environ-
mental Debate, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 2, 1992, at BI 1; Keith Schneider, Judge to Oversee Burning
in Arkansas, N.Y. TIAs, Oct. 30, 1992, at A16.
822. See A Plan to Burn PCBs Frightens Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1992, at B5;
Tessa Melvin, Croton Fights State over Incineration of PCBs, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1992, § 13
(Westchester Wkly.), at 1; New York Cancels Plans for PCB-Burning Incinerator, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 1992, at 27.
823. SHuLmAN, supra note 80, at 140. This plight resembles that faced by the states of
South Carolina, Nevada, and Washington, which thought that the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1988), would quickly relieve them of the
burden of the entire nation's LLRW. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2414
(1992).
824. EPA, supra note 65, at 14.
825. See Mullin, supra note 792, at 26. To avoid public opposition to large-scale medi-
cal waste incineration, 22 hospitals on Long Island, New York have worked out a regional
system under which regulated medical waste is treated in on-site autoclaves at each hospital,
and the residue is then burned at an existing resource recovery incinerator. Letter from Leslie
R. Bennett, Attorney, McMillan, Rather, Bennett & Rigano, P.C., Melville, N.Y., to Constan-
tine Sidamon-Eristoff, Regional Administrator, Region II, U.S. EPA (March 11, 1991) (on file
with the Tulane Law Review).
826. See Haz Waste Market, supra note 53, at 5.
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approach is used in most sewage treatment plants. 82 7 Bioremedia-
tion is a young technology, and its effectiveness and environmental
consequences are still unclear. Genetically engineered organisms
are being created to attack particular kinds of wastes. Some com-
mentators have expressed concern over the release of these orga-
nisms into the environment.828 Others have suggested that, if the
wrong methods are used, certain carcinogens could be created.829
Another newly fashionable technology is thermal desorption,
in which organic-contaminated soils, sludges, and sediments are
heated (but not burned) in a chamber that volatilizes the organics
and collects them for further treatment or recycling. Between 1990
and 1992, thermal desorption in hazardous waste cleanups
doubled, while the use of mobile incinerators at HW sites lost pop-
ularity. This reversal of fortune has been attributed to the stigma
attached to incineration. It is not clear, however, whether thermal
desorption involves lower risks to the community. 3 °
Further technological advances in the coming years may
decrease the need for off-site facilities for the disposal of remedial
wastes, but it is impossible to predict the magnitude of the impact
of future developments.831
6. Deregulation
One common but seldom-discussed way to avoid the HW/RW
siting problem is to define the material as nonhazardous. This
827. See Brian N. Hicks & Jason A. Caplan, Bioremediation: A Natural Solution, PoL-
LUTION ENG'G, Jan. 15, 1993, at 30. Recent EPA regulations encourage the use of bioremedia-
tion at RCRA sites. Corrective Action Management Units and Temporary Units; Corrective
Action Provisions Under Subtitle C, 58 Fed. Reg. 8658 (1993) (to be codified at scattered parts
of 40 C.F.R.).
828. DOREEN STABINSKY, THE OVERSELLING OF BIoREmEDInnON: A PRIMER FOR POL.-
ICY MAKERS AND Acnivis-rs (1992).
829. C.M. Williams & M. Tony Lieberman, Bioremediation of Chlorinated and Aro-
matic Organic Solvent Waste in the Subsurface, NAT'L ENv-L. J., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 40.
830. Thermal Desorption Grows; Is Your TSD Safe?, POLLUTION ENG'G, Oct. 15, 1992,
at 10; Public Opposition to Incinerating Waste Could Seriously Impede Cleanups, Officials
Say, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 2028 (Dec. 11, 1992); see also John Kingscott & Linda
Fielder, Innovative Treatment Technologies: Status and Use at Superfund Sites, 25 Chem.
Waste Litig. Rep. (CLR) 311, 314 (1993).
831. Technological innovation in waste management has a long history. During the
cholera epidemic of 1891, Hamburg's neighbors refused to accept waste from the city.
Because there was no space for a landfill, Hamburg built what became the first solid waste-
burning incinerator in Europe. Rainer Funke, Cleanup and Recycling of a Dioxin Contami-
nated Area: Glasnost-the Way to Acceptance, in INNOVATIVE APPROACHES, supra note 2, at
89, 89. The relationship between regulation and technological development in hazardous
waste treatment is discussed in Richard C. Fortuna, Same Wastes, New Solutions: The Market
for Treatment Alternatives, in BEYOND DUMPING, supra note 560, at 199, 202-06.
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form of deregulation has allowed many kinds of wastes to avoid
the rigors of the RCRA program and to be disposed of as ordinary
garbage, burned as fuel, flushed down the sewer or kept on-site
indefinitely. The EPA has a formal procedure for generators to
petition to have a particular waste stream "delisted" under
RCRA.832 The principal application and impacts of deregulation,
however, have taken place beyond the scope of this relatively nar-
row provision.
Government exemptions have placed some large waste
streams beyond the pale of hazardous waste regulations. For
example, the 1980 Bevill Amendment exempted hugh volumes of
mining waste and other materials from RCRA. 833 RCRA's exemp-
tion for hazardous waste used as fuel presents another significant
example. 834 Such exemptions invite manipulation of waste catego-
rization. RCRA's fuel exemption, for instance, led to a practice
known as "sham recycling," in which cement kilns, lime kilns,
blast furnaces, and the like burned huge quantities of liquid hazard-
ous waste at prices far below those charged by the better regulated
HW incinerators. Until the EPA finally closed the loophole in
1991 by imposing stringent air pollution regulations, these units
were burning nearly twice as much HW as were HW incinerators.
Even now these units, which were often sited many years ago in
what are now residential areas, account for a significant portion of
the nation's HW incineration capacity.835
Another example of attempted deregulation occurred in the
wake of the D.C. Circuit's decision in late 1991 to invalidate, on
procedural grounds, aspects of the EPA's definition of 1-W.836 The
EPA, under the prodding of Vice President Dan Quayle and his
Council on Competitiveness, took that opportunity to propose an
832. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(f); 40 C.F.R. § 260.22; see Karen Florini et al., EPA's Delisting
Program for Hazardous Wastes: Current Limitations and Future Directions, 19 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,558 (1989).
833. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
834. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(q) (1988).
835. See OFFICE OF TECH. AssEssmEr, U.S. CONo., PUB. No. OTA-ITE-347, FROM
PoLU~rMON TO PMRVEIMON 28 (1987); SARogrN Er AL., supra note 782, at 122; Bradley S.
Hiles & Robert F. Wilkinson, Bevill Amendment: Burning Hazardous Waste in Cement Kilns,
55 Mo. L. Rnv. 391, 396 (1991); Steverson, supra note 148, at 1809; BIF Bigger Obstacle
than Many Kilns Expected, Po.LurnoN ENG'o, Nov. 15, 1992, at 9; David B. Kopel, Burning
Mad: The Controversy over Treatment of Hazardous Waste in Incinerators, Boilers, and
Industrial Furnaces, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,216 (1993); Jock Ferguson, Burning
Question: Cement Companies Go Toxic, NAMrON, Mar. 8, 1993, at 306; Keith Schneider,
Fears Rise over Wastes as Fuel in Cement Kilns, N.Y. Tn.s, July 6, 1993, at A8.
836. See Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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entirely new set of definitions that would have had the effect of
exempting broad groups of materials from RCRA.837 By Septem-
ber of 1992, this proposal had become an issue in the presidential
campaign, and the White House Chief of Staff, James A. Baker III,
ordered its withdrawal. 38 Similarly controversial was a 1990 pro-
posal by the NRC to declare certain radioactive materials as
"below regulatory concern," so that they could go to ordinary
MSW landfills rather than to LLRW facilities. This proposal drew
storms of protest, and NRC withdrew it in 1991.8
39
There are many other examples of controversial exemptions,
or attempted exemptions, from the definitions of regulated materi-
als in an effort to save money for generators and to reduce the
demand on HW/RW disposal facilities.8 4 ° In many cases, both the
proposals and the outcomes are driven more by politics than by
science.
The regulatory ax swings both ways, and legal or political
developments will often render a given substance subject to the
HW/RW laws. For example, the enactment of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 had the effect of adding forty new chemicals
to the list of hazardous substances that are regulated under CER-
CLA.8 41 The abandonment of commercial reprocessing caused
spent fuel rods kept at nuclear power plants to be converted from a
resource into a radioactive waste. Current discussions between the
837. Hazardous Waste Management System: Identification and Listing of Hazardous
Waste, 57 Fed. Reg. 21,450 (1992) (to be codified at scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.) (proposed
May 20, 1993).
838. Keith Schneider, Campaign Concerns Prompt White House to Drop Waste Plan,
N.Y. Tuias, Sept. 30, 1992, at Al.
839. See "Below Regulatory Concern" Policy of NRC Attacked by Congress, States,
Citizen Groups, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 654 (Aug. 3, 1990); "Below Regulatory
Concern" Policy Deferred by Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 14,
at 840 (Aug. 2, 1991); NRC Withdraws Below Regulatory Concern Policy, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 24, at 830 (Sept. 3, 1993); Patrick Quinn, Below Regulatory Concern, HAZMAT
WoRLD, Oct. 1990, at 45; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2021j(a) (1988) (statute requiring NRC to
study below regulatory concern concept).
840. See, e.g., New Debris Rule to Reduce Treatment Needed for Disposal, Lower Costs,
EPA Says, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 1257 (Aug. 21, 1992) (concerning rule on debris
contaminated with HW); New EPA Rules Aid Planned Disposal Site, ENG'G NEWs-REc., Nov.
25, 1991, at 10 (observing that the EPA's redefinition of waste, coupled with rule on expedited
permitting for facilities accepting such waste, will allow planned landfill in Houston to open
much more quickly); Perspectives: Beneficial Reuse, Solid Waste & Power, Industry
Sourcebook 1993, at 10 (discussing a proposal by New York State to grant "beneficial use
determinations" for ash and other solid wastes, exempting them from usual regulatory
requirements).
841. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(b)(1) (1988), 9601(14)(E) (1988); see Lynn L. Bergeson,
New CAA Chemicals Raise CERCLA Reporting Issues, POLLUTION ENG'G, June 1991, at 23.
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United States and the Russian republics will determine how much
of the fissile material inside old Soviet warheads becomes "waste."
7. Remote Siting
Transportation of waste to some desolate, unpopulated area,
where a leak will injure no one, is a common aspiration for waste
disposal. As has been amply demonstrated by the Yucca Mountain
controversy, such plans have no guarantee of political acceptance.
Moreover, deserts, which frequently offer an appropriate environ-
ment under this criterion, have their own special environmental
problems, despite their advantages of remoteness and aridity.
They are subject to strange wind effects, such as tornados and
"dust devils"; they are often in places that are tectonically active;
and they typically have corrosive salts in their upper layers . 42 The
U.S. Bureau of Land Management has supported the construction
of a commercial hazardous waste treatment facility and landfill in
the Broadwell Dry Lake basin in San Bernardino County, Califor-
nia, an area bounded by several wilderness areas, but the EPA has
objected, largely because of impacts on wetlands and air quality,
even though there are no neighbors for many miles. 43 Moreover,
reliance on remote areas raises serious questions of geographic
equity. 44 Accordingly, deserts provide no easy remedy.
One form of remote siting is prevalent, however: locating a
facility near a border so that many of its neighbors will be in some
other jurisdiction. An uncanny number of actual or proposed facil-
ities are very close to a state or municipal border. Sometimes this
arguably occurs because the borders are formed by bodies of water
that attract heavy industry, but often this justification does not
apply. Examples include California's proposed LLRW facility in
Ward Valley, near the Arizona border;8 45 Michigan's proposed
LLRW facility in rural Riga Township, across the Ohio border
from the suburbs of Toledo;8 46 a proposed LLRW facility in North
842. Loren D. Potter, Desert Characteristics as Related to Waste Disposal, in DESERTS
AS Durmps, supra note 222, at 21, 42-47.
843. Letter from Deanna M. Wieman, U.S. EPA, to Bruce West, U.S. Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) (Oct. 15, 1992) (on file with the Tulane Law Review). The facility would
be on private land, but the BLM's approval would be required for access roads. Telephone
interview with Dick Forester, BLM (Jan. 26, 1993).
844. For a discussion of geographical equity, see supra part IV.D.1.
845. Robert Reinhold, States, Failing to Cooperate, Face a Nuclear-Waste Crisis, N.Y.
TD4ms, Dec. 28, 1992, at Al.
846. Smolen et al., supra note 410, at 4.
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Carolina two miles from the South Carolina border;8 47 the new
hazardous waste incinerator in East Liverpool, Ohio, on the Ohio
River across from West Virginia; the Model City hazardous waste
complex in the extreme northwestern corner of New York State,
near Canada; 848 New Jersey's plan to put a hazardous waste incin-
erator on a narrow body of water called the Arthur Kill, directly
across from Staten Island, New York;8 4 9 new resource recovery
plants staring at each other across the border of Gloucester and
Camden Counties, New Jersey;850 several facilities in Hudspeth
County, wedged in the western panhandle of Texas between New
Mexico and Mexico;851 and the effort of Pascagoula, Mississippi,
to burn medical waste in an incinerator right across the city line
from Moss Point, Mississippi. 52 Additionally, plans are underway
to build several hazardous waste facilities in Texas near the Mexi-
can border. 3
8. Export
Remote siting refers to locations within the same jurisdiction.
Even more attractive to most politicians is export: sending waste
to a different jurisdiction. This approach includes sending waste to
other cities or states, shipping it to other nations, disposing of it in
the oceans, and shooting it into outer space. The idea is typified by
a Saturday Night Live "commercial" for a fantastic new device, the
Yard-a-Pult, which allows suburbanites to dispose of their garbage
by catapulting it over the back fence into the yards of their
neighbors.85 4
847. Jon Jefferson, Barnwell. The Radwaste Era Ends-But Not Quite Yet, 8 F. FOR
APPLIED Rns. & PUB. POL'Y 88, 89 (1993).
848. Olsen, supra note 309, at 491-93.
849. Philip J. Landrigan et al., Toxic Air Pollution Across a State Line: Implications for
the Siting of Resource Recovery Facilities, 10 J. PUB. HEALTH PoL'Y 309, 311 (1989); Joseph
F. Sullivan, Debate Rages over Site Proposed for Incinerator, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1992, at
28.
850. James J. Florio, The Solid Waste Crisis, 9 SEroN HALL LEGiS. J. 399, 401 (1985).
851. Roberto Suro, Texas Town and Fertilizer from That City, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
1993, at B2.
852. Frances F. Marcus, Medical Waste Divides Mississippi Cities, N.Y. TimEs, June 24,
1992, at A16.
853. Edward Cody, Mexico Seeks Halt in U.S. Waste Plan; Texas Sites Raise Pollution
Concerns, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1992, at A29; see also Stephen P. Mumme, Complex Inter-
dependence and Hazardous Waste Management Along the U.S.-Mexico Border, in DIMEN-
SIONS, supra note 336, at 224, 225-27; Roberto A. Sanchez, Health and Environmental Risks
of the Maquiladora in Mexicali, 30 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 163, 181-84 (1990); Phillip Elmer-
DeWitt, Love Canals in the Making, Ttms, May 20, 1991, at 51.
854. See GoRE, supra note 509, at 153, 157.
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a. Other Cities and States
The massive political and legal wars recounted earlier over
the interstate transportation of waste all involve efforts of one
jurisdiction to transfer its waste to another. Sometimes export of
residue is an explicit part of a siting deal. For example, to secure
approval by his city council for the construction of a large MSW
incinerator, New York City Mayor David Dinkins cancelled plans
to dispose of the ash at the city's landfill in Staten Island and
instead promised to export it,855 to Virginia, as it developed. 856 On
other occasions, a community will demand that an entire landfill be
exhumed and its contents shipped elsewhere, 57 even though the
process of exhumation may well release gases into the neighbor-
hood that could cause considerably greater health risks than leav-
ing the landfill in place.858
b. Other Nations
A huge international trade exists in hazardous waste, with
waste travelling mostly from north to south. The West African
nations of Benin, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau have been among the
most active importers. Guinea-Bissau once negotiated a contract
of $120 million per year-more than the country's annual
budget-to store HW from other countries, but public outcry
forced the government to rescind the deal.859 Unscrupulous waste
merchants are known or suspected to have dumped numerous loads
of HW at sea.86°
RCRA bars the international export of HW unless the United
States and the receiving country have a waste exchange agreement,
and the receiving country has agreed to accept the shipment.861 In
855. Michael Specter, Pact on Garbage in New York City, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 18, 1992,
at Al; see also Massachusetts: MWRA Eyes Out-of-State Sites over Walpole Landfill, SOLID
WASTE DIG. (Northeast ed.), Feb. 1993, at 3.
856. See In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Resource Recovery Facility, slip op. at 13 (N.Y.
State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv., A.LJ. Dec. 23, 1992).
857. See Illinois v. Teledyne, Inc., 599 N.E.2d 472,496 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (incidents in
Wilsonville, Illinois and Sheffield, Illinois); Commercial Hazardous Waste Management:
Recent Financial Performance and Outlook for the Future, HAzARDOUS WASTE CONSuLTArr,
Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 4-1, 4-12.
858. SusAN M. BREr ET AL., ASSESSMENT Op THE PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS ASSOCIATED
WITH A PROPOSED EXCAVATION AT A HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE, IN RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TEXTBOOK OF CASE STUDIES 427 (1989).
859. MoYERS, supra note 626, at 5.
860. William L. Long, Economic Aspects of Transport and Disposal of Hazardous
Wastes, 14 MARnE POL'Y 198, 201 (1990).
861. 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (1988).
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August 1992, the U.S. Senate ratified the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and
Their Disposal, which establishes broad international controls,
although not as broad as some would have liked.8 62 However,
Congress has not yet enacted implementing legislation 63 The net
result of these and related international controls is that it is unlikely
that U.S. waste generators will lawfully be able to export large
quantities of HW. However, stringent enforcement will be
required to guard against illegal exports.
c. Oceans
The oceans have long been used for the disposal of HW/RW.
The United States began dumping radioactive waste at sea in 1946.
By the time the practice stopped in 1970, the United States had
dumped an estimated 107,000 containers of RW-mostly con-
crete-capped fifty-five-gallon drums-at twenty-eight sites in the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the Gulf of Mexico. 64 Until the
early 1970s, the near-shore areas were commonly used as dumping
sites for several types of HW. The United States also formerly
dumped obsolete nerve gas and other chemical weapons in the
ocean.865 Most of this stopped with the passage of the Marine Pro-
tection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972,866 but dumping of
acid wastes, contaminated dredge spoils, sewage sludge, and
treated municipal and industrial waste waters continued 867 until
most of those practices, in turn, were barred by the Ocean Dump-
ing Ban Act of 1988, effective at the end of 1991.868 One illegal
practice persists off the Atlantic and Gulf coasts: filling barges
with HW and abandoning them. 869 The London Dumping Conven-
862. Asante-Duah, supra note 390, at 1688; Ibrahim J. wani, Poverty, Governance, the
Rule of Law, and International Environmentalism: A Critique of the Basel Convention on
Hazardous Wastes, 1 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL. 37, 44-45 (1991).
863. Sources Seek U.S. Role in Waste Export Treaty Talks, Despite Lack of Status,
INSIDE EPA, Nov. 20, 1992, at 13.
864. Moira H. waligory, Radioactive Marine Pollution: International Law and State
Liability, 1992 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 674, 685.
865. Birks, supra note 85, at 172.
866. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1988).
867. GoLDMAN ET AL., supra note 464, at 95.
868. 33 U.S.C. § 1414b (1988).
869. Use of Barges for Illegal Waste Dumping Said to Hamper Coast Guard Cleanup
Efforts, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 2095 (Dec. 25, 1992); see also Abandoned Barge Act
of 1992, 46 U.S.C. §§ 4701-4705 (Supp. IV 1992).
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tion of 1972870 has also governed waste disposal at sea since 1975,
together with a complex of other international agreements.871
Ocean incineration of hazardous waste has received consider-
able attention. Four sets of research or interim bums occurred
under the EPA's authority between 1974 and 1982, all using a ship
called the Volcanus J.872 In 1983 the EPA held a public hearing
concerning ocean incineration in Brownsville, Texas, which was
proposed as an embarkation port. More than 6200 people attended,
the overwhelming majority of whom were opposed to the incinera-
tion, making it the largest hearing in the EPA history. 873 The EPA
proposed regulations concerning ocean incineration in 1985,874 but
never finalized them. Several companies wishing to bum at sea
failed to persuade the EPA to grant them permits.8 75
Even if the regulatory climate for ocean incineration
improved,876 it could not have much of an impact on the overall
1W disposal picture. For technical reasons, only about eight per-
cent of all hazardous wastes (mostly liquid chlorinated wastes) is
suitable for ocean incineration,877 and even the most ardent propo-
nents foresee an incineration fleet of no more than a few ships,
together burning only a tiny fraction of all the nation's HW.
878
Ocean incineration began on a commercial basis in Europe in 1969
and peaked at 108,000 tons per year in 1980. It has been declining
870. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other
Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 (entered into force Aug. 30, 1975).
871. See Clifton E. Curtis, Legality of Seabed Disposal of High-Level Radioactive
Wastes Under the London Dumping Convention, 14 OCEAN DEV. & hr'L L. 383, 384 (1985);
Daniel P. Finn, Ocean Disposal of Radioactive Wastes: The Obligation of International Coop-
eration to Protect the Marine Environment, 21 VA. J. INr'g L. 621, 623-24 (1981); David G.
Spak, The Need for a Ban on All Radioactive Waste Disposal in the Ocean, 7 Nw. J. Nr'L L.
& Bus. 803, 811-17 (1986); Waligory, supra note 864, at 674.
872. OFFICE OF TECH. AssEssMENT, supra note 28, at 179.
873. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Andrew Davis, Reconsidering Ocean Incineration as Part
of a U.S. Hazardous Waste Management Program: Separating the Rhetoric from the Reality,
17 ENVTL. AFF. 687, 731 & n.366 (1990).
874. See Ocean Incineration Regulation, 40 C.F.R. pts. 220, 227, 234 (1993).
875. See Seaburn, Inc. v. EPA, 712 F. Supp. 218,219 (D.D.C. 1989); Waste Mgmt., Inc.
v. EPA, 669 F. Supp. 536, 538 (D.D.C. 1987). The Coast Guard has promulgated regulations
for "vessels engaged in the incineration of liquid hazardous waste incineration in bulk at sea."
46 C.F.R. § 150.200 (1993).
876. See Elaine L. Hughes, Toxic Waste Incineration at Sea, 24 U. Bgrr. COLUM. L.
REV. 19, 36 (1990); Christopher B. Kende, Oceans and Coasts, in 3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
PRACTICE GumE 23-1, § 23.06 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1992); Christopher A. Walker, The
United States Environmental Protection Agency's Proposal for At-Sea Incineration of Hazard-
ous Wastes-A Transnational Perspective, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 157 passim (1988).
877. Incineration of Hazardous Waste at Sea, supra note 110, at 221.




ever since, plagued by technical problems (including discovery of
dioxin in the exhaust gases), market failures, and political
protests.879
Proposals occasionally arise to build offshore islands for
deep-sea ports, refineries, waste disposal, and the like.880  The
Deepwater Port Act authorizes licenses for artificial ports that han-
dle oil and not for those handling other commodities.8 81 The fed-
eral government has jurisdiction over the seabed from the three-
mile limit to the edge of the continental shelf,882 and it is likely that
an offshore island for any other purpose would require explicit
congressional authorization.
883
Proposals for disposal of HW/RW under the deep sea floor
still arise from time to time.884 In 1987, when Congress designated
Yucca Mountain, a provision was inserted into the NWPA, as a
concession to the Nevada congressional delegation,88 5 calling for a
study of sub-seabed disposal of HLW. 886 Scientists at the Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institution have suggested dropping torpedo-
shaped canisters of HLW into the sea floor's sediments,887 but this
proposal, like all the others, does not seem to be going anywhere.
d. Outer Space
Disposing of high-level radioactive waste or plutonium by
projecting it into outer space has been seriously discussed.888 The
concept entails using a space shuttle to crry a waste package to a
low-level earth orbit, and then transferring the waste to another
879. Bruce W. Piasecki & Hans Sutter, Alternatives to Ocean Incineration in Europe, in
AMERICA'S FrruR, supra note 35, at 67.
880. See, e.g., JAMES EHmANN, CHATrY'S ISLAND passim (1982).
881. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1988).
882. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1988).
883. See United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16, 20 (5th Cir. 1970).
884. See, e.g., A. Aristides Yayanos, Ocean Engineering: Sea-Burial of Toxic Wastes,
25 CAL. Bus. 105 (1990); Keith Schneider, Scientists Suggest Dumping Sludge on Vast, Bar-
ren Deep Sea Floor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1991, at Al. But see WHOI Report Deep Sixes
Ocean Dumping, 261 SCIENCE 423 passim (1993) (reporting that the Woods Hole Oceano-
graphic Institute argues that deep-sea dumping would be a waste of money).
885. Shapiro, supra note 201, at 64.
886. 42 U.S.C. § 10,204 (1988).
887. P.J. Skerrett, Nuclear Burial at Sea, TECH. Rav., Feb.-Mar. 1992, at 22.
888. JACOB, supra note 203, at 36 (noting that James Schlesinger had advocated space
disposal when he was chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission); TANG & SALnoa, supra
note 185, at 383; Charles D. Hollister & Harry W. Smedes, Selecting Sites for Radioactive
Waste Repositories, in HAzARDous WASTE MANAGEMENT, supra note 344, at 63, 63; William




rocket for insertion into a solar orbit, where it would be expected
to remain for at least one million years.8 89 This approach would
not be entirely unprecedented; already orbiting the earth is the
detritus of thirty years of space flight, ranging from large objects,
such as discarded rocket bodies and derelict satellites, to smaller
items, such as trash bags discarded from previous missions; clouds
of urine ice crystals; and a lost Hasselblad camera.890 Approxi-
mately forty nuclear-powered devices are currently in space, carry-
ing about a ton of radioactive material.891 One of these devices, a
Soviet satellite containing Uranium-235, fell back to earth in 1978
and landed in Canada. The U.S.S.R. paid three million dollars to
reimburse Canada for the cost of finding and cleaning up after the
satellite.892
Five international treaties have been cited that arguably would
prohibit waste disposal in space, although their effect is not
clear.893 Wholly apart from the very troubling ethical issues, outer-
space disposal has serious practical problems. It currently costs
about $10,000 per kilogram to put materials into space;894 rockets
sometimes crash; the manufacture of rocket fuel has occasionally
involved fatal accidents,895 is highly polluting, and creates its own
hazardous wastes; 896 and the burning of rocket fuel is so polluting
that it has its own subsection in the Clean Air Act.897 In fact, the
test firing and actual use of rockets is claimed to be a major cause
of stratospheric ozone depletion.898
889. Earl R. Hoskins & James E. Russell, Geologic and Engineering Dimensions of
Nuclear Waste Storage, in NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 491, at 19, 27.
890. Bernard K. Shafer, Solid, Hazardous, and Radioactive Wastes in Outer Space:
Present Controls and Suggested Changes, 19 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 3-4 (1988-89).
891. Id. at 4.
892. Id. at 24-25.
893. Id. at 11.
894. Id. at 10.
895. BENIAMiN A. GOLDMAN, THE TRUTH ABOUT WHERE You LIVE: AN ATLAs FOR
ACTION ON ToxINs AND MORTALITY 128-29 (1991).
896. See Morton Thiokol to Pay $4.65 Million, Complete Cleanup at Goose Farm Waste
Site, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 338 (Aug. 10, 1988); Workers Sue Rocket Fuel
Ingredient Maker Seeking $75 Million for Renal Cell Cancer, 7 Toxies L. Rep. (BNA) No. 12,
at 344 (Aug. 19, 1992).
897. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(e) (1988).
898. Lenny Siegel, No Free Launch, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 24; see also
William J. Broad, New Methods Sought to Dispose of Rockets, with No Harm to Earth, N.Y.




The final alternative that has been seriously offered to build-
ing new disposal facilities is simply to stop building them. Several
states have stopped even entertaining permit applications.8 99 One
environmental advocate has called for a "progressive not-in-any-
body's-backyard solidarity [that is] required for a democratic
challenge to a socially unjust and an environmentally unstable pro-
duction process." 900 This approach is founded on the idea that if
no more disposal capacity is provided, companies will be forced to
stop generating the waste.901
Robert W. Lake, adopting a similar viewpoint, has called for
reframing the entire siting question:
Siting hazardous waste incinerators, for example, constitutes a
locational solution to an industrial production problem (hazard-
ous waste generation). But the incinerator siting solution is only
one of a number of possible strategies for hazardous waste man-
agement. The facility siting strategy concentrates costs on host
communities, as compared to the alternative strategy of restruc-
turing production so as to produce less waste, which concentrates
costs on capital.902
In the words of Lois Gibbs of the Citizens Clearinghouse for
Hazardous Wastes, grass-roots groups "are doing some terrific
stuff. People are following the strategy. They're stopping land-
fills, stopping incinerators, and backing up the wastes. They're
plugging up the toilet."
90 3
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: LocAL CONTROL, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY, NATIONAL ALLOCATION
A. Reprise: The Lessons of Experience
The reader by now has endured a detailed discussion of the
many things that have gone wrong, and the few things that have
899. See North Carolina Waste Commission to Close, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at
908 (July 17, 1992); Ontario Outlaws Future Incinerators, WASTE AGE, Nov. 1992, at 11;
Rhode Island Bans Incineration, Sets 70% Recycling Rate, WASTE AGE, Sept. 1992, at 9;
Keith Schneider, Texas Calls Halt to Waste-Disposal Sites, N.Y. Tmms, Feb. 19, 1991, at A12.
900. Heiman, supra note 592, at 361; see also BLUMBERG & GOTTLmB, supra note 135,
at 77; Lois Marie Gibbs, Celebrating Ten Years of Triumph, EVERYONE's BACKYARD, Feb.
1993, at 2.
901. See, e.g., Barbara Dudley, A Burning Issue for Gore, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1993, at
A13 (written by the Executive Director of Greenpeace, U.S.A).
902. Lake, supra note 10, at 88; see also Lake & Disch, supra note 713, at 665.




gone right, in HW/RW facility siting. I will now try to summarize
the lessons of this experience as a prelude to proposing an alterna-
tive approach based on those lessons.
The current siting impasse has led to the perpetuation of old,
poorly sited, environmentally unsound on-site and off-site disposal
facilities, which are disproportionately located in low-income and
minority communities. The neighbors endure the externalities of
these old facilities without recompense, and thus, they effectively
subsidize the creation of HEW/RW. An even more powerless
group, our descendants, provides a further subsidy because the sit-
ing impasse has left HW/RW contained in impermanent vessels,
such as landfills and capped Superfund sites, that will have to be
cleaned up in the more or less distant future. These vessels prolif-
erate around the country because most places do not want to accept
waste from any other place.
Partly as a result of the siting impasse, the price of waste dis-
posal has greatly increased. This is both good and bad. It is good
in that the creation of hazardous waste and LLRW (although prob-
ably not HLW and TRU) is highly price elastic, and the high price
of disposal sparks the development of alternative, waste-reducing
production techniques. These techniques may drastically reduce
creation of hazardous waste: generation of LLRW has already
been cut by more than half.9°4 The high price is bad because it
increases the cost of cleaning up the waste that has already been
created, leading to delayed and impermanent remedies.
There is no "out of sight, out of mind" solution to HW/RW.
International law and politics prevent reliance on third world coun-
tries, the oceans, and outer space. Domestic law and politics pre-
clude shipping all the waste to remote deserts and wilderness.
HW/RW recycling is environmentally problematic. New tech-
niques for treating (as opposed to preventing) HW/RW show
promise, but some of them present their own environmental
problems, and it is too early to know if they will make much of a
contribution. Thus accomplishing our task-finding the system of
LIW/RW management that maximizes social welfare, takes full
account of social and economic costs, and still achieves fairness-
must focus on two methods: minimizing the creation of new HW/
RW; and finding a limited number of sites for new disposal facili-
ties to replace the old, poorly sited units and to handle the remedial
waste that already exists. Although these new facilities will be far
904. See supra text accompanying note 397.
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superior environmentally to the old ones they replace, they will not
be benign. Accordingly, their numbers should be minimized.
The determinative issues in the success or failure of facility
siting attempts seem to be (1) the culture of the local community
and (2) the host state's sense of national fairness. Preemption of
local control magnifies the sense of incursion and never works in
the face of determined opposition backed by the local government.
In those communities which fear that the facilities will endanger
their children's health, offers of compensation and negotiation are
ineffective and offensive. On the other hand, there are some com-
munities whose culture of risk perception does not lead them to
fear (or at least to loathe) HW/RW facilities. In these communi-
ties, compensation and negotiation, as well as some degree of local
control, can achieve local acceptance. 905 It appears possible to
reduce or eliminate a sense of incursion, though not a preexisting
dread. But even if the community is willing to host a facility, the
state will often veto the idea, at least partly because the state feels
that a disproportionate share of the nation's waste disposal burden
is being hoisted on it. The compartmentalization of disposal pro-
grams and laws fosters this sense of geographic inequity: one state
may feel it handles an unfair share of the nation's hazardous waste
disposal, for instance, although forgetting that other states may be
taking its radioactive waste or medical waste or sewage sludge.
This understanding of what kills siting attempts should lead to
a way out of the thicket. Communities with cultures that are con-
genial to HW/RW disposal facilities can be found by offering com-
pensation and asking for volunteers; places that fear those facilities
can just say no. To obtain acceptance at the state level, it will be
necessary to have a comprehensive national program that considers
all the different kinds of wastes and allocates the burdens equitably
between the states.
Drawing on these lessons of experience, I will now propose a
system that minimizes the creation of HW/RW and, for the waste
905. Professor Vicki Been, a former resident of one of the volunteer communities cited
earlier (Naturita, Colorado), has written to the author, "I would argue that 'culture of risk' is
just a euphemism for 'lack of alternatives.' The residents of Naturita certainly fear HW/RW
facilities, but they fear having their kids go hungry even more.... The 'cultural' factors...
are inseparable from those towns' economic dependence upon risky activities." Letter from
Vicki Been, Assoc. Prof., N.Y.U., to Author (Feb. 18, 1993) (on file with the Tulane Law
Review). This comment illuminates the reasons, and level of enthusiasm, behind Naturita's
willingness to accept such a facility, but it does not refute the observation that many other




that still must be disposed of, identifies willing communities and
gives the states reason to agree as well. After making this propo-
sal, I will then evaluate it by the same criteria that I used to assess
the current siting system.
B. Description of the Proposed Alternative
90 6
1. Centralized Facilities
Part II of this Article discussed the numerous sources and
types of hazardous and radioactive wastes. These wastes are all
regulated separately and are generally disposed of separately in a
multitude of different sorts of facilities, even though the same
kinds of physical characteristics, such as geological setting and
transportation access, are desirable for most disposal facilities.
The congressional Office of Technology Assessment has proposed
the establishment of a National Cleanup List to track the cleanup
of all chemically contaminated sites, but this has not occurred. 0 7
Nor does any coordinated national effort exist to site disposal facil-
ities for these varying waste streams. This fragmentation fosters a
sense of inequity in the siting of each type of facility.
A national program for allocating waste disposal facilities
would have several advantages. If every state had at least one
facility and the larger states had the larger facilities, the states
would have much less of a sense of regional unfairness. The larger
states might have centralized facilities, taking a variety of waste
streams and subjecting them to several different kinds of
processes; a physical-chemical treatment plant, an incinerator, a
landfill, an aqueous treatment plant, and a liquid organics recovery
facility might all be located on the same site. Each kind of waste
would be more likely to find its ideal treatment process. Some-
times one kind of waste can be used to treat another; a caustic
could treat an acid, for example, or the oily waste can be used as
fuel to burn other organic waste.908 Such a comprehensive
approach would realize considerable economies of scale.909
906. A considerably more detailed description and assessment of this proposal are con-
tained in the author's forthcoming book, MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE
RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNEss IN Tox=c AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING (forthcoming 1994).
907. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 63, at 61.
908. See Davis, supra note 578, at 44.
909. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSmEr, supra note 226, at 14 (noting that the develop-
ment of efficient treatment technologies for LLRW may stall because of small waste volumes
at decentralized LLRW disposal facilities); Contreras, supra note 2, at 522-23 (promoting
economies of scale in LLRW facilities); Hahn, supra note 468, at 208 (giving estimates of
costs per ton of facilities of different sizes); John F. Williams & Daniel D. Costello, Orphan
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Several European nations have successfully established cen-
tralized waste disposal facilities. For example, Denmark sends
nearly all of its hazardous waste to a central facility on the island
of Funen in the city of Nyborg, via a network of twenty-one trans-
fer stations. The facility, operated by a public corporation, houses
an incinerator, a waste oil recovery plant, a physical-chemical
treatment unit, and (twelve miles away) a landfill for treatment
residuals. Similar systems are working well in Finland, Sweden,
and the German states of Bavaria and Hessen. In most cases, on-
site treatment at industrial plants is discouraged. 910 As described
by Gary Davis, Joanne Linnerooth, and Bruce Piasecki, these
European systems all
have built technologically advanced, integrated facilities for the
storage, treatment and disposal of hazardous waste with signifi-
cant investment of public funds, placed a high priority on rela-
tively expensive treatment and incineration technologies with
little direct land disposal, have required generators to use the pub-
licly owned management facilities in a monopolistic fashion, and
have shared the cost of hazardous waste management between
industry and the taxpayer.91'
As discussed earlier, several Canadian provinces have adopted a
similar approach.91 2
2. Sites
Any site selected for a waste disposal facility would have to
meet minimum technical criteria. Beyond that threshold, however,
certain factors would make some sites more appropriate than
others.
For the last decade the tendency in siting new disposal facili-
ties, and new industrial operations in general, has been to look for
"green fields": farms or other lands with no prior industrial use.
The two main reasons for this approach are: (1) to avoid the possi-
bility of assuming a prior owner's CERCLA liability for contami-
nation of the ground;913 and (2) to avoid the greater difficulty of
monitoring leaks from a facility where the groundwater is already
Waste: Where Will It Go?, WORLD WASTES, Dec. 1992, at 47 (promoting economies of scale
at materials recovery facilities).
910. Gary Davis et al., Government Ownership of Risk: Guaranteeing a Treatment
Infrastructure, in AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 35, at 95, 122.
911. Id. at 113.
912. See supra text accompanying notes 716-17.
913. John C. Buckley, Reducing the Environmental Impact of CERCLA, 41 S.C. L. REv.
765, 808-10 (1990); Mank, supra note 688, at 239-40.
1192 [Vol. 68
WASTE FACILITY SITING
contaminated from prior uses.914  However, this approach also
increases social conflict by attempting to impose waste disposal on
pristine areas, and it leads to the spoiling of ever larger swatches of
American soil.
A growing body of scientific evidence suggests that once the
groundwater is contaminated in certain ways, it will never be clean
again, at least with current technology.915 No matter how much
money is spent, many badly contaminated sites will always be
dirty.916 Off-site waste migration must be halted, but it makes little
sense to spend huge sums in futile attempts to make badly contam-
inated sites suitable for residential use, while productive farmland
is seized for fresh waste disposal sites. Here, what is perfect is the
enemy of the good: by insisting on total cleanup, we pour billions
of dollars into a few unproductive holes and allow many other sites
to go unaddressed.917 Instead, the waste should go to places that
are already contaminated and unlikely ever to be thoroughly clean.
Many sites around the country are available using this
approach. The Pentagon is closing thirty-five major and ninety-
five minor domestic military bases,918 most of which have serious
contamination problems.919 As noted before, the military's inven-
tory includes several thousand smaller contaminated sites.92 ° In
addition, the NWC contains seventeen major facilities, all contami-
914. See McKewen & Sloan, supra note 334, at 251 (discussing difficulties "in actually
developing a site [near existing contamination] under real-world regulatory conditions in
which the greatest imperative seems to be to prove you didn't cause degradation"); cf. 10
C.F.R. § 61.50(a)(2) (1992) (stressing the importance of the ability to characterize, model, and
monitor in selection of LLRW disposal sites).
915. Randy M. Mott, Aquifer Restoration Under CERCLA: New Realities and Old
Myths, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 1301 (Aug. 28, 1992); Pump-and-Treat Remedy May
Be Ineffective at Many Toxic Waste Sites, EPA Official Says, 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 50,
at 1549 (May 20, 1992); Curtis C. Travis & Carolyn B. Doty, Can Contaminated Aquifers at
Superfund Sites Be Remediated?, 24 ENvrn.. Sci. & TECH. 1464 (1990).
916. OFmca OF TECH. AssnssMFrN, supra note 219, at 6-7.
917. Compare V. Kerry Smith & William H. Desvousges, The Valuation of Environ-
mental Risks and Hazardous Waste Policy, 64 LAND ECON. 211, 211 (1988) (suggesting that
measurements for HW cleanup may need to be constructed differently than by the traditional
benefit-cost analysis) with Robert L. Raucher, The Benefits and Costs of Policies Related to
Groundwater Contamination, 62 LAND EcON. 33, 36-37 (1986) (questioning the wisdom of
large expenditures to clean groundwater at Superfund sites).
918. Clinton Proposes Expedited Cleanup of Military Bases Scheduled for Closure, 24
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 424 (July 9, 1993).
919. CONGRESSIONAL BuDGEr OFFIcE, EtvnRotmiErAL CLEANUP Issuas AssocIATED
wrrn CLosiNG MILrrARY BASES 2 (1992); Bill Turner & John McCormick, The Military's
Toxic Legacy, NEWsWEEK, Aug. 6, 1990, at 20.
920. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
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nated,921 and several of them are likely to cease all production. 922
The closing facilities, and the surrounding civilian communities
that relied on them as their economic foundation, are desperately
seeking a new mission. Fort Dix in New Jersey may be converted
into a large federal prison,923 and officials at many military
research facilities aspire to convert them to environmental
research.924 Congress has eased the sale of military property for
civilian uses.92 5
Some work of this sort is already underway. Waste Manage-
ment, Inc. has announced plans to build a large HW incineration
and treatment complex at Hanford, in the hopes of attracting much
of the remedial waste from the cleanup there.926 The Army plans
to incinerate hazardous wastes from chemical weapons and pesti-
cide production at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado.927
The NRC is considering proposals to allow the disposal of LLRW
at uranium mill tailings sites. 928 In late 1992, the DOE revealed it
was considering using NWC facilities for interim HLW storage.
929
Waste Management's HW complex in Niagara County, New York
was formerly a defense installation, the Lake Ontario Ordinance
921. See supra part II.B.4.
922. Dan W. Reicher & Jason Salzman, Cleanup or Buildup: Nuclear Weapons Produc-
tion in the 21st Century, in HIDDEN DANGERS, supra note 85, at 144, 147-49. In 1979 the
GAO recommended that these NWC facilities be investigated for the nation's HLW reposi-
tory, but the idea was ignored. U.S. GAO, PUB. No. EMD-79-77, THE NATION'S NUCLEAR
WASTE: PROPOSALS FOR ORGANIZATION AND SrriNo at iv-v (1979).
923. Robert Hanley, Fort Dix May Become Federal Prison, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 30, 1992,
at 33.
924. Environmental Technology Seen as Possible New Focus for Labs That Developed
Weapons, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1514 (Oct. 2, 1992); see also Kevin D. Murphy,
Making the Most of a Base Closing, GovERmlNG, Sept. 1993, at 22 (reporting on community
efforts to convert closed bases for economically productive purposes).
925. Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (Supp. IV
1992) (amending CERCLA to require federal government, before termination of federal activi-
ties on any real property owned by the government, to identify land where no hazardous waste
was stored, released, or disposed of). The issues in reuse of closed bases are discussed in
Raymond T. Swenson et al., Resolving the Environmental Complications of Base Closure,
FED. FACILITIES ENvTL. J., Autumn 1992, at 279.
926. Waste Management to Build Treatment Facility at Department of Energy's Han-
ford Reservation, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1971 (Dec. 13, 1991).
927. Army Set to Burn Wastes at Arsenal, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1925 (Nov.
27, 1992). For a discussion of incineration of obsolete chemical weapons at the depots where
they are stored, see supra text accompanying notes 86-93, 813.
928. In the NRC, RADmoAcrvE EXCHANGE, Nov. 2, 1992, at 8.
929. DOE Looks to Federal Facilities, supra note 212, at 1.
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Works. 3° On a much smaller scale, in 1973 and again in 1979, a
private company built small HW disposal facilities on two aban-
doned Titan missile sites in Idaho.931
Many civilian sites might also be suitable. Some former
Superfund sites are being reused for purposes such as transporta-
tion centers, industrial parks, and shopping centers, but that is the
exception rather than the rule.932 The taint of contamination has
killed development on many sites. 933 In the 1970s, a few small
hazardous waste treatment facilities were built at vacated industrial
plants,934 but this does not seem to have occurred since the enact-
ment of CERCLA, except at sites already used for waste
management.
The idea that some places will always be contaminated, and
will become "sacrifice zones," has been widely attacked.935 How-
ever, the permanent physical alteration of large areas of land is
hardly a novel human activity. Lake Mead, the reservoir created
by Hoover Dam on the Colorado River, is 175 square miles, and if
the area were drained the land would still be covered by many feet
930. TERA CORP., PART 361 CERTIFICATE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY AND PUBLIC
NECESSITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE ARC
PYROLYSIS PROJECT, MODEL CITY, NIAGARA COUNTY, NEW YORK 2-5 (1985).
931. O'HARE ET AL., supra note 11, at 144-46.
932. See DEBORAH COONEY ET AL., REVIVAL OF CONTAMINATED INDUSTRIAL SIS:
CASE STUDIES (1992); HAZARDOUS WASTE ENG'G RESEARCH LAB., U.S. EPA, PUB. No. EPA/
600/2-86/066, RECLAMATION AND REDEVELOPMENT OF CONTAMINATED LAND: VOL. 1, U.S.
CASE STUDIES (1986); Kathleen M. Martin, Siting on Contaminated Property: Development
and Cleanup Through Public/Private Cooperation, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1993,
at 20, 20; Tom Arrandale, Developing the Decontaminated City, GOVERNING, Dec. 1992, at
44; Jim Ford et al., Contaminated Sites: An Overlooked Site-Selection Opportunity?, INDUS.
DEv. SEC., June 1991, at 643; Regional Transportation Center Planned by EPA in Restoration
of Massachusetts Superfund Site, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1641 (Oct. 23, 1992);
Rodolfo N. Salcedo & Delbert H. Dettmann, Cities Wrestle With Abandoned Properties, PoL-
LUTION ENG'O, June 1, 1993, at 76.
933. See Mank, supra note 688, at 255-56 (regulatory impediments to redevelopment of
contaminated property); Elizabeth S. Kiesche, A Smaller Role for the Chemical Industry in
New Jersey, CHEMICAL WK., July 22, 1992, at 7 (observing that New Jersey's Environmental
Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA), NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 to -17 (West 1991), has
reportedly resulted in the abandonment of several industrial sites); Keith Schneider, Rules
Easing for Urban Toxic Cleanups, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at A12; Matthew L. Wald,
Trenton Acts to Loosen Industrial Cleanup Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1993, at B1 (asserting
that the New Jersey State Legislature weakens ECRA because of concerns about its negative
effect on economic development).
934. Farkas, supra note 347, at 453 & n.8.
935. See, e.g., David Evans, Nuclear Cleanup Falling into Gap, CH. TRIB., Sept. 12,
1991, at 29; Paul Hoversten, Some Military Bases Will Never Be Cleaned Up, USA TODAY,
July 5, 1991, at 7A; Satchell, supra note 74, at 20; Steven W. Setzer, Army's Green Is More
than Its Uniforms, ENG'G NEws-REc., Nov. 30, 1992, at 30.
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of sediment.936 The artificial Lake Volta in Ghana, formed by the
Akosombo Dam in 1965, inundated 3275 square miles of land.937
A decade of hydrogen bomb tests seems to have made the coral
island of Bikini, in the Marshall Islands, permanently uninhabit-
able, despite massive cleanup efforts.938 Many sites contaminated
by nuclear weapons production and other military and civilian
activities will never be completely clean.939 Although we must
regret the initial loss of land, the past cannot be undone. We
should focus now on minimizing the risks at existing sites and
avoiding the contamination of new sites. Building a limited
number of centralized HW/RW treatment and disposal facilities on
already contaminated land seems to be the way to achieve this
goal.
3. Finding Volunteer Communities
Under my proposal, a site for a centralized disposal facility
would not merely have to be physically suitable; it would also have
to be acceptable to the neighboring community. As noted above,
numerous communities in the United States have volunteered for
HW/RW facilities.940 How does one find such communities and
secure their consent?
In 1984, a consulting firm hired by the California Waste Man-
agement Board said that disposal facilities were more likely to be
successfully sited in rural areas where the residents were older, had
an educational level of high school or lower, were low-income,
Catholic, politically conservative with a free-market orientation,
and had occupations such as farmer, rancher, or other jobs the
report called "nature exploitative." 941 This characterization gener-
936. C.W. Thornthwaite, Modification of Rural Microclimates, in 2 MAN's ROLE IN
CHANGING THE FACE OF THE EARTH 567, 572 (William L. Thomas, Jr. ed., 1956).
937. NEw COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2910 (William H. Harris & Judith S. Levy eds.,
1975).
938. BARTLE.rr & STEELE, supra note 187, at 331-33. A 1958 nuclear waste accident in
Kyshtym, Soviet Union seems to have had the same effect. Id. at 72.
939. In fact, the only hope these sites would ever have of complete purity would be to
excavate huge quantities of soil (a task with unknown health and safety impacts) and replace it
with clean fill. The removed soil would, of course, have to go to some other disposal facility.
See Safety, supra note 225, at 169 (remarks of Sen. Glenn); see also id. at 345 (statement of
Keith 0. Fultz, GAO) ("[Slome sites may be irreversibly contaminated, and DOE may have to
place them in long-term institutional care ....").
940. See supra text accompanying notes 721-35. The World Health Organization is
currently considering a proposed "code of practice" for HW facility site selection that recom-
mends a voluntary siting process,
941. William Glaberson, Coping in the Age of "NIMBY", N.Y. TIM s, June 19, 1988,
§ 3, at 1, 25.
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ated considerable outrage, particularly in the Catholic press.942 A
few years later, Lawrence Summers, chief economist of the World
Bank, suggested in a memo that it made some sense to encourage
the migration of dirty industries to Third World countries, where
people were more complacent and needed the money. This so
annoyed the incoming Clinton administration that the memo may
have cost Summers the job of chairman of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers. 943 The lesson here is that it is neither possible nor
wise to characterize the communities that might accept HW/RW
facilities. Some communities have cultures that make them eager
to attract defense-related industries, 944 and other communities (per-
haps some of the same) are amenable to HW/RW. Predicting
which communities these will be is very difficult, although some
have suggested that areas with heavy industry already are likely
candidates.945 A better approach to finding volunteer communities
is simply to ask.
Herbert Inhaber has suggested a procedure he calls a "reverse
Dutch auction," which would presumably be carried out through
the newspapers. The auctioneer would propose a compensation
amount that would be paid to a volunteer community. Any county
that thought it might be willing to accept the facility for that
amount would bid. For example, the auctioneer might declare a
bid of ten million dollars and keep it open for a month. If no bids
were received, the bid amount would be raised to twenty million
dollars the second month, thirty million dollars the third month,
and so on until a bid was received. (This is similar to the auction
sometimes conducted by airlines seeking volunteers to give up
their seats on overbooked flights.) A bid would have to specify a
proposed site. Once a bid was received, the auction would stop
until the site was studied to determine if it was physically accepta-
ble. During this study period, bidding communities would receive
funds from the state to hire their own consultants to do their own
942. Crim, supra note 619, at 132. Another study found that neighborhoods which
accepted mental health facilities "are those in which residents have few children, are well-
educated, and predominantly English-speaking; where the population is relatively transient, the
population density relatively high; and where there is a mixture of land uses with commercial
development and public open space in addition to residential areas". Armour, supra note 381,
at 20-21.
943. Timothy Noah, Gore Vows to Block Incinerator Start-Up, Suggesting He'll Play an
Activist Role, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1992, at B6.
944. ANN MARKUSEN ET AL., THE RIsE OF THE GUNBELT: THE MILrrARY REMAPPmNG OF
INDUSTRuAL AMERICA 239-42 (1991).
945. MORPLL & MAGORIAN, supra note 10, at 57-58, 154; GREENBERG & ANDERSON,
supra note 309, at 166-67.
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studies, and the communities could withdraw their bids at any
time. Communities that did not want the facility under any cir-
cumstances would simply not bid.946
This procedure raises several questions:
1. What mechanism would ensure that the facility is endorsed
by the whole community, and not just a (biased/unrepresentative/
corrupt) governing body? The best procedure, and the one actually
used in seeking volunteers for several solid waste facilities,947 is a
referendum of the entire electorate after the detailed studies but
before the final decision.
2. What is the geographic extent of the electorate? Inhaber
suggests a county. The county should consent, but sometimes
there will be a politically isolated municipality within the county;
for instance, the county could be dominated by one party but the
municipality by another. Thus, the referendum should be required
to succeed in both the county and the municipality where the pro-
posed site is located. If the proposed site is near a border, people
in the adjoining jurisdiction need a voice as well. One method to
provide this might be to include in the electorate all voters outside
the voting jurisdiction but within a certain radius of the facility.
3. What considerations should be given to close neighbors of
the proposed site who are adamantly opposed to the facility but
lose the referendum? People within a close radius of the site
should not be trapped; they should be offered the preproposal value
of their property, plus relocation costs. This would follow the
experience of several chemical plants that have bought out all the
homes around their plants to create buffer zones.948 One small
946. Herbert Inhaber, A Market-Based Solution to the Problem of Nuclear and Toxic
Waste Disposal, 41 J. AIR WASTE MGMT. ASS'N 808 (1991); Herbert Inhaber, Can We Find a
Volunteer Nuclear Waste Community?, PuB. Urm. FORT., July 15, 1991, at 19; Inhaber, supra
note 2, at 52, 61-62. Other auction-like mechanisms are described in Mitchell & Carson,
supra note 468, at 288-89; Swallow et al., supra note 344, at 294.
947. See supra text accompanying notes 721-35.
948. See, e.g., Neighbors of Texas Plant Offered Buy-Out by Defendant in $100 Million
Injury Suit, 7 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 461 (Sept. 16, 1992); Jon Bowermaster, A
Town Called Morrisonville, AuDuBON, July-Aug. 1993, at 42; Keith Schneider, Safety Fears
Prompt Plants to Buy Out Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1990, at 1; Caleb Solomon, How a
Neighborhood Talked Fina Refinery into Buying It Out, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1991, at Al.
Several agencies have developed guidelines for minimum buffer areas around hazardous facili-
ties, especially those presenting an explosion or fire risk. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REs.
tit. 6, § 361.7(b)(9)(ii)(a) (hazardous waste facility siting regulations mandate consideration of
buffer zones established in the American Table of Distances for Storage of Explosives);
Anderson & Greenberg, supra note 344, at 226. The more extensive use of buffer zones is
urged in Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal: 'Dead Zones' and Toxic Death Risk Index
Taxes, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 786-91 (1992).
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community of twenty-two homes in Baltimore was voluntarily
bought out and relocated to make way for a new HW landfill
nearby.949 To be sure, forced relocation from a home can impose
serious psychic costs above and beyond any purely financial costs,
especially when the residents consider themselves part of a com-
munity,950 or when the residents have a limited range of job oppor-
tunities and housing alternatives.95 1 Perhaps some premium above
fair market value should be offered.952
4. What would be done with the compensation money?
Those neighbors that want to move should have a priority claim to
being bought out. Beyond that, the governing bodies of the county
and the municipality should initially determine the intended uses of
the compensation (for example, tax relief, new schools and hospi-
tals, and more police and teachers) and then include the proposed
uses in the referendum question. Unless the money is spent on
capital facilities, it should probably be made available over a
period of years to prevent current residents from receiving all the
benefits, because the facility will affect future residents for many
years to come.
4. Needs Assessment
The facility siting process will require specific information on
the nature, quantities, and generation patterns of waste. This
assessment should address all RCRA hazardous waste, all regu-
lated radioactive waste, and other categories of non-RCRA or
RCRA-exempt waste for which a national disposal market and sig-
nificant interstate siting conflicts exist. Examples include incinera-
949. McKewen & Sloan, supra note 334, at 249-50.
950. See BRION, supra note 2, at 175, 181, 198; EDELSTEIN, supra note 354, at 62; John
E. Seley & Julian Wolpert, Equity and Location, in EQurry IssuEs, supra note 180, at 69, 80.
951. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
CoLUM. L. REv. 346, 420 (1990).
952. Large-scale relocation is hardly unusual for major public projects. Construction of
the Oak Ridge facility displaced about 1000 families. JOHNSON & JACKSON, supra note 314, at
8. About 1500 people were displaced for construction of the Hanford Reservation. MICHELE
S. GERBER, ON THE HOME FRONT: THE COLD WAR LEGACY OF THE HANFORD NUCLEAR SITE
22-23 (1992). Some 4000 apartments were condemned to build one approach road to the
Triborough Bridge in New York City. ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT
MosES AND THE FALL OF NEw YORK 344 (1974). The Tennessee Valley Authority's Ken-
tucky Reservoir project relocated 2609 families and 102 schools, churches and businesses
from a 300,000-acre area. U.S. TVA, TECHNICAL REPORT No. 13, A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT
ON THE PLANNING, DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, AND INITIAL OPERATION OF THE KENTUCKY PRO-
jncr 545-46 (1951); see also Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455
(Mich. 1981) (upholding condemnation of community in Detroit to make way for new produc-
tion facility for General Motors).
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tor ash, PCBs, medical waste, and asbestos waste. Those waste
streams that are usually handled locally, for instance municipal
solid waste, sewage sludge, and dredge spoil, would be excluded at
this stage, even if there are occasional interstate conflicts.
For the waste streams included in the process, the next step
would be to prepare a disposal needs assessment. The EPA would
take the lead in assessing non-radioactive wastes, and the NRC
would assess radioactive wastes. The needs assessment would
have these elements:
a. Current Generation Patterns: The assessment would
describe the quantities of wastes generated, where the generation
occurs geographically, and the physical form of the wastes when
they leave the site of generation. Waste streams disposed of on-
site would not be the concern of the federal allocation process if, in
the view of the state environmental agency, the on-site methods are
environmentally satisfactory. Similarly, if the waste is treated on-
site before being shipped off-site for disposal, then the form of the
material as it leaves the site is what is relevant to the assessment,
subject to the same proviso.
b. Future Generation Projections: The assessment should
include projections of how much of this waste will be generated in
the future. This will require predictions of future patterns of eco-
nomic growth and technological development. Although this is a
complex undertaking, it is hardly novel. Waste disposal compa-
nies engaged in long-term planning, and financial analysts assess-
ing the stock of those companies, perform such analyses routinely.
Similar work is also performed in preparing permit applications
and environmental impact statements for disposal facilities. Many
states have their own hazardous waste planning processes that have
addressed these questions. Thus, there is a large body of existing
research and analysis on which these projections could be based.
The projections would include not only recurrent waste streams,
such as waste from ongoing industrial processes, but also remedial
waste from the cleanup of past contamination.
c. Future Waste Generation Targets: The assessment would
also establish goals for waste reduction by adjusting future waste
generation projections downward to reflect waste minimization,
recycling, and other methods to reduce the amount of waste requir-
ing disposal. An important goal of the process is to provide for the
sound disposal of the waste that must be disposed, but not to create
so much disposal capacity that waste generation will be
encouraged. Industry-by-industry analyses of opportunities for
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waste minimization will be necessary in calculating these targets.
This is similar to the processes used by the EPA in formulating
technology-based effluent limitations under the Clean Water
Act,953 land disposal restrictions under RCRA,9 54 and new source
performance standards955 and air toxics limitations956 under the
Clean Air Act-processes that have already given the EPA a large
data base about the production techniques used in virtually every
major industry. Congress would have to determine the degree of
technological stringency that will be required for the waste mini-
mization technology adopted. The federal pollution control stat-
utes have a large grab bag of concepts using combinations of
"reasonably," "best" or "maximum" and "available," "achievable,"
"practicable" or "demonstrated" (or similar words) to modify
"technology." The planning efforts now underway pursuant to the
Pollution Prevention Act957 will help answer this question and will
provide much of the required industry-specific information. In
particular, the EPA's Source Reduction Review Project is initially
focusing its study on seventeen industrial categories. 958
d. Current disposal facilities: It will be necessary to inven-
tory the nation's waste disposal facilities, their present and future
capacity, and their regulatory status; for example, whether they are
under orders to close. EPA's RCRA data base and commercially
produced directories already contain most of this information. 9 9
Facilities operating under RCRA interim status and unable to
obtain full RCRA Part B permits should be excluded from future
capacity projections, because they should ordinarily be presumed
to be environmentally unsatisfactory. Facilities under construction
or in the permit application stage should be inventoried, with an
assessment of the likelihood that they will come into operation
and, if so, when.
e. Future disposal needs: The inventory of current and pro-
posed disposal facilities will allow a projection of future disposal
953. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1988).
954. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(g) (1988).
955. Id. § 7411 (1988).
956. Id. § 7412(d) (1988).
957. Id. §§ 13,101-13,109 (1988).
958. Lynn L. Bergeson, The SRRP: Making Pollution Prevention Work, PoLLUTnON
ENG'G, July 1993, at 73.
959. E.g., ENviRoNmENTrA. INo. LTD., ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION DIRECTORY
(1993); McCoy & Assocs., 1993 Outlook for Commercial Hazardous Waste Management




capacity. A comparison to the future generation targets will allow
a projection of future capacity shortfall: the deficit (if any), per
type of waste, of future waste disposal capacity under future waste
generation, even after the use of waste minimization. The deficit
projections should specify the type of facilities necessary, for
instance incinerator, landfill, or aqueous treatment. This determi-
nation will require knowledge about the treatment technology
involved with each type of waste; the EPA has already compiled
such information for most RCRA wastes as part of preparing its
land disposal restrictions under HSWA.
The draft needs assessments from the EPA and the NRC
should be distributed for public comment. This will ensure that all
the affected industries and localities will be able to check the accu-
racy of the data and assumptions. The final needs assessments,
prepared by EPA and NRC after receiving the public comments,
will reveal what new waste disposal capacity needs to be created.
A somewhat similar process, limited to recurrent streams of
RCRA hazardous waste, is now underway pursuant to the capacity
assurance provision of SARA. In May 1993, the EPA released its
Guidance for Capacity Assurance Planning,960 requiring each state
to submit base-year (1991) data and projections of commercial
hazardous waste capacity and demand for the applicable waste
streams generated within that state. This information is due from
the states by May 1, 1994. Based on this data, EPA will project, to
the year 2013, whether national shortfalls in disposal capacity will
exist. If national shortfalls are projected, then states with demand
exceeding supply in the national shortfall categories will be
required to proceed to Phase II: the submission of waste minimi-
zation plans and information on permitted but not-yet-built facili-
ties. If, after this information is assessed, national shortfalls are
still projected, then the states will be required to go to Phase III:
submission of plans to eliminate the gap between supply and
demand by added waste minimization, new disposal capacity, or
interstate agreements. The timing of Phases II and Il has not yet
been determined. The data developed during this process will go a
long way toward providing the information on RCRA hazardous
wastes needed for the federal allocation process. Furthermore, the
statistical methodologies used will be helpful for non-RCRA
960. OFFICE OF SOUD WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, supra note 326.
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The needs assessment prepared by the EPA and the NRC will
reveal how much new disposal capacity will be required. This
determination will certainly address capacity for high-level and
low-level radioactive waste, and perhaps for other categories of
RCRA and non-RCRA wastes. Once the capacity needs are
known, the process of allocating the satisfaction of those needs
between the states should be assigned to an independent federal
entity, perhaps called the Federal Waste Disposal Commission
(FWDC).9 62 The FWDC would have a thankless task: allocating
hated facilities between reluctant states. To avoid unending, fruit-
less debate and rampant political interference, the FWDC should
be a politically independent commission whose recommendations
are subject only to approval or rejection of the entire package by
Congress, under the model of the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act.963 The Defense Base Closure Commission cre-
ated by this Act has performed admirably in carrying out a simi-
larly unpopular mission. Composed of distinguished people with
no future political aspirations, this Commission has been able to
make base closure decisions on the merits, grounded on detailed
information provided by the Department of Defense, and its rec-
ommendations have been accepted by Congress, despite the pre-
dictably outraged speeches on the floor of the House and Senate by
members whose districts lost bases.964
The FWDC would have the job of determining what needed
capacity should be provided by what states.965 Although it would
961. Mazmanian & Morell, supra note 7, at 196-97.
962. See also MASON WILLRICH & RICHARD K. LESTER, RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGE-
MENT AND REGULATION 119 (1977) (proposing the creation of national Radioactive Waste
Authority for HLW and TRU).
963. Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1808 (1988) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note
(1988)); see Specter v. Garrett, 971 F.2d 936, 939 (3d Cir.), vacated, O'Keefe v. Specter, 113
S. Ct. 455 (1992); County of Seneca v. Cheney, 806 F. Supp. 387, 387 (W.D.N.Y. 1992),
vacated, 992 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1993).
964. See Natalie Hanlon, Military Base Closings: A Study of Government by Commis-
sion, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 331, 339-40 (1991); Eric Schmitt, A Mission Accomplished: In
Deciding Which Military Bases to Close, Commission Was a Fortress Against Politics, N.Y.
TimEs, June 29, 1993, at A10.
965. See GREEN, supra note 37, at 91-93 (suggests various possible mechanisms for
allocating among the states the obligation to create various amounts of disposal capacity for
RCRA HW, largely proportionate to the amounts generated).
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announce its decisions all in one package, it should go about its
internal deliberations in a step-by-step fashion. Because Congress
has already decided, as matters of national policy, that HLW
should go to Yucca Mountain in Nevada and TRU should go to
WIPP in New Mexico, this should serve as the starting point for
state allocation, and no further capacity should be allocated to
either of those states. If the NRC believes that a separate reposi-
tory should be established for the remains of decommissioned
nuclear power plants, the FWDC would have to find a state where
that repository would go. The NRC would specify the minimum
physical conditions that would be necessary for such a repository,
and the FWDC would have to allocate the repository to a state that
had an ample supply of land meeting those conditions. The NRC
could also be asked to specify an optimal general location: that is,
the region of the country where the facility should go, determined
on the basis of safety and cost, without reference to politics. As
noted below, sophisticated computer programs have been devel-
oped to include transport risk in this kind of calculation.966 This
specification would play heavily in the FWDC's decision. For
example, inasmuch as most commercial nuclear power plants are
located east of the Mississippi,9 67 this repository would probably
be located in an eastern state that contains such plants.
In next allocating repositories for LLRW, the FWDC should
again look to the NRC for guidance on the physically optimal
number and general location of LLRW facilities. I suspect the
optimal number will be either two or three. If it is two, then there
should be one in the East and one in the West; if three, there
should also be one close to the center of the country. As it hap-
pens, California, North Carolina and Texas are all well along in the
process of selecting LLRW sites,9 68 so the FWDC's task here may
be fairly simple.
The process of finding a site for a monitored retrievable stor-
age facility for HLW is already underway.969 If a site has been
selected by the time the FWDC gets to work, that state should be
spared further allocations. Once the permanent HLW repository is
opened and the MRS facility has been emptied, decades from now,
the MRS state might again be eligible for a future allocation. If no
966. See infra text accompanying notes 995-96.
967. OcFC oF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., PUB. No. OTA-E-575, AGING
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: MANAGING PLANT LIFE AND DECOMMISSIONING 7 (1993).
968. See supra text accompanying notes 245-48.
969. See supra text accompanying note 558.
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site has been selected, and it appears that the initial volunteer pro-
cess is not going to work, then the FWDC would allocate this facil-
ity to a state, again looking to the NRC for guidance on physically
optimal location.
Uranium mill tailings sites should be addressed next. These
wastes are extremely voluminous. Thus, unlike arrangements for
HLW and LLRW, long-distance transport is not feasible. Once
again, the NRC would designate the optimal number of facilities
and their general locations. It is virtually certain that these facili-
ties should be allocated to the western states in which the largest
mill tailing piles are located. For this physical reason, a mill tail-
ing repository for in-state waste might be located in a state that
already has a HLW, TRU, or MRS facility, as an exception to the
rule that those states would be exempt from future allocation. If a
national policy decision has been made by then to develop reposi-
tories for naturally occurring radioactive material, such sites would
be allocated on a similar basis.
By now all the major radioactive waste streams will have
been allocated. The next subject of the FWDC's deliberations
would be the nonradioactive waste streams, including RCRA haz-
ardous waste; PCBs, which by historical accident are regulated
under TSCA rather than RCRA; asbestos; medical waste; and any
other waste streams under FWDC's jurisdiction, as well as mixed
radioactive and hazardous waste. The EPA will have declared
whether there are any nationwide capacity shortages. If there are,
the EPA should also reveal whether there are any unique geologi-
cal or other physical characteristics that must be met by a site for
the required facility. It is unlikely that this will disqualify any
states; the EPA has already promulgated location standards for
RCRA and TSCA disposal facilities,970 and on their face they do
not require, for example, an arid climate that would only be found
in the West.
Based on the estimates of future waste generation and future
waste disposal capacity calculated earlier by the EPA, the FWDC
would determine which of the states still eligible for allocations
(those without a radioactive waste disposal facility) are projected
to become net exporters of nonradioactive FWDC waste streams,
which primarily covers RCRA hazardous waste. The largest net
exporters would receive the first allocations of new disposal capac-




ity. The FWDC would allocate the largest new facility, measured
in terms of tons per year, to the largest projected exporter; the sec-
ond largest new facility to the second-largest projected exporter;
and so on down the list, until every needed facility had been allo-
cated to a state.
Under this allocative method, large centralized facilities
would likely go to the largest exporting states; small transfer sta-
tions might go to importing states. In the following circumstances,
however, the FWDC could vary from this otherwise mechanical
process:
- the if EPA advised that special physical characteristics
were needed for a particular kind of facility, and the presumptively
designated state for that facility lacked those characteristics;
- if most of a particular waste stream is projected to be gen-
erated in places so distant from the target state that it would be
clearly unsafe or inefficient to send it to that state; or
- if it is unfair to assess exports purely on a tonnage basis,
because some of the wastes involved have high volume but low
toxicity, or vice versa.
It is also possible that the rule against allocation of
nonradioactive facilities to states with RW facilities would be
breached in one other circumstance. As noted, California and
Texas might get LLRW disposal facilities. Both of these are large
states in which a great deal of HW is generated. If they are also
projected to be significant HW exporters, it might be fair to allo-
cate to them some HW facilities if doing so offered clear safety or
efficiency advantages.
Once all the needed facilities had been allocated to states, the
FWDC would issue its comprehensive report on where all the RW
and HW facilities would go. The report would be submitted to
Congress, which would be required to vote yes or no on the entire
package. The statute establishing the FWDC would mandate that
Congress must consider the package as a whole and may not mod-
ify the FWDC's recommendations.
Because every state generates HW and because every state
exports HW to other states,97 1 every state should have some dispo-
sal obligations; no state should think it can get a free ride. The
possibility of a free ride-the knowledge that only one state in a
compact region would probably have to host a facility-is one of




the major reasons for the failure of the federal siting efforts for
LLRW.972 States would be given credit in this allocation process
for existing private HW/RW disposal facilities within their bor-
ders, such as Emelle and Barnwell, inasmuch as such facilities will
tend to make these states importers rather than exporters.
After Congress has acted, states should then be able to trade
allocations among themselves.973 The National Governors Associ-
ation or a similar group could establish a trading mechanism.974
States might also want to trade disposal rights for waste streams
not within the FWDC's jurisdiction, such as MSW; if New Jersey,
for instance, wanted to export municipal trash to Indiana, then
Indiana might agree if it could send some of its hazardous waste
back to New Jersey.
Once the state-by-state allocations are established, each state
should have the responsibility to find the necessary sites for any
newly required facilities. Perhaps the state would look for volun-
teer communities using Inhaber's bidding process. Land on federal
facilities would be made available to the extent it was physically
suitable.975 In any state that shirked its responsibility, the FWDC
could step in and find sites itself. This resembles the process under
the Clean Air Act in which a federal implementation plan can be
prepared for any state that fails to submit a satisfactory state imple-
mentation plan.976 Such a role for the FWDC would involve a lim-
ited violation of the antipreemption principle, but that may be
necessary in order to induce states to provide sufficient incentives
972. See generally Rabe, supra note 354.
973. Frank J. Popper has suggested allowing communities to trade all kinds of locally
undesirable land uses; for example, a neighborhood that agreed to accept a HW facility could
decline the next three halfway houses. Frank J. Popper, LULUs and Their Blockage: The
Nature of the Problem, The Outline of the Solutions, in CONFRONTING REGIONAL CHAL-
LENGEs: APPROACHES TO LULUs, GROWTH, AND OTHER VEXING GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS 13,
24 (Joseph F. DiMento & LeRoy Graymer eds., 1991).
974. Some evidence exists that, in a few instances, states have informally allocated bur-
dens among themselves. See Colglazier & English, supra note 10, at 647 n.28 (discussing the
tacit agreement between Washington and Oregon by which Washington will continue to host
an LLRW facility for the region, and Oregon will continue to host an HW facility). On the
other hand, in meetings of the Southeast Compact (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia) to pick a host state for an LLRW
facility, Alabama contended that, because it had the Emelle HW landfill, it should not have to
receive LLRW. The other states rejected this argument, in part because considering Emelle
would require consideration of then existing or proposed large-scale waste facilities in the
other states as well. See ENGLISH, supra note 10, at 121.
975. Such land should be sold or leased to the state or the new facility operator at the
prevailing price for comparable industrial land, so as not to create a hidden subsidy.
976. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (1988).
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for volunteer communities to step forward.977 Additionally, the
FWDC might set caps on how much waste each facility could
accept to avoid the creation of excess capacity that might
encourage waste generation.
Once sites were selected, the states would be responsible for
overseeing the detailed characterization studies and the permitting
and construction of the facilities, all under the applicable guide-
lines of the EPA or the NRC.978 Local communities should be
given technical assistance grants to participate in the process. Per-
haps each facility would have its own board of visitors, with fed-
eral, state, and local representation. This board should have full
access to the site and its records and could conduct inspections at
will to ensure that all environmental standards are met. It would
also regularly meet with facility management to discuss mutual
concerns, and it could make public these discussions if its recom-
mendations were not followed.
State compliance with the FWDC's allocation would be
ensured largely by the structure of the national system. A state's
failure to meet its FWDC-set allocation of waste disposal would be
penalized by other states, which could exclude its waste from their
FWDC-allocated facilities. A similar sanction for states failing to
site facilities was upheld under the LLRW PAA.
9 79
To advance the goal of closing existing older facilities, private
companies should be able to relocate to FWDC-allocated sites if
they (or someone from whom they bought capacity rights) shut
down older, environmentally deficient disposal units. The receiv-
ing state and locality first have to consent to this move. This idea
of disposal capacity trading is based on the emissions offset trading
program under the Clean Air Act.980 Many disposal companies are
currently in constant conflict with their neighbors and would prob-
ably embrace this option of new, preselected sites. To encourage
these moves, perhaps the older facilities with the greatest environ-
mental problems should be required to move after a few years,
such as when their existing permits expire.
977. Perhaps FDWC-selected sites would have to be on land already owned by the fed-
eral government, if any such land is physically suitable for this purpose.
978. HLW and TRU repositories would be an exception to the rule of state oversight;
they would have to be in federal hands because they will contain fissile materials.
979. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct 2408, 2414 (1992).




Actual construction and operation of facilities could well be
contracted to the private sector. Private companies could also
attempt to site and construct new commercial facilities above and
beyond those found necessary by the FWDC. In such cases, how-
ever, the firms would be on their own and would not be able to rely
on any preemption of local land use controls.
C. Evaluating the Proposed Siting Process
1. Needed Disposal Capacity
In evaluating the existing siting processes, I have shown that,
despite some regional disparities, no major national shortage of
hazardous waste disposal capacity exists, although some old facili-
ties should be replaced with new ones. My proposed alternative of
local control, state responsibility, and national allocation is
designed to eliminate any remaining shortages of capacity, antici-
pate future ones, and replace aging units. The FWDC would iden-
tify shortages and allocate between the states the responsibility to
site facilities to meet these needs. Because it ordinarily takes five
to eight years to site and build a new waste disposal facility, 91 the
task should begin soon.
Without such hidden subsidies as zoning overrides, those
wishing to site new facilities will have to negotiate with local gov-
ernments in volunteer communities for siting approvals. These
local governments, to secure support from their constituents, might
well require the disposal companies to guarantee neighboring prop-
erty values and to compensate otherwise for any injury, thereby
internalizing many of the externalities of such facilities.982 This is
a natural market mechanism, not an artificial one with its attendant
transaction costs and uncertainties. The proposed approach will
increase the cost of building new facilities. However, much of the
cost will be passed along to waste generators in the form of higher
disposal prices and will lead to decreased waste production.983
981. OrmcE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 136, at 342.
982. See Margaret A. Walls & Barbra L. Marcus, Should Congress Allow States to
Restrict Waste Imports?, RESOURCES (REsouRcEs FOR THE FuTuRE), Winter 1993, at 7 (argu-
ing that host community fees internalize the external costs of siting waste facilities).
983. There is a greater societal interest in high disposal prices for production wastes than
for remedial wastes (i.e., waste that already exists, often lying dormant in the ground), because
the cleanup and disposal of remedial wastes should be encouraged. One possible approach
would be to impose a tax on the production of HW and LLRW and use the proceeds to subsi-
dize the cleanup and disposal of remedial waste. However, this would have high transaction




Any threat that higher prices will cause more illegal dumping, a
concern that was shown above to be largely misplaced,984 would be
addressed through heightened enforcement. Hidden subsidies from
inadequate tort remedies would be reduced, to the extent that the
older facilities, which cause most of the nuisances, are shut down
and their capacity traded to new FWDC sites. One important
uncompensated cost, psychic injury, should decline greatly,
because the new facilities would be in volunteer communities and
any neighbors that still opposed the siting would be fully compen-
sated for moving.
To encourage further the replacement of old facilities with
new ones, consideration should be given to creating a tort-like
remedy for facility neighbors, so that external costs cannot be so
readily ignored. Expanding the definition of recoverable "response
costs" under CERCLA is one possible approach.985
2. Protecting Health and the Environment
The proposed system's method of capacity trading will reduce
the number of old facilities, which tend to have the worst health
and environmental impacts. To the extent that the new facilities
are located on already contaminated land, such as military, NWC,
or uranium mill tailings sites, agricultural and virgin land will be
spared degradation. The aesthetic impact of these facilities will
also be reduced, because they will be located in settings that are
already industrial.
The allocations assigned by the FWDC are likely to lead to
the creation of centralized, integrated waste management facilities
based on the Scandinavian and German model.986 A state given
the responsibility to handle waste streams requiring five different
kinds of processes will have an easier time siting one big rather
than five small facilities. Such centralized facilities have several
advantages for health and the environment over a much larger
number of smaller, decentralized facilities:
- the available sites with the best physical characteristics
could be used for multiple purposes;
- specialized forms of waste treatment can be provided,
making it more likely that each load of waste will be optimally
treated;
984. See supra part IV.C.2.
985. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
986. See supra notes 910-11 and accompanying text.
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- with the much higher revenues per site, a higher caliber of
management and technical staff can be provided;
- employees can enjoy better on-site medical care and
receive better training and supervision in safe work practices;
- treatment residues are more likely to find an on-site use,
rather than requiring landfilling;
- each centralized facility can be assigned a full-time staff of
governmental monitors, some with specialized functions and some
accountable to the local community;
- public exposure to contamination will be reduced, because
ordinarily one large facility will have fewer neighbors within a
given radius than will multiple small facilities;
- a larger buffer zone around the facility will be economi-
cally feasible; and
- only one site, as opposed to several, would be subjected to
possible groundwater contamination.
Persons living near existing contamination, such as CERCLA
sites, would also benefit, because the proposed system, by ensuring
adequate disposal capacity for remedial wastes, should expedite
cleanup. Similarly, the centralized facilities might reduce the
amount of on-site disposal at factories, thereby benefitting the fac-
tory neighbors.
Transportation poses the biggest problem with a centralized
system. The risk of transportation accidents is a very controversial
issue, both legally987 and politically.98 8 Accidents are an inevitable
feature of any system of transportation. On average, trucks are
involved in accidents once every 400,000 miles of travel.989
987. See National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 910
F.2d 713, 720 (1lth Cir. 1990), modified, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir.) (concerning complaints
from Alabama about truck traffic to Emelle facility), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (199 1); City
of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 736 (2d Cir. 1983) (denying
New York City's attempt to prevent transportation of nuclear waste from Brookhaven National
Laboratory through City highways), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1055 (1984). See generally Stan
Millan & Andrew J. Harrison Jr., A Primer on Hazardous Materials Transportation Law of the
1990s: The Awakening, 22 Envfl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,583 (1992); Edward A. Nolfi,
Annotation, State or Local Regulation of Transportation of Hazardous Materials as Pre-
Empted by Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (49 USCS §§ 1801 et seq.), 78 A.L.R.
Fed. 289 (1993).
988. 131 CONG. REc. Hi1,081 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino
concerning trucking of hazardous waste to facility in his district); Gerald Jacob & Andrew
Kirby, On the Road to Ruin: The Transport of Military Cargoes, in HIDDEN DANGERS, supra
note 85, at 71, 77-81; Zimmerman, supra note 623, at 207.
989. OFFICE OF TECH. AssassmENT, U.S. CONG., PUB. No. OTA-SET-304, TRANsPoR-
TAMON OF HAzARDous MATERIALS 103 (1986). The EPA has devised formulae for the frac-
tion of the annual quantity of liquids expected to be released in transportation mishaps. For
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Between 1971 and 1985, there were 167 transportation accidents
(mostly on highways) involving 2602 packages of radioactive
materials; a total of 67 packages experienced some release of their
contents. 990 The three worst accidents all involved the rupture of
fifty-five-gallon drums of yellowcake, the product of uranium
mills. 991 To put this in perspective, of all hazardous materials ship-
ments annually (numerically, not by volume), about one percent
involve RCRA hazardous waste and about two percent contain
radioactive materials; the most shipments by far involve gasoline,
with chemical products or intermediates a distant second.992
Hazardous waste transportation is a big business. The cost is
about $0.23 per ton per mile,993 and this adds up very quickly.
More than half of the six billion dollars spent on hazardous waste
services in 1990 went to transportation. 994 Sophisticated models
have been developed to determine the least costly and least risky
routes to a given set of disposal facilities.995 Some models go fur-
ther and also identify ideal facility locations, as well as transporta-
tion routes.9 96 Unfortunately, all these models rely on a very large
bulk liquids carried in tanker trucks, the fraction released is predicted to be (9.5 x 10- 8 x D) +
(7.6 x 10-6); for liquids contained in drums on flatbed trucks, the fraction is (2.4 x 10- 6 x D) +
(2.9 x 10-4) (where D is the distance, in miles, to the treatment or disposal facility). OFFICE OF
POLICY, PLANNING & EVALUATION & OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S.
EPA, POLLUTION PREVENTION BENEFITS MANUAL C-2 (1989).
990. Transportation of Hazardous Materials: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Public Works & Transp., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 273 (1988); see also id. at 760, 780 (discuss-
ing six accidents that involved spent fuel rods).
991. Id. at 274.
992. OFFcE oF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 989, at 35, 41.
993. OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, U.S. EPA, 1986-1987 SURVEY OF SELECTED FIRMS IN
THE COMMERCIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY: FINAL REPORT 3-19 (1988);
cf. HAMMrrr & REUTER, supra note 486 (using figure of $0.20/ton/mile).
994. Hazardous Waste Industry Grows with Public Concern, CHEMICAL MARKETING
REP., Jan. 26, 1991, at 9. This report stated that consulting and engineering services were the
second largest market segment with revenues of $1.2 billion, followed by remediation services
at $920 million. A very different breakdown (but still showing transportation as a major mar-
ket segment) is presented in No Quick Recovery for Hazardous Waste, CHEMICAL WK., Jan.
13, 1993, at 26.
995. See, e.g., SEWALL, supra note 401, at 78-87; R. Batta & S.S. Chiu, Optimal Obnox-
ious Paths on a Network: Transportation of Hazardous Materials, 36 OPERATIONS RES. 34
passim (1988); Ram Gopalan et al., Modeling Equity of Risk in the Transportation of Hazard-
ous Materials, 38 OPERATIONS RES. 961 passim (1990); Cerry M. Klein, A Model for the
Transportation of Hazardous Waste, 22 DECISION SCI. 1091 passim (1991).
996. E.g., George F. List et al., Modeling and Analysis for Hazardous Materials Trans-
portation: Risk Analysis, Routing/Scheduling and Facility Location, 25 TRANSP. SC. 100 pas-
sim (1991); George List & Pitu Mirchandani, An Integrated Network/Planar Multiobjective
Model for Routing and Siting for Hazardous Materials and Wastes, 25 TRANSP. SCI. 146 pas-
sim (1991); Charles ReVelle et al., Simultaneous Siting and Routing in the Disposal of Haz-
ardous Wastes, 25 TRANsP. Sci. 138 passim (1991).
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number of assumptions. One of the models, for example, in con-
sidering the optimal location for a LLRW facility in Pennsylvania,
performed three different computer runs, depending on whether a
life is valued at $300,000, $18 million, or $300 million.997 This
modelling literature does not lend itself to a generalization as to
whether, considering transportation risks, centralized or dispersed
HW/RW facilities are better. Moreover, the prior work generally
focuses on just one type of waste at a time, and it does not reflect
the lower transportation risks of a centralized facility that result
from eliminating the need for external shipment of wastes that
would be handled internally, for example, ash or sludge from on-
site treatment units that would go to an on-site landfill.
To a considerable extent, however, the question posed by
transportation risks is moot. The experience of the past fifteen
years shows that, at least under present siting procedures, a large
number of new, dispersed facilities is not an option. The nation
already possesses a large number of old, dispersed facilities, plus a
great deal of "temporary" on-site storage and other substandard
management techniques; finding new sites will, under any scheme,
be sufficiently difficult that a centralized system is likely to be
necessary.
3. Affording Fairness
The third factor in evaluating the proposed siting system is
whether it affords fairness to locations, to classes and races, and to
generations. The national allocation process to be conducted by
the FWDC would be designed to provide a high degree of fairness
between regions and states. When each waste stream is considered
separately, the results are lumpy: a few states bear the burdens
while everyone else gets a free ride. The lumpiness can be elimi-
nated by considering together all the many kinds of hazardous and
radioactive waste. The FWDC would have the task of making sure
that each state bears a fair share of the cumulative national bur-
dens; there should be no clear winners or losers. Any state that
failed to carry its fair load would then be penalized by being
unable to export its HW/RW-a serious penalty, since no state is
self-sufficient in waste disposal.
997. Marcus V. Voth & Warren F. Witzig, Determination of Optimum Alternative Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site/Disposal Technology Combinations, 78 NUCLEAR
TEcH. 312, 318 (1987).
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Within states, some localities would inevitably bear a very
high burden. However, these would be the volunteers. As Mark
Sagoff has written, in the context of the voluntariness of risk,
"[t]here is an ethical difference between jumping and being
pushed-even if the risks and benefits are the same." 998 No one
would be forced to bear a disproportionate risk; dissenting individ-
uals in volunteer communities could move away at no economic
cost. The new facilities would be subject to strict environmental
regulation and local, as well as state and federal, oversight. The
facilities will not be without hazard, but they will still be less risky
than such unpleasant but necessary neighbors as petrochemical
plants, oil refineries, and steel mills, which society has deemed to
pose acceptable risks. There is usually little immoral about
informed consent to risk, unless the consent is obtained under con-
ditions of coercion.
One form of coercion could be a poverty that forces a com-
munity to trade a case of cancer tomorrow for a loaf of bread
today. There is concededly some danger of this under my propo-
sal, but it is not at all clear that the volunteer communities will
have low income profiles. As seen earlier, the chief factors in
whether communities volunteer appear to be cultural rather than
demographic. Many of the municipalities that have offered to
receive HW/RW facilities have had well-educated populations,
although newly hard times, such as the closure of a major
employer, certainly contribute to willingness to accept a facility.999
To the extent that the suggestions made here are followed, the cen-
tralized facilities are likely to be located at old military, nuclear
weapons production or uranium mining sites, which-unlike old
industrial areas-do not tend to be surrounded by minority
communities. oo
Thus, fairness between classes and races would be improved
by the proposed system. The system would aim to close down, and
certainly prevent expansion of, old grandfathered facilities, which
tend to be located in low-income, high-minority areas, and to open
new facilities in places with less skewed demographic profiles.
More fully internalizing the external costs of HW/RW disposal
will tend to reduce the aggregate social costs of disposal (because
it will drive up the price of, and therefore lower the demand for,
waste disposal) and shift the remaining social costs away from
998. SAGOVF, supra note 687, at 46.
999. See supra notes 652-54 and accompanying text.
1000. See MARKUSEN ET AL., supra note 944, at 239-42.
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facility neighbors and toward those that benefit: the shareholders,
employees, suppliers, and consumers of hazardous waste generat-
ing companies. 00 1
Future generations should also benefit significantly from this
proposal. Higher disposal prices would lower HW/RW produc-
tion. The availability of new disposal facilities would divert waste
from temporary storage units to the more permanent new centers
and would encourage permanent rather than containment remedies
at CERCLA sites and other contaminated locations. The HLW
stored in leaking tanks in Hanford and Savannah River could be
properly entombed in the near, rather than distant, future. The use
of already contaminated land would preserve more agricultural and
virgin land for posterity.
1002
Aside from allocative equity, this proposal also offers an
important element of procedural justice. Many activities that cause
a great deal of anguish in large segments of the population are
allowed by the law (such as flag burning, abortion, and marches by
hate groups) or even required (for example, busing to achieve
racial integration). But each of these activities invokes important
constitutional values, at least as the Supreme Court now construes
those values. The forced siting of a hazardous or radioactive waste
facility in an unwilling community causes no less anguish, but it
serves no fundamental constitutional value. As shown throughout
this Article, ramming these dreaded facilities down the throats of
unwilling communities is neither necessary nor effective, and the
power of government should not be invoked in the attempt.
4. Political Viability
Success in finding volunteer communities is necessary to the
success of my proposal. As shown above, many communities have
already volunteered, typically with only minor financial induce-
1001. The demographics of these beneficiaries of hazardous waste generation are
unknown. I am unaware of any studies concerning the income distribution impacts of higher
hazardous waste disposal prices, for example. Such work has been done for the costs of air
pollution and water pollution control. See ELIZABmH E. LAKE Er AL., WHO PAYS FOR CLEAN
WATER? THE DISTRIBUTION OF WATER POLLUrION CONTROL COSTS passim (1979); A.
Myrick Freeman I, The Incidence of the Costs of Controlling Automotive Air Pollution, in
THE DISTRIUnTON OF ECONOMic WELL-BEING 163, 165-67 (F. Thomas Juster ed., 1977).
1002. This is not, of course, a solution for all time. Presumably, after some years, new
waste streams will be created that were not accounted for in the initial national allocation. It is
hoped that, by then, at least one of the volunteer communities would volunteer to accept this
new waste stream; if not, then the federal government would have to step in again. If in the
intervening years the wastes going to one of the states declined, that state might be a prime
candidate for this new stream.
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ments. 10 0 3  If offers of serious compensation were forthcoming,
still more localities with compatible cultures of risk perception
should also come forward. To be appropriate, volunteer areas
would also have to be physically suitable; land that sits atop a pro-
ductive aquifer, for example, would have to be rejected for land
disposal units. Could enough sites be found where both the sociol-
ogy and the geology are suitable? I believe so, but I cannot say for
sure.
This proposal requires the consent of the states as well as the
localities. Here, I am more confident of success. A major reason
for state opposition to locally acceptable waste disposal projects is
the fear of being exploited, being stigmatized, and becoming the
national patsy. A slight variation of a recurring phrase, "nation's
dumping ground," permeates state declarations of opposition to
proposed HW/RW facilities.'0 °4 The national allocations provided
by the FWDC should go a long way toward eliminating that senti-
ment. The map that the newspapers will print the day after the
FWDC announces its proposed allocations will show that every




The task I set at the beginning of this Article was to find a
system of hazardous and radioactive waste management that maxi-
mizes social welfare, takes full account of social and environmen-
1003. See supra notes 721-35 and accompanying text.
1004. See, e.g., National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt.,
910 F.2d 713, 717 n.6 (11th Cir. 1990) (Alabama), modified, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991); Arizona v. Motorola, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 566, 575 (D. Ariz.
1991) (Arizona); Government Suppliers Consol. Servs. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739, 745 (S.D.
Ind. 1990) (Indiana); MARrrZA PECK, How TO SAVE YouR NEIGHBORHOOD, CrrY, OR TowN:
THE SIRRA CLUB GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ORGANIZING 67 (1993) (North Carolina); Carol Pols-
grove, Where Will We Dump the Nuclear Trash?, PROGRmsSIvE, Mar. 1983, at 22 (Texas);
William Poole, Gambling with Tomorrow, SImRRA, SeptJOct. 1992, at 50, 52 (Nevada). In
1990, 13 importing states formed a group, States for Responsible and Equitable Waste Man-
agement, because they were "fired of being the country's hazardous waste dumping grounds."
MAZMAmAN & MORELI, supra note 6, at 139.
1005. On several occasions various mayors of New York City have tried to site simulta-
neously multiple incinerators, homeless shelters, or other unpopular facilities in different com-
munities. The resulting newspaper maps did not achieve community acceptance of these
proposals, and in each case the attempt failed politically. However, that experience differs
greatly from the current proposal. In New York City, the mayor named specific sites, leaving
no choice to the affected communities. Under my proposal, the FWDC would allocate facili-
ties among states; the states would be left to pick sites for the facilities (or to trade allocations
with other states). The New York City experience suggests that central allocation is ineffec-
tive if not accompanied by decentralized site selection and local control.
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tal costs, and still achieves fairness. I believe that my proposed
system of local control, state responsibility, and national allocation
can fulfill this task.
Social welfare would be maximized by reducing waste dispo-
sal requirements to a minimum, primarily through price incentives
and elimination of hidden subsidies for waste generation, and then
determining how much disposal capacity is still required. This
capacity would be allocated between the fifty states, based primar-
ily on how much waste they generate, what disposal facilities they
already have, and their geological and other physical attributes.
Volunteer communities would be sought in each state to handle
that state's allocation. Social and economic costs would be mini-
mized through a sound siting process, and those that remained
would be compensated. The national allocation process would
achieve fairness between states; the search for volunteer communi-
ties would achieve fairness within states; the closure of antiquated
facilities would reduce the disproportionate burden on the poor and
minorities; and the construction of centralized destruction and dis-
posal units, especially on already-contaminated federal land, would
reduce the number of affected neighbors, preserve now-clean land
for posterity, and help relieve future generations of the burden of
caring for our waste.
This system would face many practical, political, and eco-
nomic obstacles, but it is superior to the current regime of impasse,
conflict, fragmentation, and futile attempts at coercion.
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